




CENJOWS

WEB ARTICLE

# CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: ROLE IN STRATEGIC THINKING IN INDIA

RISHI ATHREYA

# CENTRE FOR JOINT WARFARE STUDIES



## CENJOWS

### CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: ROLE IN STRATEGIC THINKING IN INDIA



**Rishi Athreya** is Head of Strategic Studies at Indus International Research Foundation. He is a widely published author and editor who has written on governance, diplomacy and security.

India has developed strategic thinking since its Independence. Strategic Thinking is often attributed to political party ideology. However, this view is not necessarily valid. This paper posits that there is an underlying common thread through the decades. Both civilian and military practitioners and scholars have influenced such thoughts. Think tanks inside and outside the government have played a key role in developing strategic thinking.

The importance of think tanks has been a recurrent theme in the articles published in the **Synergy** journal of CENJOWS. Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain mentions that the think tank culture has entered India in a big way and the need to interact with other domains<sup>1</sup>. Lt Gen P.R. Kumar mentions the excessive influence of civilian bureaucracy and accentuates the need for think tanks in policy-making<sup>2</sup>. Lt Gen Atulya Solankey highlights the think tanks' role in Professional Military Education and for strategic training at the highest level for officers with over 25 years of experience<sup>3</sup>. Air Cmdre Tara Chand recommends consultations by governments with think tanks<sup>4</sup>.

**Rooks and Knights**, published by CENJOWS, is India's only book on CMR written by a scholar located in India<sup>5</sup>. **Army and Nation** is by Dr Steve I. Wilkinson an American scholar<sup>6</sup>. **The Absent Dialogue** is by Dr Anit Mukherjee and Indian scholar based at USA and Singapore<sup>7</sup>.

## Schools of Thought

Strategic thinking in India has evolved since Independence. A review of strategic thinking in India, made in a volume published in 2014, identified six primary schools of thought. These three major schools are Nehruvianism, Neoliberalism and Hyperrealism, and the three minor schools are Marxism, Hindu nationalism or Hindutva, and Gandhianism<sup>8</sup>. A CENJOWS paper identifies three main IR theoretical perspectives prevalent in India, i.e. Realism, Constructivism and Liberalism<sup>9</sup>.

**Realists:** Many leading Indian authors have studied Foreign Policy from a realist perspective. This is seen both in works by scholars and practitioners<sup>10</sup>. Dr David Brewster also holds the view of the dominance of Realism in India's thinking<sup>11</sup>. Indian Foreign Policy has the concept of Strategic Autonomy<sup>12</sup>. Experts see this position as a natural continuation of the erstwhile Non-Alignment<sup>13</sup>.

**Neoliberals:** This view gives primacy to economics and trade. They are inspired by market economics and the extraordinary explosion in trade, investment, and the diffusion of technology, putting their faith in economics and commerce and a mercantilist approach to external relations<sup>14</sup>.

**Constructivists:** There is a view that India's post-colonial identity defines its nationhood. This view draws on India's early prominence in the 1950s. It considers material power one route to global stature<sup>15</sup>. A principal element of this is the Nehruvian view<sup>16</sup>. Gandhian views, too, contribute to the long-term pacifist views in India. As long ago as 2010, Dr Ladwig asked, Will the land of Gandhi become a great conventional power?<sup>17</sup>.

**Hindutva:** One issue that often gets raised is the role of Hindu nationalists or Hindutva thinking in India's Foreign Policy. Some scholars consider Hindutva a branch of Realism<sup>18</sup>. Some Constructivists necessarily link the BJP Government and NDA to increased militarism and attribute this to the ideology of Hindutva<sup>19</sup>. Dr Ian Hall attribute the strong response of India to Pakistan in the Balakot Air Strikes of 26 February 2019 to the Hindutva ideology of the ruling BJP<sup>20</sup>. According to Dr Ian Hall, the BJP introduced Hindutva principles into foreign policy primarily for electoral gain. However, he, too, concludes that there is no substantial change in hitherto pursued foreign policies since Narendra Modi took power in 2014<sup>21</sup>. A converse view is that Hinduism is a pacifist religion and propagates Ahimsa or non violence and led to India being idealist in it's approach. This Idealist view is also linked to the Nehruvian position of foreign policy<sup>22</sup>.

**Theoretical Consensus:** India has long followed Modified Structuralism a combination of Realism and Idealism<sup>23</sup>. Vice Admiral Chauhan<sup>24</sup> believes there is a need to blend the three IR mentioned above theoretical streams prevalent in India<sup>25</sup>. The foreign policy is seen as shades of grey rather than black and white<sup>26</sup>.

The liberation of Goa is seen as initiating the shift from the earlier "Idealist" to the current "Realist" position.<sup>27</sup> However, this is seen as a gradual process. Some authors believe there has yet to be a radical shift from idealism to Realism. The doyen of contemporary strategic thinking in India, K. Subrahmanyam believed that non-alignment itself was a pragmatic position<sup>28</sup>. The Indo-Pak War of 1971 is seen as a watershed regarding the growth of strategic thinking. India's strategic community led by K. Subrahmanyam made hawkish pronouncements that guided India's war efforts<sup>29</sup>. These would be significant since he would later head the Kargil Review Committee that recommended greater Integrated and Joint Defence, including the CDS' post<sup>30</sup>.

Some authors describe Indian Foreign Policy as Pragmatism but see it as a move from Idealism to Realism<sup>31</sup>. Other writers, talk of so-called doctrines that are attributable to politicians<sup>32</sup>. These are often vague and not created by scholarly rigour or official policy. As long ago as 2009, before the BJP came to power, earlier writers too talked of Pragmatism in India's Foreign Policy<sup>33</sup>. This once again raises the question of whether political parties necessarily have revolutionary influence on foreign policy.

### **Non-Political Governance**

India has a strong tradition of civil service and bureaucracy. They have generally been seen to be apolitical. The armed forces, too, have been seen to be apolitical and under civilian control. Dr Ian Hall has mentioned the influence of the bureaucracy on India's Foreign Policy. These have been a major factor in forming foreign policy.

**Yes Minister:** The appointment of Dr S. Jaishankar as Foreign Secretary<sup>34</sup> in 2014 was seen as enhancing Realism<sup>35</sup>. This view has been vindicated since after retiring from bureaucracy, Dr Jaishankar was appointed Minister for External Affairs<sup>36</sup> in the second Narendra Modi-led BJP Government. Interestingly, irrespective of his views on Hindutva, Dr Hall also considers the then Foreign Secretary, Dr Jaishankar, pivotal in Foreign Policy<sup>37</sup>. Dr Jaishankar is a curious case of Sir Humphrey Appleby taking over the post of the Rt Hon James Hacker. Dr S. Jaishankar considers the end of the Cold War and the opening of the United States of America to be a watershed that brought together Realists in India<sup>38, 39</sup>.

**IDSA:** The Late K. Subrahmanyam was the founder-Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses<sup>40</sup> (IDSA). As aforementioned, he is a long-term presence in strategic thinking in India. He has mentored many IR practitioners and scholars in India<sup>41, 42</sup>. The first nuclear Doctrine was drafted by K. Subrahmanyam. Dr S. Jaishankar is his son and is seen as the intellectual heir. This was highlighted at the Second Annual K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture. Dr Jaishankar and his son Dhruva<sup>43</sup> were described as chips off the old block. India is stated as following the K. Subrahmanyam Method<sup>44</sup>.

The second director of IDSA was Air Cmdre Jasjit Singh. His fourteen-year tenure has been profiled in a biographical article by Dr Manpreet Sethi. The first service-specific think tank, the Centre for Air Power Studies, was established under his tutelage<sup>45</sup>.

**ICWA:** The Indian Council for World Affairs was set up in 1943 in Sapru House, New Delhi<sup>46</sup>. The ICWA is governed by an Act of Parliament and is directly under the Ministry of External Affairs<sup>47</sup>. Scholars are working on several work streams. There are MOUs with several institutions across India<sup>48</sup>. These include academic institutions and government and private think tanks. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that the outreach of ICWA to civilian scholars has been limited.

### **Indian Military Doctrines**

A review of the entire gamut of previous scholarly work shows that there has not been much active engagement with Indian military doctrines. India has not drafted a White Paper on Defence Strategy.<sup>49</sup> Thus, Military Doctrines provide the best source of strategic thinking. The first Doctrine adopted in India was the Nuclear Doctrine of 2003<sup>50</sup>. This was under the first BJP government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee after all three forces, and joint doctrines released several doctrines.

The Congress under Dr Manmohan Singh had a ten-year reign from May 2004 to May 2014. This period saw the promulgation of military doctrines of all three branches of the armed forces, and the joint forces adopted Doctrine.

The BJP had been in power for only six years in 2004. These would not have continued if their policies had not been sufficiently accepted by the permanent civil service and the military. However, it continues to be honoured by all governments. This was possible because the bureaucracy, businesses, and economists were in broad concurrence. This is akin to post-1991 economic liberalisation commenced by the Congress Government that have cross party consensus. There has been a common thread across political parties in India's foreign policy including continuing a nuclear programme and deterrence towards external threats<sup>51</sup>. As long ago as 2010 it was believed that the doctrines of all three forces and the joint Doctrines were already a move towards power projection<sup>52</sup>.

Apart from the political class, there is certain hawkish thinking among the Indian foreign policy elite. This view is converse to that of Dr Hall, where he gives primacy to the political party Hindutva ideology of the BJP.

The BJP under Narendra Modi has been in power since May 2016. There have been several follow-up doctrines. There are similarities in all doctrines, irrespective of the party in power. The following are the main doctrines of the armed services in India:

**Army:** The Indian Army has a Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Under this is the Deputy Chief of Staff (Planning and Systems). Under it is the Directorate-General of Perspective Planning<sup>53</sup>. Army Training Command (ARTRAC) at Shimla is responsible for doctrinal formulations<sup>54</sup>. It published a journal titled *Pinnacle*, although it is not very widely circulated. Only the past two issues are available online<sup>55</sup>.

In October 2004, the Cold Start Doctrine of the Indian Army was released. It has taken several realist positions on border disputes, terrorism, nuclear weapons and grey-zone warfare<sup>56</sup>. The Indian Army released a second doctrine in 2018<sup>57</sup>.

**Navy:** The Indian Navy has a Chief of Naval Staff (CNS). The Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation (DSCT) directly under the CNS. The Indian Navy has several doctrinal other bodies, including the Flag Officer Doctrines and Concepts (FODC), the Maritime Doctrines and Concepts Centre (MDCC) at Mumbai and the Indian Naval Strategic and Operational Council (INSOC) in New Delhi. The MDCC drafted the *Indian Maritime Doctrine* 2015<sup>58</sup> and the DSCT drafted the *Indian Maritime Strategy* 2016<sup>59</sup>.

The Indian Navy released the first Doctrine in 2009. In 2007, Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy was released<sup>60</sup>. A second version of the Indian Maritime Doctrine was released in 2016. In the same year, a Maritime Strategy Paper was also released<sup>61</sup>. Dr Ladwig considers this maritime strategy to be an early example of power projection<sup>62</sup>.

One major weakness in India's military strategy was the priority of land warfare over maritime security<sup>63</sup>. Starting with the decade of the 2004 to 2014 there has been increased importance to maritime power<sup>64</sup>. Dr David Brewster as long ago as 2010, was farsighted in mentioning the possible role of the Indian Coast Guard in a constabulary-related diplomatic role<sup>65</sup>. This has been noted in recent years<sup>66</sup>.

As can be noted, these observations were made during the second tenure of Dr Manmohan Singh. The growth of India as a maritime power was much in progress, irrespective of the political party in power.

**Air Force:** The Chief of Air Staff heads the Indian Air Force. The 2012 doctrine was published by the Air War Strategy Cell in the IAF Headquarters<sup>67</sup>. The College of Air Warfare besides being a training establishment also has a doctrinal role<sup>68</sup>.

This 2012 Doctrine talks of democracy, secularism, and peaceful coexistence as India's core values. The conclusion chapter mentions that a defensive strategy may be politically and economically attractive in a democracy. However, given that an adversary may have an offensive strategy, there is a need for an effective air force. It states that the IAF is on its way to becoming a lethal force. In effect, even this Doctrine shows a move from idealism to Realism<sup>69</sup>.

The air strike at Balakot is an example of the execution of air power. These can be seen as implementation within the scope of the 2012 doctrine<sup>70</sup>. At a seminar organised by CAPS to mark the first anniversary of Balakot, Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said that these strikes changed the impression that India did not adequately respond to terrorism. Also, that strikes served to rewrite manuals for cross-border strikes. Further hybrid warfare and terror continued to be challenges from Pakistan<sup>71</sup>. Speaking at the same seminar, the Chief of Air Staff mentioned that the taboo on using Air Power in sub-conventional warfare had been broken. He commended the higher leadership in this regard<sup>72</sup>. In terms of Civil-Military relations this shows the Concordance theory as has been seen in India<sup>73</sup>. The use of air power does however have continued operational challenges<sup>74</sup>.

**Joint Doctrine:** The IDS has a DCIDS Doctrine Organisation and Training Branch<sup>75</sup>. Within this branch, a Directorate of Doctrine has drafted the *Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces*<sup>76</sup>. There is, besides the DCIDS Policy Planning and Force Development, which is in charge of Professional Military Education<sup>77</sup>. The outgoing incumbent of this post is being quoted in this paper. The first Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces was released in 2006. The second Joint Doctrine of the Armed Forces was released in 2017<sup>78</sup>. This is seen as a step towards collaboration across the armed forces<sup>79</sup>.

### **Military Think Tanks**

A point that scholars should have noticed is the presence of think tanks for each of the three armed forces and one for the joint forces. All of these were created after 2000. The armed forces have institutional structures for the formulation of doctrines. Besides, there are dedicated think tanks for all the forces. Many serving and retired Army, Navy and Air Force officers are active in these think tanks. Many serving officers are deputed to think tanks and serve therein while receiving emoluments from their service. Even serving officers in holding such posts do not wear their uniform. There are also civilian staff in these think tanks. They have a role in Professional Military Education<sup>80</sup>. There is also a doctrinal role for these think tanks.

**CLAWS:** The *Centre for Land Warfare Studies*<sup>81</sup>, an independent think tank, operates under the Directorate-General of Perspective Planning<sup>82</sup>. Thus, the think tank and doctrinal branches are separate. This encourages intellectual discourse. CLAWS was established on 14 January 2004. The founder director was Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi. The second director was Brig Gurmeet Kanwal. He, too, was influential in strategic circles.

**NMF:** There is Navy-supported think-tank, the *National Maritime Foundation*<sup>83</sup> was created in 2005. Vice Admiral K.K. Nayyar, a retired naval officer was the founder Director<sup>84</sup>. There is an endowment by his family in his name at the NMF<sup>85</sup>. This has operations in Chennai along with *Chennai Centre for China Studies*<sup>86</sup> (C3S). Cmde R.S. Vasan is Regional Director of NMF and Director General C3S<sup>87</sup>.

**CAPS:** There is IAF-supported think-tank *Centre for Air Power Studies*. CAPS was created in 2001 under the tutelage of Air Cmde Jasjit Singh<sup>88</sup>. This was the first service-specific think tank.

**CENJOWS:** There is also an IDS-supported think-tank called the *Centre for Joint Warfare Studies*<sup>89</sup>. It was founded on 24 August 2007. The founder director was Lt Gen Amarjeet Singh Kalkat. Between 2016 to 2021, Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia was Director, and the think tank has grown in stature.

**USI: United Services Institution (USI)** too is a colonial-era institution set up in 1870<sup>90</sup>. Until 1952 it was based in Shimla. In 1986 USI got its building<sup>91</sup>. Currently, it undertakes research and offers many Staff Courses. There is also training for the

United Nations. USI, too, is under the HQ IDS<sup>92</sup>. USI faces shortages of funds and has been requesting CDS, DRDO, MoD, MEA and other government bodies<sup>93</sup>.

### Private Civilian Think Tanks

Politicians and bureaucrats apart, International Relations scholars have had a vital role. Think tanks best exemplify these. Dr Ian Hall mentions the role of think tanks in foreign Policy in India<sup>94</sup>. He explicitly cites **Observer Research Foundation** (ORF<sup>95</sup>) and Brookings India, now **Centre for Social and Economic Progress**<sup>96</sup>.

The BJP, for its share, has created several think tanks aligned with the Sangh Parivar. These include the **Vivekananda International Foundation** (VIF<sup>97</sup>) VIF, created in 2009 and the **India Foundation**, created in 2011. As Dr Hall highlights India Foundation is run in tandem by Ram Madhav and Ajit Doval's son Shaurya Doval. Ajit Doval a retired officer of the *Indian Police Service* and head of the *Intelligence Bureau*, himself was earlier with the VIF. Currently he is the *National Security Adviser* with a Cabinet Rank. Dr Hall believes these have significantly impacted foreign and defence policy<sup>98</sup>. It is feared that time-honoured think tanks like ICWA and IDSA are being sidelined<sup>99</sup>. This view is partly flawed given overlapping personnel. As noted, V Adm K.K. Nayyar was instrumental in establishing NMF, VIF and ORF<sup>100</sup>.

### Logistical Issues

While there has been the growth of both government and private think tanks, these continue to be plagued by several issues:

**Location:** The early think tanks of USI, ICWA and IDSA are naturally in the national capital. The military think tanks are all based in Delhi. Private think tanks are concentrated in New Delhi, although there is a presence outside. ORF, the premier think tank, has chapters in Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai. Other private think tanks include **Gateway House**<sup>101</sup> in Mumbai, **Takshashila Institution, Asia Centre Bangalore** (ACB)<sup>102</sup> in Bangalore, C3S<sup>103</sup>, and **CASS Pune**<sup>104</sup>. The Chairman ACB, Amb C.V. Ranganathan is quoted in this paper. The Director V Adm R.N. Ganesh too is a leading strategic scholar<sup>105</sup>.

More recent examples of newly emerging think tanks include **Indus International Research Foundation**<sup>106</sup>, **STRIVE India**<sup>107</sup>, and **CASA Forum**<sup>108</sup>. These are still in the early days. Their personnel are leading experts who write for major think tanks, including CENJOWS.

There are suggestions for these think tanks to have chapters outside Delhi. Currently, NMF has a Chennai Chapter. There may be a case to open new think tanks in locations outside the National Capital. There are already training establishments for the three forces and IDS across India. These could be used to base one or more think tanks. This will be akin to the current arrangement where the respective services provide logistic support to their think tanks. Regarding CMR, there will be a greater opportunity for practitioners and scholars across India to contribute to strategic



thinking. Specifically, a greater presence in Peninsular India will reduce sea blindness noted hitherto.

**Funding:** A major issue with think tanks is funding. Lt Gen PR Kumar mentions that corporate donors are willing to donate to private think tanks<sup>109</sup>. While there has been some progress, it is vastly inadequate. Many think tanks struggle for resources. ICWA had MOUs with ACB and C3S<sup>110</sup>. However, anecdotal evidence would suggest that this is not being continued. CASS Pune, too, needs more funds to achieve many of its plans<sup>111</sup>. The Director is Air Marshal B.N. Gokhale<sup>112</sup>.

A major issue is that Indian Income Tax laws do not include think tanks within the scope of Corporate Social Responsibility<sup>113</sup>. This needs to be remedied to make such funding more accessible.

### Global Examples

It is pertinent to examine major global examples. Think tanks in UK and Australia are good case studies.

**United Kingdom:** The UK is home to the world's oldest think tank Royal United Services Institute, created in 1831<sup>114</sup>. Chatham House was created in 1920<sup>115</sup>. Both are government supported. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, a private think tank, was created in 1958<sup>116</sup>. These are among the world's top think tanks.

The Doctrine and Concepts Development Centre (DCDC) was created because of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Its mission is to enhance the conceptual component to inform and guide Defence policy, strategy, capability, and operations. DCDC's outputs and responsibilities include the Strategic Trends Programme, Concepts, Doctrine, and Oversight of operational law training<sup>117</sup>.

The Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre (RNSSC) is the think tank of the Royal Navy, created in 2019. It aims to harness internal and external intellect to guide and strengthen future decision-making in the Navy. There is a collaboration with major think tanks like RUSI and IISS<sup>118</sup>. The Royal Air Force has a think tank, the Centre for Air and Space Power Studies. This, too, publishes journals and other documents<sup>119</sup>.

**Australia:** Australia does not have a long history of think tanks. The two major think tanks are the Australian Strategic Policy Institute<sup>120</sup>, created by the government in 2001 and Lowy Institute<sup>121</sup>, a private think tank created in 2003. The Australian Navy has had the Sea Power Centre since 2001<sup>122</sup>. It collaborates with many think tanks, including ASPI and Lowy. There is also cooperation with India's NMF<sup>123</sup>. Australia has a unique Australian Civil-Military Centre<sup>124</sup>.

**NATO:** The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has a think tank called Civil-Military Cooperation Centre for Excellence. This is dedicated to the study of CMR. It is based in The Netherlands and is supported by several NATO countries<sup>125</sup>. NATO Defense College Foundation is a think tank that undertakes strategic analysis. It is located in Italy<sup>126</sup>.

## Conclusion

The primary conclusion of this paper is that irrespective of the political party in power, the underlying foreign security and economic policies stay constant. The contrary views on Hindutva as being either Realist and pacifist further illustrates the fallacy of attribution of foreign and defence policy to political party-based ideology. India has a robust civil service, and the armed forces. There have not been any revolutionary changes in thinking and strategies. There is a strong Concordance of Civilian and Military thinking in formulating and implementing military doctrines. The strategic community and think tanks play a vital role in the development of doctrines and foreign security policy.

To the extent foreign and defence policies vary these are more due to external factors. After the end of the Cold War, India has increasingly become Realist. The economic reforms of 1991 and the nuclear tests of 1998 are the two watershed moments in this regard. The move towards power projection was prevalent starting from the turn of the century, irrespective of the political party in power. The use of lethal air power at Balakot in 2019 cannot merely be explained in terms of political party ideology. This culminates two decades of moving towards Realist thinking in India. The speech by the Air Chief at CAPS gave this clarity. Other speeches and publications of think tanks too throw light on Indian strategic thinking and policy making.

The first two decades of the twenty-first century have seen the emergence of an influential strategic community both civilian and military, in India. K. Subrahmanyam and Air Cmdre Jasjit Singh are the first two eminent scholars from the late twentieth century. Other influential scholars have also been named in the paper. The presence of Dr S Jaishankar and Mr Ajit Doval in the current cabinet under Narendra Modi shows that India's strategic community has become it's own. They are now influential at the highest level.

Today, the three service-specific think tanks, and CENJOWS are at India's main forefront of strategic thinking. They are unique in having a combination of armed forces and paramilitary personnel, academics, and civilian scholars on their staff. Further, these are collaborating with civilian private think tanks. The best example is the collaboration of NMF with C3S. In terms of Civil-Military Relations, these think tanks have been most effective.

The Armed Forces have doctrinal branches located across the country. It would make sense for there to be think tanks in various parts of India. Active steps should be taken towards creating new think tanks across the country. There could be a second institute on the lines of IDSA separate from the existing one. Even a different name can be used. Further, all the services can create new think tanks in different regions of the country. HQ IDS has two think tanks based in the national capital. It may be worth relocating CENJOWS to a location in Peninsular India, or a new think tank on similar lines could be created. This could also house a Civil-Military Centre akin to the NATO Centre and the one in Australia.

At another level all directorates of HQ IDS are located within New Delhi. It may make sense for the either DOT or PP&FD to relocate to the DSSC premises in Wellington in the Nilgiris. This would complement ARTRAC at the Shimla in the Himalayas.

Examples from the UK and Australia address the issue of think tanks in India. In the case of the UK, while there were major old think tanks like RUSI and Chatham House, IISS is relatively recent. The UK created service-specific think tanks only after these were created in India and Australia. In the case of the UK, the old think tanks are open to the civilian public, including scholars. In Australia, too, Lowy and ASPI are playing that role. In India, more than USI, ICWA, and IDSA, the newly created services think tanks and private think tanks are more open to civilian scholars. The collaboration between SPC-A and NMF is an example that another military should emulate, government and private civilian think tanks. These will provide effective Track 1.5 events and exchanges.

A continued issue is the lack of funds for think tanks. While this is mentioned in the USI Annual Report, anecdotal evidence suggests that all services think tanks, and even IDSA, and ICWA are starved of resources. Private think tanks unless with a single major backer are often doomed to languish in oblivion.

The Union Government should amend tax laws to make it attractive to support private think tanks. In addition, state governments should incentivise the creation of military, government, and private civilian think tanks in their states. Given the continental nature of India, each state or group of states may have challenges. By way of illustration, it is noted that the Indian Coast Guard plays a major role. Hence maritime states should have a seat at the table in any discussion on maritime security. There may be a similar concern for states with land borders. NATO comprises several nation-states with diverse challenges and has think tanks in several member states. As a federal country, India should adopt such decentralisation of think tanks.

CENJOWS published a journal titled Synergy, each issue of which has a specific theme like a book and are path breaking. The present February 2023 issue addresses Civil-Military Relations and is a major step in this regard. This issue is the first multi-author compilation on this topic. CENJOWS is ideally placed as the focal point for the study of CMR in India.

### **DISCLAIMER**

The paper is author's individual scholastic articulation and does not necessarily reflect the views of CENJOWS. The author certifies that the article is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/ web upload elsewhere and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed and are believed to be correct.

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