Abstract
The use of improvised explosive device (IED) warfare by Maoists is examined in this issue brief as a persistent and evolving threat to India’s internal security situation. It contends that the employment of IEDs by Maoists has changed from simple pressure-activated devices to more tactical and adaptable techniques such as command-wire, remote-controlled, buried anti-vehicle, and fragmentation-enhanced devices. Insurgents can target predictable movement patterns, take advantage of geography, and cause disproportionate deaths at a minimal cost. This issue brief traces the evolution and the operational reasoning for Maoist dependence on IEDs, and thus the issue is placed within broader trends of left-wing extremism in India. The state’s counter-IED response, including route-opening procedures, specialised units, forensic attribution, intelligence sharing, and institutional changes like the Institute of IED Management (IIEM), the National Security Guard’s National IED Data Management System (NIDMS), and the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), is also evaluated. But it discovers that enduring gaps still exist in forensic consistency, intelligence verification, interagency cooperation, and HUMINT sustainability. In order to lessen the effectiveness of Maoist IEDs and improve internal security, the brief concludes that India needs a more comprehensive and proactive counter-IED doctrine that integrates operational discipline, technological competence, forensic support, and community-based intelligence.
