Securing the Bay: Underseas Cable Security in India’s Bay of Bengal Strategy Introduction.

India’s digital security excessively relies on undersea cable networks that travel through eastern coasts of landing stations like Chennai, Visakhapatnam, Tuticorin, Digha (planning stage) and Andaman and Nicobar Islands (domestic connectivity). These submarine cable hubs are significant strategic points that link India to other parts of the world, mainly to the regions of West Asia, Europe and Southeast Asia via some of the globe’s critical undersea cable network.⁷ From these, significant undersea cables, Bay of Bengal Gateway (BBG) (connects India’s Chennai and Tuticorin to Southeast Asia, Gulf region and later further extend to some parts of Europe indirectly); i2i (India-Singapore) Cable Network (connects India’s Chennai to Singapore and indirect access to other part of Southeast Asia) and SEA-ME-WE 6 (connecting India’s Mumbai and Chennai to South Asia, Southeast Asia, Middle East and Europe).⁸ These linkages are essentially significant for India, as it transports enormous amounts of digital data necessary not just for market-driven goals but also for national security purpose.⁹ They allow military communications, intelligence gathering and data sharing with partner countries, command and control systems, and GPS-based defence system depends on these cables which supports overall military stability.¹⁰ To substantiate this point, in 2020, PM Modi, while inaugurating cable connectivity to Andaman & Nicobar Islands (CANI), highlighted the increasing significance of the region and undersea cables for better connectivity of digital India and fast-paced development of national security.¹¹ Currently, India serves as a hub for seventeen international undersea cables over fourteen different landing stations.¹² According to the latest data provided by the government of India, the total active capacity of these fibre cables is approximately 138.606 Tbps and 111.111 Tbps.¹³

Yet, India’s crucial reliance on specific cable landing points and network systems substantially threatens strategic stability.¹⁴ In contrast to air stations and seaports,  the cable landing stations and undersea cable networks are more sensitive to vulnerable threats. Most cable stations lack strong security protection and operate with limited military supervision, despite their significance in 21st-century high-tech warfare.¹⁵ Without strong digitalised and proper infrastructural safeguards, these landing points and network systems are subjected to several dangers:

Natural Disasters

The BoB region is at significant risk of natural disasters like cyclones, coastal erosion, floods and landslides.¹⁶ The region records an average of five to six cyclones forming in the Bay of Bengal yearly, with rising severity as a result of the changing climate patterns.¹⁷ For instance, 2015, Cyclone Vardah struck India’s eastern coast, particularly places like Chennai and northern Tamil Nadu, resulting in a few deaths.¹⁸ According to the reports given by Bharti Airtel, a private Indian company, along with other privately owned companies like Vodafone, stated that “probably shook the undersea cable network across the Bay of Bengal”, which later affected the internet and telecom services in the eastern part of India.¹⁹ A significant occurrence in the Bay like this might cause devastation to several submarine cables and offshore stations, severing India’s military command-and-control systems, real monitoring data and protected data exchanges. In an emergency or involving a dispute, such damages could harm India’s military coordination and help opponents with a significant strategic edge.

Accidental Maritime Activity

Undersea cables are most often affected by illegal fishing, mechanical dredgers and ship anchors, particularly in coastal waters near landing stations where the undersea cables are more at risk of being threatened.²⁰ According to the reports of the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), internationally, approximately 150-200 cable breakdowns and technical issues are reported yearly, and more than sixty to seventy per cent of these are brought on by commercial maritime operations.²¹ In the case of India, the densely populated Bay of Bengal region, with its heavy naval traffic, faces a vital challenge in protecting a stable environment around the undersea cables, creating a significant vulnerability. For example, as reported by the INDIA TODAY in January 2008, India’s internet connectivity was interrupted due to the damage of two undersea cable networks (Indian-owned FLAG cable and also SEA-ME-WE), which affected internet connectivity near the Mediterranean Sea.²² The damage to the cables was reported due to the anchoring of a ship near the coast off Alexandria, Egypt.

Disruptions due to Cyber-Attacks and Deliberate Sabotage by Non-State Actors

In the current era of digitalised warfare, secure and seamless data transmission is necessary for everything from satellite coordination to cyber defence.

However, submarine cables and offshore landing stations are nonetheless frequently seen as non-military assets, instead of as defence-critical infrastructure. This current viewpoint needs to change. These cables now form part of India’s core military infrastructure and should be protected with the same urgency as ports, airbases, or surveillance networks. With increasing risks, spanning from cyberattacks to intentional sabotage by state and non-state actors, overlooking their strategic significance is no longer viable.²³

Over the past few years, non-state actors spanning from militant groups to structured criminal networks, have in most instances tried to destroy the undersea cable network and offshore cable hubs to interrupt strategic information operations without claiming responsibility. The attackers often try to cut the cable using submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles. Recently, in 2024,  Asia-Africa-Europe-1, Europe India Gateway (EIG) cable networks in Red Sea-Western Ocean were disrupted most probably due to the actions of extremists Houthi group ²⁴and in the year 2013 attacks by non-state actors in SEA-ME-WE 4 submarine cable (in Egypt)²⁵ highlighted the issue that undersea cable networks are no more mere infrastructure; they have become immediate targets in geostrategic disputes, hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks.

Emerging Threat: China Factor

Apart from non-state actors, geopolitical competition between States has increased at a higher rate, which persistently risks national security and digital infrastructures in the era of digitalised warfare. According to the reports of Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2024, the overdependence on Chinese private companies of China for repairing and servicing of undersea cables gives access to espionage of governments to access highly sensitive military data of other states and also acquire knowledge on confidential data on location that would allow countries to damage cables and landing stations with efficiently and accurately.²⁶

Chinese footprints have increased in the BoB region and across Indo-Pacific recently for its economic and geostrategic interests. For instance, China has launched China-Myanmar International terrestrial and submarine cable network (2014), which links China’s Yunnan region to the BoB via Myanmar²⁷, resulting in both advantages and challenges for regional stability and balance of power in the region. Moreover, Chinese company like Huawei Merin has shown interests in Bangladesh’s Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company Limited (BSCCL) programs, particularly in the context of the SEA-ME-WE 6 submarine cable initiatives²⁸, raising concerns over surveillance vulnerabilities in BoB region. 

Latest findings provided by ORF India (2024) argues that China’s developing Digital Silk Road investments is growingly rapidly in India’s neighbourhood countries particularly in Sri Lanka (300 US$ millions); Thailand (1900 US$

millions); Bangladesh (1,130 US$ millions) and Myanmar (339 US$ millions).²⁹ Chinese private companies like HMN Technologies have been engaged in supporting and developing undersea cables across the Indo-Pacific region, voicing worries regarding possible unauthorised monitoring and supervision.³⁰ As significant numbers of India’s east-coast cables links through landing stations in Cox’s Bazar (Bangladesh), Matara (Sri Lanka) and Ngwe Saung (Myanmar), there is an increasing insecurity persisting that Chinese participation in the region could misuse these stations or cut the cables during an emergency, either interrupt India’s internet communications or evaluate its sensitive data and information. In a potential conflict, a deliberate attack- either hybrid/physical on offshore undersea cable stations or network systems- might devastate India’s defence command and national security. This developing Chinese digital presence signals a new frontier of digital contestation in the BoB region, which confronts India’s geostrategic domain and could result in prolonged reliance for immediate neighbourhood States on China.