Deciphering Emerging Chinese Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Footprints under the Cloak of Global Development Initiative (GDI)

Post 2013, BRI has become a key platform for leveraging diverse Chinese Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities globally. Under the guise of the BRI, Chinese HUMINT operations target a wide range of individuals, including political leaders, bureaucrats, military personnel, business figures, civil society, pressure groups, journalists, media outlets, academics, students, researchers, diasporas, policymakers, think tanks, and film industry. The BRI and intelligence operations had worked in tandem: the BRI serves as a platform for intelligence collection, while intelligence and influence campaigns are used to mitigate criticism of BRI projects.²⁴ The following paragraphs highlight the envisaged shift of Chinese HUMINT operations from the declining BRI to the evolving GDI, by its intelligence agencies to advance future global dominance goals.

Chinese global construction efforts under the BRI have frequently resulted in an increased Chinese civil/military presence abroad and the permanent settlement of Chinese nationals for training and development, often on their terms through the purchase / leasing of land for People Liberation Army (PLA) bases, Chinese colonies, or agricultural projects. In response to rising attacks on Chinese personnel and assets, there has been a significant uptick in the use of Chinese security contractors to safeguard citizens and property overseas. The deployment of PLA and police forces is anticipated in unstable regions, particularly in Asia and Africa, which will inevitably enhance China’s HUMINT capabilities in these territories.

China’s 2015 and 2019 Defence White Papers emphasised the need for far seas protection to safeguard its overseas interests and establish itself as a global power.²⁵ In 2015, China enacted a controversial counter-terrorism law that authorised its armed forces to conduct operations abroad, directing the PLA to explore options for protecting these overseas interests. In June 2022, Xi Jinping signed new regulations for “non-war” military operations, enabling the Chinese military to carry out “special military operations” overseas. The new law requires communication companies to cooperate with security agencies. ²⁶ Agreements for intelligence sharing, joint military or police training, and arms supply with foreign forces are crucial for conducting operations on foreign soil. Following the launch of the BRI, China has already formed such arrangements through frameworks like the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) in Counter-Terrorism²⁷, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)²⁸, and various bilateral agreements with South Asian countries, including Nepal,²⁹ Pakistan,³⁰ Afghanistan,³¹and Bangladesh³². The GDI, like the BRI, is anticipated to use international and bilateral partnerships to advance intelligence operations under the guise of development. Through numerous multilateral projects and agreements under GDI, China will gain access and influence in partner countries, position operatives within roles in development, technology, and aid. China’s extensive bilateral ties for intelligence-sharing and collaboration under BRI could be replicated under GDI, granting deeper access to sensitive networks and infrastructure. This overlap between development and intelligence will allow China to leverage these platforms for information gathering, influence, and operational footholds in strategic regions.

With the construction of naval infrastructure at Gwadar Port and defence factories in Pakistan, under CPEC, the BRI project has already taken a military turn. A military dimension is further consolidated through law wherein China has pushed for civil-military integration by constructing dual-use (commercial and military) overseas infrastructure projects in BRI. In future, GDI is also expected to further reinforce PLA and HUMINT capability to be operated abroad through Military Civil Fusion (MCF) under the garb of development. MCF aims to enable China to become an economic, technological, and military superpower by fusing the country’s military and civilian industrial and Science & Technology resources. The PLA also uses military diplomacy through the MCF to gather intelligence, learn new skills, benchmark PLA capabilities, and build interoperability with foreign partners.³³ 

China’s global diaspora, estimated at around 60 million people across more than 150 countries, plays a vital role in supporting the BRI. Their local knowledge and business expertise have been essential in furthering China’s national development goals. Officials now see the diaspora as crucial not only for technological advancements through multinational collaborations but also as key contributors to broader geo-economic ambitions. Chinese communities along BRI routes act as guides, intermediaries, and active participants, utilising their deep understanding of local conditions. In 2016, China began hosting annual conferences for overseas Chinese involved in the BRI,³⁴ and similar initiatives are anticipated for the GDI in the future.

In consonance with the “thousand grains of sand” approach, Chinese intelligence agencies are heavily involved in both inbound and outbound education for intelligence gathering. US intelligence has warned that China employs student spies to steal secrets.³⁵ Leaked documents reveal that Chinese authorities utilise students in the BRI through the United Front Work Department (UFWD), which oversees 42 local organisations and 220,000 members abroad.³⁶ The UFWD uses scholarships to attract international students and send Chinese students abroad, while groups like the Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA) help recruit party members and monitor overseas students, causing many to self-censor for fear of losing scholarships or facing harassment. China also fosters relationships with educators and young leaders through funded trips and free Mandarin teachers for establishing informant networks to monitor students abroad. China’s educational diplomacy aligns closely with the BRI, providing scholarships and funding to universities in BRI countries, which helps counter its criticism. Significant aid has been directed toward attracting foreign students, particularly from Asia and Africa; in fact, two-thirds of international students in China came from BRI nations, and 61% of government scholarships in 2016 were awarded to these students. Among the ten countries receiving the most Chinese government scholarships that year, eight were BRI partners. ³⁷ Initiatives like the Silk Road School at Renmin University, enrolling students from BRI countries, further reflect this focus.³⁸ As the largest exporter of students, China wields considerable influence in European universities also, where Chinese students made up 22% of international students in 2019, contributing $4 billion. A recall of these students could severely impact European higher education.³⁹ According to a HCOAMS report, the US Department of Education lacks a coherent strategy to protect American and Chinese students from harassment and suppression by CCP-affiliated groups, such as Confucius Institutes (CIs) and CSSA.⁴⁰

The cultural institutions too have reportedly been utilised alongside the BRI to connect with Chinese students studying abroad, and their seemingly benign activities have played a significant role in China’s emergence as the world’s second-largest economy. The rapid growth of CIs, and Confucius Classrooms (CCs) from 2004 to 2018, followed by some closures in European countries and US due to intelligence concerns.⁴¹ As per Chinese Ministry of Education 2019 report, of the more than 525 CIs and more than 1113 CCs around the world, 154 CIs and 149 CCs are located in 54 BRI countries⁴²and most of them were established after the BRI’s launch in 2013, with no reports of closures in BRI nations. By end of 2023, the number reduced to 496 CI and 757 CC in over 160 countries.⁴³ Other cultural institutions like the CSSA⁴⁴ and the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC)⁴⁵ are also actively involved in conduct of covert intelligence operations under the guise of cultural events and educational programs.

With shifting Chinese focus from BRI to GDI, China is expected to transition its unique HUMINT strategy from BRI platform to GDI platform. Through the GDI, China can establish educational and cultural institutions, ostensibly aimed at promoting cultural exchange and development. However, these institutions can also serve as discreet platforms for intelligence gathering, recruitment, and influence-building, particularly by fostering ties with students, academics, and policymakers. By embedding its initiatives within community projects and local partnerships, China gains structured access to local networks and key figures, enhancing its ability to gather intelligence and shape perceptions. As the GDI extends across Africa, Latin America, and Asia, China can leverage these channels to strengthen its diplomatic reach while discreetly building HUMINT networks that support its strategic interests.

According to the report “The Road Ahead: Cyber Security in 2020 and Beyond,” recent cyber espionage associated with the BRI has targeted various sectors, including government, transportation, energy, defence, space, media, and telecommunications. The GDI also includes numerous small projects aimed at poverty alleviation, food security, pandemic response, vaccines development, financing, climate change, sustainable development, industrialisation, and digital connectivity,⁴⁶ which are directly or indirectly linked to the sectors targeted by the BRI. Evidence of the GDI’s growth in India’s vicinity is reflected in the 2023 GDI Progress Report by CIKD, which highlights China’s expanding influence during post-COVID recovery assistance in Nepal and Pakistan,  the Smiling Children Feeding Program in Nepal,  pest monitoring in Bangladesh and Pakistan,  and renewable energy technology transfers to Sri Lanka, disbursement of a number of agricultural quality upgrading projects to Sri Lanka and “small but beautiful” projects that focus on rural poverty reduction, youth education and women vocational training in Pakistan since 2022.⁴⁷

China has emerged as a highly effective UN player wherein it has successfully advanced its agenda and deflected objectionable proposals from others. Chinese effectiveness and assertiveness in UN forums can be observed in its ability to shape policies, utilise organisations to further its interest. Tangibly, China has exploited the UN structure for elevating its status by strategically placing its nationals/proxies in key UN positions, providing substantial funding, initiating developmental programs/initiatives, and transforming organisations aligned with its interests.⁴⁸ A recent report by the HCOAMS dated October 24, 2024, reveals that the CCP has co-opted international institutions like the UN and WHO, often neglecting its commitments. This influence is bolstered by CCP-affiliated leaders prioritising CCP loyalty over organisational responsibilities. Mr. Bethel’s testimony highlighted China’s substantial impact on global standards, particularly through support for telecom companies Huawei and ZTE, viewed by the US as national security threats.⁴⁹ China also strategically places its skilled nationals in lower roles within multilateral bodies, using an ‘A Team’ approach to promote its interests.⁵⁰ It expands its influence through strategic funding, capitalising on the UN’s dependence on its contributions. Noteworthy initiatives include exclusive support for the UN Global Geospatial Knowledge and Innovation Centre and a $1 billion pledge for the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund.⁵¹ Evidence suggests China may impose conditions on its donations, including restrictions on funds for states with ties to Taiwan.⁵² Chinese diplomats have held the position of Under-Secretary-General of the UN DESA since 2007, enabling China to shape UN development programs.⁵³ Additionally, China has exploited the Interpol ‘Red Notice’ system to repatriate fugitives and has attempted to identify individuals seeking to speak out against its human rights abuses.⁵⁴

China operates a global network of programs, including Fox Hunt, Overseas Police Stations, Overseas Chinese Assistance Centers, and extraterritorial “black sites,” aimed at repatriating or silencing dissidents, critics, and Chinese nationals abroad. Initiated in 2014 by President Xi, Fox Hunt operation targets individuals labelled as economic fugitives but mainly pursue political opponents and activists overseas, with FBI Director Christopher Wray noting its focus on stifling dissent. Reports claim around 10,000 individuals have been compelled to return to China, including some from the U.S. ⁵⁵  Additionally, from 2016 to 2022, Chinese public security bureaus established 102 Overseas Police Stations across 53 countries, leading to investigations in countries like the US, UK, Canada, the Netherlands, and other nations due to concerns over interference and intimidation. ⁵⁶ These “Police Service Centers,” linked to local Chinese associations and the CCP, serve as a global surveillance network. ⁵⁷ Between April 2021 and July 2022, China claims to have “persuaded” 230,000 nationals to return for prosecution. ⁵⁸ Several Overseas Chinese Assistance Centers worldwide are also reportedly involved in espionage, suppressing dissent, and identifying pro-democracy Chinese expatriates, in addition to their stated mission of supporting the diaspora. Though distinct from Chinese Police Stations, both entities share overlapping roles and tactics.⁵⁹ China is also accused of operating an extraterritorial “black site” in Dubai for detaining dissidents, corruption suspects, and ethnic minorities like Tibetans and Uyghurs. ⁶⁰ BBC Newsnight has documented cases of exiled Uyghur students and pilgrims being targeted in countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, in coordination with Chinese authorities.⁶¹ Although a direct link between the BRI and China’s global network for repatriation and intimidation has not been formally reported, the BRI’s expanding reach has created fertile ground for such operations. As Chinese influence grows in developing and underdeveloped nations, particularly through BRI and the GDI, the HUMINT/ISR activities by organisations linked to these initiatives are increasingly plausible.

Most of China’s global operations such as “Fox Hunt,” and Overseas Police Stations have been reported primarily in Europe/North American countries where significant Chinese populations and diasporas reside. However, as China’s presence and influence expand in developing and underdeveloped regions, there is an increased likelihood that such activities may spread to these new areas as well. The growing Chinese footprint in these regions provides opportunities for expanded intelligence operations under various guises, from diaspora support to cultural outreach. Platforms like Sister City agreements and other formalised partnerships also warrant scrutiny as potential avenues for Chinese intelligence activities. These arrangements foster consistent cross-border exchanges, which may serve as conduits for HUMINT operations or other forms of influence in host countries.

China launched the concept of sister cities, or “City Diplomacy,” in 1973 to foster people-to-people connections between Chinese cities and those in other countries. Following Xi Jinping’s ascent to the presidency and the introduction of the BRI in 2013, agreements between Chinese cities and cities in BRI countries surged. In 2018, over 700 of approximately 2,600 sister city partnerships are within BRI regions.⁶²Although no direct link has been confirmed between the Sister City concept and Chinese HUMINT operations, the structure of these arrangements offers elements that could potentially support such activities. Sister City partnerships provide regular, formal channels for engagement, allowing for exchanges of personnel, information, and resources between Chinese cities and their foreign counterparts. These connections create opportunities for building relationships with local stakeholders, accessing valuable information, and establishing long-term networks. Given China’s track record of leveraging cultural, economic and diplomatic platforms for intelligence gathering, the possibility of using Sister City agreements as vehicles for HUMINT operations in developing and underdeveloped countries, under GDI, cannot be discounted. With China’s modus operandi of extensively utilising non-conventional platforms, monitoring these less conspicuous yet pervasive channels could be critical in identifying and understanding its evolving HUMINT networks and strategies worldwide.

Like the BRI, the GDI may leverage its small-scale projects to establish new hubs for covert intelligence activities. Under the guise of advancing local development goals such as poverty alleviation, food security, pandemic response, sustainable industrialisation, and digital connectivity, the GDI can discreetly support intelligence gathering. By engaging in community-based projects and infrastructure improvements, the GDI can also cultivate relationships with key local stakeholders, gather information, and monitor local dynamics. This subtle expansion of China’s human footprint worldwide not only advances development aims but also strengthens its global intelligence capabilities, supporting broader strategic objectives.

The Chinese economy is currently facing challenges such as rising debt, an oversaturated property sector, and slowing growth prospects. Under Xi Jinping, political power has become centralised, leading to a less predictable and more ideologically driven policymaking process. Xi’s shift from the traditional “reform and opening up” strategy, which encouraged private enterprise and global integration, towards increased state control and import substitution could hinder economic growth and efficiency. His adversarial approach toward the US has also strained the international environment that previously supported China’s economic progress, jeopardising vital investment and technology flows. A faltering economy would undermine Beijing’s ambitions for global influence and its ability to present its political and economic system as a superior model for solving global issues.⁶³  Furthermore, democracy remains highly appealing in the Global South, where many developing nations have experiences with representative government and may not align with China’s authoritarian values.