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Foreword

Lt Gen Anil Chait, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC

CISC & Chairman CENJOWS

Wars have always remained important tools and instruments of last resort for achieving political objectives, the world over. The degree of success achieved by the war waging nations has varied with subjective interpretations. The outcomes during the World War II, Bangladesh Liberation War and even Falkland War could be termed decisive. The outcomes of the more recent wars/conflicts such as Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War II and likely outcome of the Afghanistan war are perhaps far different from the desired objectives and hence relevance of wars in achieving political objectives comes under more critical scrutiny.

The character of the emergent warfare itself is changing fast. Possibilities of large scale mobilisation of formations equipped with heavy weaponry are fast receding. Non State actors driven by religious and ethnic considerations, operating in small non descript groups from among the urban masses, equipped with measures to offset asymmetry at very low cost have ushered an altogether different methods for trying to achieve their objectives. Legacy defence forces are often found wanting in offering an optimum and calibrated response against such warriors, prompting many thinkers and writers to predict that the war as we understand no more exists. Does that make wars less relevant for achieving political objectives. The answer is no. Wars or armed conflicts are likely to continue to be an important tool but their form and manifestation may change.

Transformation in the doctrinal discourse, methods and means of war fighting is already underway globally and a dynamic approach is needed for preparing to fight the emergent warfare.

(Anil Chait)
Lt Gen
CISC & Chairman CENJOWS

Director's Remarks

Writings of Chanakya, Clausewitz and Machiavelli are finding more readers and researchers as never before. Also the seminal work of General Rupert Smith, the former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in NATO, titled "The Utility of Force" is being viewed with great interest. His conclusion of the book is remarkable where he states that "For it must never be forgotten: war no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all round the world and States still have armed forces which they use as a symbol of power. Nonetheless, war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs, industrial war – such war no longer exists. We now are engaged, constantly and in many permutations, in war amongst the people. We must adapt our approach and organize our institutions to this overwhelming reality if we are to triumph in the confrontations and conflicts that we face." Writings of General Smith are supplemented by the writings of General Wesley K Clark, Former supreme Allied Commander Europe where he brings out the problems faced by the US and NATO in using military force for achieving political objectives during Kosovo war. General Smith finds support from the writings of editors Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn. One may conclude from the writings of General Smith that the relevance of war has not diminished but the form of warfare has definitely changed. Therefore, reorganization of the armed forces is essential which will help give the organizational mobility necessary to make best use of our limited forces deployed and employed on the long operations amongst the people.

India is facing a no war, no peace situation for the last many years. Our Defence Forces are structured to fight a conventional war which according to General Smith no longer exists. But General Clausewitz wrote in 1827 that war is only

a continuation of state policy by other means, while defining war as an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will. What role than are our Defence Forces likely to play for achieving our long term political objectives in the years to come. This issue of the Synergy is devoted to help find answers to this and many more such questions especially in the Indian context. Five brilliant articles by imminent authors have been supplemented by an article by William C. Banks from the Utrecht University Netherlands.

(KB Kapoor)
Maj Gen (Retd)
Director

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Penumbric Warfare: The Interplay and Competition of Comprehensive National Power

Vice Admiral (Retd) Vijay Shankar

An Unvarnished Approach to the Use of Force

Machiavelli in 1520, as did Chanakya almost two millennium earlier and Clausewitz two centuries later, saw the need for a precise analysis of the strategic problem when friction arose between states before one or the other state embarked on the use of the military to provide a solution. This discernment was firmly grounded on an understanding of the nature of war that was to be fought. Postulating an a priori, Chanakya categorised warfare into four genres based on strengths and weaknesses, intensity of interests, geography and the holistic power of the State and its allies. He designated these as Mantra-yuddha (war by counsel), Kuttayuddha (psychological warfare and manipulation of outcomes through deception and an indirect approach), Guddayuddha (covert operations and proxy wars) and Prakasayuddha (declared and open military hostilities).[1] In his analysis of the nature of conflict he introduced factors such as the balance of comprehensive power of the antagonists, time and space, objectives of the war, the relative fervour it generated, unity of purpose and a sophisticated cost-benefit scrutiny.[2] Political pragmatism in the justification of use of violence to resolve relations in the international milieu lay at the core of the strategic thesis of the three thinkers.

If we are to form an opinion on the utility of force to achieve political purpose in the current state of reality, some sort of a simplified theory is necessary. The end of the Cold War and the paradigm that it represented brought in its wake scholarly works that sought to prognosticate what future international relations and order held. Wide ranging theories were advanced from the emergence of one world in which harmony, democracy and an end to conflict were prophesized, and with it an end to a turbulent history of man's ideological evolution with the grand terminal formulation that western liberal democracy had prevailed.[3] Some saw the emergence of a multi polar order and the arrival of China not withstanding the warts of Tiananmen. Yet others saw in the First Iraq War, the continuing war in the Levant, the admission of former Soviet satellite nations into NATO and the splintering of Yugoslavia an emerging clash of civilisations marked by violent discord shaped by cultural and civilisational similitude.[4] However, these illusions within a decade were dispelled and found little use in coming to grips with the realities of the post Cold War world as each of them represented a candour of its own. The paradigm of the day (if there is one) is governed by uncertainty and its symptoms are the tensions of the multi polar; the tyranny of economics; the anarchy of expectations; and a polarisation along religio-cultural lines all compacted in the cauldron of techno-agitated globalisation.

In the interest of objectivity, for our examination of the contemporary efficacy of military power in achieving political goals, we choose the maritime domain as our canvas and focus on the stresses created by a rising China.

The Uncertainty Exemplar

When addressing maritime affairs the uncertainty paradigm only places in perspective the events that we are confronted with. It provides a pattern and a context within which a strategy may be devised for the use of force and structures put in place to come to terms with an indeterminate future that may not readily welcome a head-to-head armed conflict. China's quest to secure efficiently rights of passage on the sea to fuel her thirst for energy, primary produce and commodities has led her to the 'Northern Passage'[5]. Today that search has found fruition; in 2012 alone more than 40 commercial ships had made the now expanded isochronal ice-free crossing and it is no surprise that Chinese merchantmen are leading the charge. To put matters in perspective, as a trade corridor the distance from China to markets in Europe is cut down to less than

8000 miles from 14,700 miles. Significantly two strategic factors loom in the wings. Firstly, the route avoids two sensitive 'choke points' the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal. Secondly, to stir matters, the littorals of the Arctic Ocean have asserted overlapping claims to sovereignty in these resource rich waters.[6]

China, with questionable reason, theorises that the road to securing these sea lines of communication is through a strategy of 'Access Denial'.[7] The access denial proposition is founded on China's security concern instigated by the Taiwan crisis of 1995–1996 when the U.S.A. deployed two carrier groups to the region (which remains in Chinese memory as an embarrassing infringement of sovereignty), now enlarged to assuring the right to unimpeded passage globally. The value and logic of an access denial strategy is obvious in reference to Taiwan, but enabling such a strategy when scope and space are global must clearly tax strategists' world wide and suggest misgivings of an impending clash.

Riposte to Malevolent Competition: Penumbric Warfare

Contemporary strategic maritime thought shaped by the endowment to control sea spaces for specific causes has long supplanted the Mahanian concept of Command of the sea which envisaged a life and death fleet-on-fleet struggle for domination.[8] Corbett's formulation, adapted for the present, of 'Control-for-Causes' is far more sophisticated and appropriate to contemporary geo political circumstances.[9] Its application will have penetrating relevance as a political tool in an era when calibrated escalation of power antagonism, pressure diplomacy, economic influence and coercion as opposed to a destructive and economically debilitating military conflict. China has not lost sight of this truism.

The current situation in Iran, West Asia, North Korea, weaponising of space, access denial strategies, disruptive control of cyber space, 'Lawfare'[10] and indeed the South and East China Sea imbroglio are marked by "malevolent competition" where the principal tools are persuasive in their threat to dent the adversaries Comprehensive National Power (CNP). In all cases there is not just a compelling military posture that notifies antagonists but also one that reassures allies. Decisive action seen as the clash of battle fleets, which naval strategists of the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century considered the key to all strategic problems at sea is today displaced by the interplay and competition of the CNP of states which we may term as 'Penumbric Warfare'.

In concept, the comprehensive capability of a country to pursue its strategic objectives through freedom of action internally and externally defines that nation's CNP. To achieve freedom of action, three factors play a disproportionate part. First and primary of these is strategic capability in all dimensions. Second, is the resolve of the nation as underscored by the will of its people to actualize power and the leadership that steers it in that direction. And lastly, is the State's ability to face up to and manipulate strategic outcomes. Specific attributes that may be involved which will define the character of the new face of conflicts will include strategic resources as a summation of the level of knowledge application, technology prowess state of economy, human capital, natural resources with an emphasis on energy consumption and those that have a direct impact on building infrastructure, capital resources in terms of investments, government expenditure, military resources including nuclear capabilities and lastly international resources as a function of the influence of soft power. But the key strategic resource will remain military power since it is seen as an all pervasive enabler for internal as well as external security. What is of particular significance is the precision it provides to national power on the one hand, while in the abstract it may be perceived as a manifestation of the will to power.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Klaus Knorr, an American academic influenced greatly by the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War, while putting forth an analysis of the war making potential of states, went beyond the characteristics of economic and military potential to include such components as "the will to fight" and "administrative capacity." He defined national power as the aggregate of a state's economic capability, its administrative competitiveness in terms of the influence it was willing to bring to bear globally and its readiness to use its military in order to bring about favourable conclusions.[11]

The Ray Cline expression that emerged during the height of the Cold War, moves away from the Second World War mould and sought to expand CNP with the introduction of soft power facets. It placed before the statesman the natural subjectivity which arises, when dealing with strategic factors and the will and vigour of people; at the same time it did not lose sight of the hard objective factors that contribute to power. This blend of the abstract with the realist's point of view is Cline's most abiding virtue. The other significant feature of the latter

criterion is that it sees power through the eyes of the international system or a potential adversary.[12] Dealing in abstract matters related to the correlation of power was fresh and sophisticated in approach.

This then is the make-up of the malevolent competition that is underway. If, now, we search for a practical expression we need go no further than the current situation in Iran. The nature of the 'penumbric war' that we are currently witness to does not readily fall into any mould other than one in shadows. Covert action, cyber attacks and political alienation sufficiently reinforced by economic sanctions and intrusive nuclear inspections on the one hand, has unleashed globally disruptive nationalism on the other. The South China Sea imbroglio, the claim for sovereignty over the entire water body and the more recent establishment of the Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea and over the disputed Senkaku/Daiyou Islands are other manifestations of a 'penumbric war' being waged.

China and its Superintendence of CNP

The rise of a new hegemon in China and the slow decline of the current principal, the USA stimulates the former to develop forces and alliances necessary to realize its grand strategy which China has unambiguously articulated as: stability of dispensation, unimpeded resource access to spur growth and regional pre eminence.[13]

China believes that the purpose of CNP is to render the adversary (or the international system) powerless to stop its will. In this definition there are shades of an expanded Clausewitz when he defined 'war as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will'.[14] Clausewitz, in his understanding of the application of national power, perceived two inseparable factors that had to be overcome, the first of which was the total means at the disposal of the adversarial state to pursue their interests and the second the strength of their will to resist. The rub in this knowledge is that as a combination while the former is measurable, the latter is much less easy so and can only be gauged by the strength of motivation[15]. This construct will invariably lead to an upward spiral of power application against increased resistance till one or the other breaks, at which point an extreme would have been reached. In a nuclear context this may mean the end of purpose.

China perceives CNP as the single most critical indicator and measure of the aggregate economic, political, military, and technological prowess of a nation. In its calculus the nature of power is made up of two ingredients; the first is that set of dominance that manipulates and forces desired outcomes, termed as Command Power; while the second is ideational virtues (soft power) that serve to influence and mould finales with no great certainty. Professors Hu Augang and Men Honghua, in their paper on CNP and grand strategy[16] identify three considerations that establish the CNP of states: Strategic Resources, Strategic Capability and Strategic Outcomes. They go on to add that while the latter two are a function of the former, CNP is in fact a summation of the total Strategic Resources of a nation. Their approach is a natural progression of the various formulations that we have seen thus far.

In the maritime domain, consistent with this strategy is China's shipbuilding programme of Aircraft Carriers assisted by strike and denial forces to establish and assure security of control over designated sea spaces and a fleet of escorts and scouts to exercise control. Control and Security of Control is the classic model that China's naval revival has been inspired by. The problem with the guiding Grand Strategy and its implementation, specifically the coming 'Third Island Security Chain'[17] superimposed on 'Access Denial' is its blindness to recognize that we are dealing with a hydro space that is the busiest of all the "vast commons". The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high, the impulse to alter the status quo stimulates counter alliances, a revisionist strategy generates turbulence while aggressive resource garnering sets into motion precarious trade practices.

China's Multi Pronged Resource Access Trend

China's commercial and military engagement of Africa and West Asia, quest for alternative secure and controlled strategic energy and raw material corridors and its vigorous involvement in sea bed mining in the Indian as well as the Pacific Oceans is no aberration but the start of a strategic multi pronged resource access trend. Like the Imperial Powers of the colonial era before and Super Powers in more recent times, China's charge to acquire other discrete supply lines will demand that the primary prong to the 'trend' embrace continued enhancement of it's naval capabilities in-region if it is to make her presence credibly felt in the West Pacific and Indian Oceans and exploit the willingness of allies, such as

Pakistan, to supplant the influence played by America. The second prong is on the diplomatic front; its growing assertiveness is evident in the stance it has taken on Syria in the UN, its influence over North Korea, continued technological and material support it provides to Pakistan, it's blocking of sanctions and refusal to cut back on oil sourced from Iran, its very keen attention to the course of the confrontation there, and its rapid mending fences with Russia and Central Asia; in these dealings, what is most remarkable is the absence of political or ideological baggage. The third prong is its deployment of soft power in the region in terms of infrastructural, educational, technological, financial and other programmes in order to leverage a favourable political disposition amongst the littorals.

Against this backdrop is the centrality, to China, of continued rapid growth and regime perpetuation and therefore the imperative to temper and balance her strategic aspirations with a firm, and should the need arise, a confrontational posture when dealing with other key regional players even at the cost of relations with secondary players. Two conditions will govern Chinese moves in the immediate future; China has little incentive in catalysing unrestricted rivalry with regional players, as such a situation will only serve to close markets and draw down resources which could better be used in the cause of growth and development. The second condition is that China would extend themselves to ensure that their interests are not degraded either by inimical forces or as consequence of unrelated political or military action even if it means indulging in a penumbric war.

The significance of the Gwadar-Xinjiang energy and raw material passageway, China's sea lines of communications across the Indian Ocean, its claim for control over the South and East China Sea, the string of pearls, securing 'control and right of passage' in the Indian Ocean and South and East China Sea in all conditions remains strategically pivotal. The 'string of pearls' provides to its nascent 'blue water' navy a reach and control that would assure security of its energy lines and sanctuary to its raw materials emanating from Africa. It is towards this end that Chinese strategic policy is directed.

Access Denial

The development of 'Access Denial' capabilities is central to China's strategic orientation. Its development has shown impressive growth over the last decade,

not just in terms of material progress but also in terms of doctrinal foundations and operational precepts. China's force modernization along with investments in cyber warfare, anti air, anti ship weaponry and anti carrier hardware in addition to the thrust on nuclear submarines both strategic and nuclear powered attack submarines, a carrier group centred on the Liaoning (ex Varyag) aircraft carrier with its suite of very potent multi role fighters all make for a force that is increasingly lethal in effectiveness and enhanced in reach. Operating from infrastucture that they have cultivated from Sittwe and Aan in Myanmar to Hambantotta in Sri Lanka, Maroa in the Maldives and Gwadar in Pakistan (collectively the so called string of pearls) gives teeth to the long range access denial within the coming Third Island Security Chain.

Specific operational deployment, as an illustration, may include one carrier group operating in the Indian Ocean; a Jin class Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine (SSBN) on deterrent patrol; two Nuclear powered Submarines (SSN) on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) patrol with cooperating surface group and maritime patrol aircrafts; long range maritime strike aircrafts operating from Aan or Gwadar; one amphibious brigade standby with transports on hand at one of the 'string of pearls.' Also, one regiment of anti satellite missiles along with cyber warfare teams to manipulate, black out, control and wage information warfare that will seek to paralyze operations in the Indian Ocean or the Western Pacific Ocean. Whether development as an international maritime power is going to cause friction with regional players such as Japan, India and other stake holders remains the moot question.

A Conclusion: Strategic Entente and the coming Penumbric Clash

India's interests in the region are strategic, enduring and diversifying just as China's is; while those of the sole superpower's cannot be set aside. These interests often overlap, abrade and at times chafe. What form this strategic rivalry will take and the substance of it will perhaps only be clear when the dust of USA's involvement in Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq settles down and the nature of the US strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region fully crystallizes. Notwithstanding, there is considerable congruence of interests between USA (and its allies), Japan and India which provides a substructure for a strategic entente.

The challenge before the Indian Planner begins with an understanding

of the significance of China's rise. Just as Japan, a century ago in the post Battle of Tsushima era (1905), propelled herself into "Greater East Asia" in the quest for strategic security, great power status and resource access; China's spread across the West Pacific and move into the Indian Ocean may be seen as analogous. Divergences from the analogy lie in the fact that there are other competing stake holders (which include India, Japan, Russia the USA) in the region and significantly the change in the nature of warfare. The probability of a Fleet on Fleet conflict when there is balance in the correlation of power is low but friction and tensions are more than likely to take penumbric form. So the first task before the Planner is to ensure the building of an entente with like minded nations and the second is to structure and deploy forces such that the balance of power is not upset and the resolve to confront the 'penumbric war' is not weak.

The new found strategic Indo-US relationship provides leverage to promote common interests of the entente, such as guaranteed energy security, safety of production facilities, protection of transportation infrastructure, upholding the status-quo and the right to unimpeded passage. The stake holders also share a common sensitivity to terrorism emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. Measures to arrest it may translate to joint naval patrols working in tandem with littoral states and the use of commercial and diplomatic clout to rein-in maverick states. The relationship that oil producers have with their consumers is a symbiotic one; this interdependence also provides the basis of a new framework which could be driven by action to promote security to both consumer and producer in such a manner that stability becomes of interest to all parties.

Participation of interested parties in forums such as India Africa Forum Summits (IAFS) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) would give relevance and substance to these institutions. After all, not to include the main actors with governing stakes in the area, not withstanding the fact that China, Japan, Russia and the USA are extra regional powers, is to denude these associations of context. This may cue the next logical step to give regulatory teeth to these institutions. Given the interest that China has in her own development and security, there are adequate signals to suggest that India needs to pull out of the state of paranoia that she transits through every time that China collaborates with Pakistan and replace it with an understanding of and preparedness for a 'penumbric war' on the one hand, while on the other a willingness to find sway in its burgeoning trade with China which is expected to reach $100 billion by

2015. In this deepening of commercial relations and the common interest it underscores lies the germ of friction resolution.

Endnotes

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4 Huntington. Samuel, P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Penguin Books, India 1997, pp 30-39.

5 Article by author titled "The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor", published in the September 2012 issue of the DSA. The Northern Passage was a fabled sea route theorised by adventurers, merchants and money chandlers over the last six centuries to link the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean. The Route lay through the Arctic archipelago the treacherous ice flows that frustrate passage across the Arctic Ocean.

6 News report in the Hindu of 13 December 2013 titled *Russia to boost Arctic presence*.

7 Security analysts have examined China's efforts to develop weapons systems that can retard or even stop a potential adversary from entering an area of interest. Dubbed "access-denial," the aim of such a strategy is to use weapons that deter and should the need arise challenge or indeed prevent inimical forces from operating in conlict zones or oceanic areas of interest . The teeth of this strategy is an anti-ship missile. Such a missile, fired from land, sea, underwater or air can cause tremendous damage to an enemy surface vessel. While such technology isn't new, the effective ranges of such weapons have increased tremendously, along with their accuracy, speed of delivery and precision. Defending against such systems is therefore a major problem for planners

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Problems of 21st Century: Use of Military Force and Statecraft

Air Marshal (Retd) Dhiraj Kukreja

Introduction

Attempts to gaze into the crystal ball of the future are rife with inconsistencies and contradictions. On the one hand, most people believe that the future – particularly in the details of probable events – is essentially enigmatic; on the other hand, humans inherently want to know their future to plan for it! Importantly, the mainstay of planning, particularly long-term or strategic planning, which many tend to overlook, is an assessment of the inputs provided, with a belief in the situations or environment that will be faced. No plan, except the most general or unforeseen, can exist without some assumptions about the future. To the defence planner, an expectation of the turn of events of the future, is an absolute requirement in preventing, preparing for, deterring against, and, if necessary, fighting wars.

From history to the present day, anticipation of the actions of the enemy, at the operational and tactical levels of war, is always considered a defining skill of history's greatest military commanders, differentiating, successful from unsuccessful military leaders. While personal leadership and courage may be two predominant elements that lead to victory in a tactical situation of the battlefield, even the bravest of them all has faced defeat because of an unanticipated element derailing the plan. This is also true of otherwise successful strategists; the list includes the great Napoleon himself - who did not foresee the effects of delay and the Russian winter on his 1812 campaign.

Clarity and Fog Continues

On the level of grand strategy, where there is interplay of the competing efforts of nation-states in defending their security and achieving their vital interests, a detailed assessment of the overall international and regional security environment is clearly the fundamental requirement in the development of a national defence policy. In addition, for the policy to continue to remain effective, the common understanding of the environment should be frequently assessed, and changes anticipated.

The need for a continuing assessment of the security environment seems common sense when a security threat is evident. During the Cold War, the NATO alliance saw the potential expansion of the Soviet empire as a clear and omnipresent threat, against which well-defined plans were an absolute must and existed so, with constant re-assessments and threat evaluations conducted for the plans to remain valid and deterrence maintained.

In contrast, the post-Cold War Western world, heady with the collapse of the communism empire, and in which the United States remained as the sole super-power, has proven a much difficult environment to analyse. The environment has become all the more hazy after the US victory in Desert Storm and the marked absence of any clear threat. Entire organisations, created in the US and NATO alliance nations, such as staffs of intelligence collectors, analysts and planners, supported by academic assessments of demographic, industrial, economic factors, seemed redundant.

Many in the Western hemisphere were of the opinion that the collapse of the Soviet Union would create a new world order with a possible peace-dividend; the United States did re-orient and reduce its defence structure by almost a third! The United States, as does the rest of the world, with the period of strategic euphoria over, now faces a 'post-post-Cold War' security environment in which threats, at times, are more direct and evident, but dispersed, and at other times, not so evident, indirect and foggy. It is a world in which a liberated Russia did not develop a solid foreign policy in partnership with United States. It is a world in which China rejected and ruthlessly crushed the growth of democratic sentiment at Tiananmen Square, and in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and elsewhere too. It is a world in which globalisation and economic interdependence could

not prevent ethnic wars in many parts of the world. In other words, it is a world that did not cease to be chaotic and dangerous as it was earlier.

Problems of Force and Diplomacy

It is hazardous for policy makers to rely on, as they sometimes do, upon a single historical analogy to arrive at a decision in a new situation. The question then arises, how then can historical experience be utilised to deal effectively with a new situation that may have a semblance to past cases, but also possesses certain unique features? To make good use of historical experiences is a difficult task, just as it is difficult to gaze in to the crystal ball and predict the future. The answer, probably lies in synthesising lessons from a broader range of experience, drawn from a variety of historical instances, be it cooperation, detente, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management or some aspect of relations between nation states. The task is to convert the lessons from history from a larger number of cases into a comprehensive compilation that would encompass the complexity of each situation. By comparing successes and failures of a particular strategy under varying circumstances, one can identify conditions under which a particular line of action is likely to succeed or fail. For example, American leaders, scholars, and analysts drew quite different lessons regarding a strategy for dealing with limited conflicts after the frustrating experience of the Korean War. Second, even if there is agreement between people on the correct lesson to be drawn from a particular case, it is often misapplied to a new situation that differs from the past in one or more important respects; the United States is a current example of the misapplication of the lessons learnt with its involvement in the various recent conflicts.

A separate theory regarding the efficacy of strategies and instruments of policy, based on the lessons from history, is necessary, as any historian will bear out that such lessons from the past are often inconsistent, if not contradictory, and simplifications are risky, if not carefully thought of. An inadequate knowledge base employed in foreign policy can often lead astray individual strategies that constitute some of the tools of statecraft. A classic example of this is the policy pursued by the two Bush administrations towards Iraq, first, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, and then later in 2003; administration leaders operated with a poor understanding and conceptualisation of their logic and requirements, leading to the employment of poor strategies. The leaders also possessed

inadequate general knowledge of the operational requirements, and their efforts were further handicapped by an incorrect image of Saddam Hussein.

Ambitious States, not merged into the norms of the international comity of nations, often confront great powers (read USA and allies) and hence pose a threat to the orderly working, peace and stability of the global structure at large. Highlighting the issue of 'Revolutionary States' at the very beginning of his book, *A World Restored*, Henry Kissinger has considered it to be of utmost importance for the stability of the international system. While Kissinger refers to them as Revolutionary States, the terminology has since been changed and such States are now generally referred to as 'Rogue or Outlaw States'. Although there is no historical precedence of dealing with such States to provide the policy makers with a template, the absorption of Kemal Ataturk's Turkey into the international system is perhaps an example of the successful integration of what was once considered as an Outlaw State. Failed attempts to integrate such States, despite appeasement and coercion, into the international system are Saddam's Iraq, Gaddafi's Libya, Assad's Syria and Kim Il Sung's North Korea.

Crisis Management

The history of international relations is replete with numerous diplomatic confrontations, some that were resolved peacefully and others that ended in war. Conflicts of interest normally create crises, which can erupt into war-threatening scenarios through deliberate actions by the parties concerned, or inadvertently, leading to delicate diplomatic and military decisions by policy-makers under the pressure of time and as events unfold. Such decisions may result not merely in success or failure for the nations they represent, but in the preservation or destruction of the existing international order. The build-up of the Indian Armed Forces on the border with Pakistan in 2001-02, named Op *Parakram*, after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, is one such example in our environment.

Crisis management, a familiar phenomenon in the European balance-of-power era of the 16th-18th centuries and later preceding the two World Wars, took on a new urgency in the nuclear age. Shortly after the harrowing experience of the Cuban missile crisis, Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, is reported to have remarked.... "the age of military strategy is over and crisis management

has begun". The necessities and modalities of tackling crises effectively did not emerge for the first time during the Cuban crisis; the two super-powers of the post- WW II era had acquired considerable experience in controlling and managing tense situations in Berlin earlier. However, after the Cuban crisis, scholars, policy researchers and strategists studied the tasks and requirements of crisis management in considerable detail with the hope that the studies may shed some light upon the problems of information processing and decision making in trying times. Nonetheless, there is no handbook of management of crises and each case has to be resolved individually.

Analyses of examples of crisis management, some resolved successfully, like the Cuban crisis and Op *Parakram*, and others not, like the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, support the proposition that a crisis can be managed if one or both sides limit the objectives they wish to pursue in the confrontation, and/ or the means employed to pursue those objectives. The studies also indicate that both sides must also understand and act on the following:

(a) Maintain the highest level of civilian control of military action.

(b) Create pauses in the tempo of military action to provide time for diplomatic efforts.

(c) Coordinate diplomatic and military moves to terminate the crisis, preferably without war.

(d) Avoid military steps that may suggest a large-scale attack, which could lead to pre-emption by the other side.

(e) Chose diplomatic-military actions that signal a desire to negotiate, rather than just opt for a military solution.

It is essential to recognise that crisis management requires novel concepts of planning, control, and conduct of military operations and that these requirements may put a strain on the experience and patience of military professionals. The five essentials for crisis management noted above impose stringent constraints on the use of force and can easily lead to tensions between the political and the military leaders of a nation. Effectual adherence to these principles of crisis management requires, among other things, appropriate military capabilities, doctrines and alternatives, top-down effective command and control of tactical

units, intimate interaction between civilian and military planners and skill and flexibility in adapting to contingencies.

The modern policy-maker enjoys many technological advantages over his predecessor, such as improvement in communications and transportation, which permit him to exercise personal control over his military force, irrespective of the distances involved. At the same time, the policy-maker is also likely to face difficulties in decision making with events unfolding at break-neck speed due to the improvement in communications. Advances in military technology have made it vastly more difficult to keep secret, moves that may give indications of large-scale warfare to the opponent. With the increased destructiveness of modern weaponry, military forces can destroy not only select targets but also inflict heavy collateral punishment. This and more has greatly strengthened the policy-makers' resolve and incentives to choose a diplomatic-military option rather than purely a military solution.

Use of Force in Diplomacy

The suggestion, that force and threats of the use of force are at times a necessary instrument of diplomacy and have a role to play in foreign policy, is part of conventional wisdom of statecraft. It is also true that history supports the view that efforts to deal with interstate conflicts of interest, solely by means of rational persuasion and peaceful diplomacy, do not always succeed and may even cause substantial damage to one's interests. On the other hand, one can also find examples in history when threats of force or the actual use of force were not only ineffective but seriously aggravated disputes between States, or even triggered wars that otherwise could have been avoided.

Historical experience, therefore, supports both the necessity, as well as the risks of applying force, or the threats of applying force and, gives rise to the question: Under what conditions can military force or the threat of using military force, be used effectually to accomplish different types of foreign policy objectives at an acceptable cost and risk? The issue is of importance, as it tends to run down the strategies of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Efforts to deter adversaries from serious encroachments on one's interests and those of friendly States, often require an ability to make threats that are sufficiently credible and potent enough to dissuade the adversary. Coercive diplomacy, as

well, depends upon a credible capability of issuing threats of the use of force. Thus with the continuous evolving geo-political situation, the dilemma continues, as to what role force or the threat of the use force can be expected to play in a variety of conflict situations.

General MacArthur's argument, from the war in Korea, that there is no substitute to victory and that the military should not be forced to fight with one arm tied behind its back, has lessons for policy-makers, strategists, analysts and scholars alike, all over the world. In the United States, after the war in Korea, military and civilian strategists argued that either the country should stay out of such conflicts altogether or, if it had to intervene, it should use whatever military force necessary for a decisive victory. Obviously, lessons were not learnt, to repeat the mistakes of the past!

New Perspective on the Use of Force

In the current international environment, there continue to be occasions, where mere threats of use of force would not suffice or be credible enough to deter and reverse inimical behaviour; international power equations have been in a state of unpredictability, with the older pecking order declining and new powers arising on the horizon. The question today is not of the use of force, but its legitimacy, of its acceptance to the new world order and the capacity to sustain the deployment, should the use of force be the only alternative.

The Russian and American 'adventures' in Afghanistan are examples of unsound strategic choices and the long-lasting price that the two nations have had to pay for the choices. Russian involvement in Afghanistan had disastrous consequences on the leadership and the military; the US involvement has led to a divide in the coalition and to a new understanding of the limits to the use of military power in international relations.

The post-post-Cold War era have also seen questions raised on the legality of the unilateral use of force in sovereign nations. The debate, by some segments of the international polity, is viewed as dependent on the outcome of the intervention; if the outcome is a failure the legitimacy is questioned, and if it is successful, the intervention is considered positive. The removal of the former ruler of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, is now being portrayed as worthwhile, even though no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, for which the war

was primarily waged, at the cost of massive casualties and extensive damage to the country's infrastructure.

The existing geo-political situation in many continents has seen a notable shift from inter-state to intra-state wars, from wars between militaries to conflicts between people of the same country, leading to major increase in the use of force by another nation. With a marked increase in failed and failing States, and also in the number of terrorist organisations, each possessing or having access to high technology and finances, attempts to vanquish them with the use of military force, and put in place a new form of government, have generally ended in a failure. What, however, does seem apparent is that the use of military force can be successful if there are limited political aims. It is therefore, for the policy-makers to weigh the pros and cons of such an action before deciding on the use of military force.

Another occurrence that has come to prominence in the post-post-Cold War era is that a number of developing nations, newly independent and with a diverse population, tend to freely use military force against their own to quell an internal strife as an instrument of statecraft. This phenomenon, however, is not limited to just such countries but has also been witnessed even in powerful States like Russia and China. It must be borne in mind that attempts to defeat secessionist movements with just the application of military force have never really been successful and have to be backed up by a well thought-out and calculated mix of negotiations, persuasion, political concessions and social and economic development.

Status in India

Secessionist and insurgent groups have challenged the territorial integrity of India for many a decade now. In a country with such a diverse demographic fabric, this was to be expected. Such challenges, often armed with foreign support, need to be dealt with a firm hand to preserve the integrity and unity of the nation; use of military force, in such cases, is an extension of statecraft. The Indian strategy, however, was that since the opponents were Indian citizens, the use of force had to be limited, putting severe constraints on the military in terms of the type and quantity of firepower to be used to keep casualties to the minimum. Simultaneously, the use of force was combined with negotiations and

development attempts to assimilate the secessionist groups into the mainstream. Though the process took many years, it was largely successful with many a group agreeing to be absorbed, leading to a strengthening of the nation.

The use of force by India has not been limited to just intra-State conflicts; India has intervened, with the use of military, in neighbouring nations, when there was threat to its own core interests or security. To defend its territory, India has been more than willing to use its military, as demonstrated in the wars against Pakistan. When inundated with refugees from the erstwhile East Pakistan, India did not deter from using force to create favourable conditions for the refugees to return. Indian military was also used successfully in Maldives, at its invitation, to preserve the democratic institution that was under threat; however, the use of force, again on the invitation of the Government of Sri Lanka was not as successful. What is of relevance is that in all cases the application of force was ceased as soon as the limited political objectives were achieved, giving the interventions a strong semblance of legitimacy.

Conclusion

Today's world is influenced, more than ever before, by complex forms of interdependence between States and the people, not just in the economic, but also in the life-essential ecological and other spheres too. Events such as the Chernobyl disaster and the Fukushima burn-down brought home the grim lessons of interdependence. The continued growth of interdependence provides the incentives for cooperation and reduces the chances of military interventions. Even as the relevance and utility of the use of military force, to settle conflicts, has declined, and non-military forms of power and influence have gained prominence, the value of military force in statecraft should not be underestimated.

The boundaries between conventional and unconventional, regular and irregular, traditional and non-traditional wars have become indistinct. Today, even small non-state actors have access to modern technology and weapons that were the prerogative only of developed States. To counter the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and asymmetric attacks, such as a cyber attack, needs a rethink for a new approach on the use of force. The new geo-political and security environment requires a continuous adaptation on the use of military force. What has not changed, though, are the requirements that all applications

of force have to be limited in scale and size, with limited political aims, to be achieved in a limited period. Similarly, what has not changed is the relationship between force and statecraft.

We can hope that with the proliferation of regimes and a continuation of the trend of interdependence, the world can move towards a more comprehensive structure, cutting across major grouping of States, to provide a more closely-knit comity of nations; yet, the threats and challenges continue to be immense. The outcome is not to be seen thus far in the crystal ball.

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Political Objectives and Modern Wars

Lt Gen PC Katoch

"*The arrow shot by an archer may or may not kill a single person; but skilful intrigue, devised by wise men, may kill even those who are in the womb.*" - Chanakya.

Introduction

The history of warfare is as old as mankind. If Gandhi ji said, "There is enough in the world for everyone's need but there is not enough for everyone's greed", Napoleon Hill went on to say, "War grows out of the desire of the individual to gain advantage at the expense of his fellow man." Warfare itself has undergone change in recognition of the new realities of modern warfare and the modern landscape of the battlefield. Even a super power like the US has not been unable to fully execute her policy of 'regime change' in the stated "axis of evil", and the recent case of Syria, albeit indirect means continue to be employed. Not without reason David Friedman said, "The direct use of force is such a poor solution to any problem, it is generally employed only by small children and large nations." Then is the issue of political objectives that are the nucleus of strategy. Sun Tzu had said that "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." He said, "Strategy without tactics is the slow road to victory" implying that if you can do anything right in war, it should be strategy. So, did US have a strategy in Afghanistan or is it that the US has successfully misled the world as to what her political objectives are in Afghanistan?

Then, 'Political Warfare' is not a new concept. Both China and Taiwan have

exclusive departments dealing with this type of warfare. US President Harry Truman established a government political warfare capability in the National Security Act of 1947 by creating the National Security Council, which became the infrastructure necessary to apply military power to political purposes. Many countries have followed suit. Success or failure of achieving political objectives through modern war depends upon the type of war waged and the time envisaged to achieve those objectives, Chinese statement of "prepared to wait 100 years" being but one example.

War and Modern War

Revolution in military affairs is an ongoing process but the advent of nuclear bombs jolted the world to this new reality of destructive power of science. Shocked with its tests, Albert Einstein said, "The release of atom power has changed everything except our way of thinking ….. If only I had known, I should have become a watchmaker." While nuclear exchanges especially at tactical levels may not be entirely ruled out, given the factors of economic interdependence, price of war at conventional and above levels and a world progressing towards multi-polarity, nuclear weapons would likely remain a threat in being. At the same time, warfare has raced ahead to more alternatives of waging war in borderless battlefields without rules and largely through forces without faces. Over the years, Irregular forces have demonstrated they have greater strategic value over conventional and even nuclear forces. Global super powers have learnt their lessons the hard way. The US was defeated in Vietnam through irregular forces. The Soviets met the same fate in Afghanistan and now the US is once again forced to exit Afghanistan under similar circumstances. The last war between two conventional forces was fought in 2005 between Russia and Georgia. So, sub-conventional war is and will likely continue to be the order of the day. Even the US and NATO forces have been battling irregular forces and themselves are now engaged in hybrid wars by optimizing proxy radical forces, as evident in Iraq, Libya and Syria.

Militarily strong countries like US and China too are employing sub conventional means in terms of irregular forces and proxies. China spawning Maoist insurgencies world over, engaging with Taliban and Al Qaeda, and arming and supporting Maoists in India and Nepal, plus United State Wa Army in Myanmar are proof of this. Pakistani Military has nurtured powerful proxies,

the LeT having emerged one of the prominent one focused against India. The restructuring under the ISI being done presently is the mating of the Mujahid battalions with various terrorist organizations and select regular troops to target both Afghanistan and India post US pullout from Afghanistan; the Taliban-Mujahid combine targeting Afghanistan and the Mujahid-LeT combination targeting India. So what India should be expecting to face is the combination of Pakistani SSG-LeT-Mujahids-Taliban tasked with terrorizing and attacking, planning and coordination of which will be done by Islamabad. According to Afghan intelligence, the terrorist attack on the Indian Consulate at Jalalabad on 3rd August 2013 was the handiwork of LeT, not Haqqanis or Taliban.

Technology has also empowered the terrorists and many irregular forces, mostly state sponsored, have acquired capabilities near comparable to conventional forces. Other than modern arms including hand-held PGMs that could be used against aircraft (both civil and military), and automatic weapons facilitating wide array of terrorist operations, communications, GPS equipment etc, some of the technology-terror manifestations are: *Internet* used for radicalization, messaging and coordinating terrorist actions. Increase in networks implies rise of 'netwar' with power transferred to terrorists; *cyber terrorism*, though not new. The first major attack caused the Siberian pipeline explosion in 1982. Over the years, dams, communications and power at airports, pipelines, sewage system, nuclear monitoring systems, train signaling system, automobile plants, hospital systems have been attacked. The 9/11 terrorist attack knocked out critical financial transaction networks and caused an overload of the telecommunications grid; *Body Bombs* - in August 2009, Al Qaeda terrorist Abdullah-al-Asin, tried to assassinate a Saudi prince with bomb inserted in his rectum. That bomb implants may be a reality soon was brought home in a fictional article on Mail Online by Michael Burleigh on 8th August 2013 describing a man carrying a diabetic kit with the syringe injects 'insulin' (actually chemical explosive Triacetone Triperoxide) into his stomach during flight, the liquid combined with explosives implanted inside him blowing up. In 2012, Asadullah Khalid, head of Afghan intelligence was targeted by a human bomber. In the 2005 London Tube bombings, 12 British nationals killed and wounded had bone shrapnel injuries, including one man blinded by a bone fragment from the bomber himself. US intelligence believes Al Qaeda has devised a way to conceal explosives inside the body that can avoid detection by sophisticated scanners. They also claim Al Qaeda has

developed an undetectable liquid explosive that can be soaked into clothing and ignited when dry; *3D printing of weapons* -Texas firm, 'Solid Concepts' has made the first metal gun using a 3D printer, successfully fired 50 bullets from it and took it on board a fully packed Eurostar train on 10th May 2013 without being stopped through security. Blueprints of the weapon ('Liberator') were reportedly downloaded more than 100,000 times before it could be removed from the web. The 'Liberator' costs just $25 if you have the 3D printer; *explosives* like Semtex, liquids and non-detectable type developed by Al Qaeda are on the scene though terrorists generally rely on explosive material (chemicals, fertilizers) available in open market; *WMDs* have two connotations - Weapons of Mass Destruction and Weapons of Mass Disturbance. If the Sarin gas attack in Syria has shaken the world, the Aum Shinrikyo cult also used Sarin Gas for multiple bombings of Tokyo Subway in 1995 killing 13, injuring 50 and caused temporary loss of vision to 1000. The Cult actually had enough Sarin Gas to kill one million people. Terrorists today are developing NBC capabilities, assisted by fissile material available in the black market. Toxic radioactive agents can be paired with conventional explosives and turned into a radiological weapon. The recent theft of a truck full of Cobalt-60 in Mexico is an example of the inherent dangers. Recovery of a 1.5 kg Uranium mine by the Army in Assam during January 2013 is significant since intakes of uranium can lead to cancer risk, liver and kidney damage, and cause widespread public panic, and; *aerial delivery* - with reference to the Tokyo Subway bombing of 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult had two remote controlled helicopters but luckily, both remote controlled crashed during trials. Had they used aerial spraying, the damage would have been catastrophic. LTTE had owned aircraft, the USWA has its own helicopters presently, 9/11 terrorists commandeered US commercial aircraft. The threat from air has multiplied greatly with proliferation of UAVs. If Amazon.com can use autonomous winged robots to deliver your orders on your doorstep, so can terrorists deliver bombs and chemicals to assassinate political leaders.

Rapid advancements in technology have also impacted the changing nature of warfare in altering the dimensions of modern conflict. Improvements to military weapons throughout history have forced armies to continually adopt new fighting tactics to win battles. This is still true in the modern era where advances in robotics and targeting systems have lead to smarter weapons with deadlier payloads including directed energy weapons. Technology has also

enabled addition of space, cyberspace and the electro-magnetic as vital domains of warfare, which coupled with information advantage are the hallmarks of asymmetric war. Irregular forces are making good use of information technology and are well networked with modern communication. The advent of weapons of mass disruption has increased the lethality of terrorists and irregular forces. In the emerging age of economic constraints, diminishing recourses and prohibitive costs, most nations are cutting down on large standing armies. At the same time, they are looking at exploiting technology for increased lethality of weapons with enhanced ranges and precision, concurrently optimizing information technology to have smaller forces with network-centric warfare capability.

Modern Wars and Political Warfare

As mentioned above, political objectives are the nucleus of strategy. Concurrently, aiming for political objectives through war is what since long has been termed 'Political Warfare' albeit it was generally described as the use of non-lethal 'political' means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political described the calculated interaction between one's government and a target audience to include another country's government, military, and/or general population, governments using a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over the opponent. The fulcrum of these techniques was application of psychological operations both at the strategic and tactical levels, serving both national and military objectives. But political war can also be combined with violence, economic pressure, subversion, and diplomacy. Creation and application of such coercive methods are part of statecraft and serve as a potential substitute for more direct military action, economic sanctions being one example.

It is the changing nature of modern wars (conventional to sub-conventional, hybrid and asymmetric) that has forced the amalgamation of modern war and political warfare optimizing the 'violent' content of the latter. This not only includes measures by the aggressor like assassinations, sabotage, coups, insurgencies, psychological operations, revolution and civil wars but more and more proxy wars through application of irregular forces and terrorism. Foreign infiltration or liberation occurs when a government is overthrown by foreign military or diplomatic intervention, or through covert means. The campaign's ultimate purpose is to gain control over another nation's political and social structure

for larger strategic aims, as is happening in Syria presently with deliberate infiltration and support to rebel forces with the ultimate purpose of extending influence and control. Political warfare can also be aimed at balkanization of a country by exploiting internal tensions between political, class, ethnic, religious, racial, and other groups, even accepting smaller intermediate states within the victim state that meets interim political objectives. Paramilitary forces can also be employed in furtherance of political war, as planned by Pakistan through her Mujahid battalions; infiltration and subversion as well as small group operations, insurrection, and possible civil war in conjunction Maoists etc.

Political Objectives – Time Factor

Laying down rigid timeframes for attainment of political objectives may not work out in the present context. The US plans of regime change went awry for this very reason. In the case of Syria, Assad may eventually be replaced but it certainly did not work out in the time schedule the US desired. Interestingly, Dr Subhash Kapila wrote in his article 'US Strategic Blunders in Southwest Asia' in South Asia Analysis Group on 18 March 2013, "Strategically, the US cannot expect to sustain a long-term and effective presence in South West Asia by a constant and vicious demonization of Iran…… Iran commands the Shia Crescent extending from Lebanon, through Syria and to the borders of Afghanistan…… the current de-stabilization of Syria through a US-Saudi Arabia contrived war is more targeted at Iran than Syria." US actions in Syria including her use of Al Qaeda (as reported in US media) is for political purposes. Significantly, Russian intelligence had reportedly obtained proof of 'Britain Defence' (topmost British mercenary outfit) plans to provide a chemical weapon to Syrian rebels proposed by Qatar and approved by Washington that was perhaps eventually used for the Sarin gas attack in Syria. Perhaps it was Putin's threat to make the evidence public that stayed Obama's hand in striking Syria but despite the present US-Iran rapprochement, US political objectives are likely to remain unchanged.

Chinese have not laid down time frames for achieving their political objectives in Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea and "South Tibet". Thomas Reed, former US Air Force Secretary in his recent book 'The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation' reveals that China under Deng Xiaoping, decided to proliferate nuclear technology to communists and Muslims in the third world based on the strategy that if the West started

getting nuked by Muslim terrorists or another communist country without Chinese fingerprints, it would be good for China. The obvious political objective was to undermine western influence and economy but without any time frame. Same was in the case of China spawning Maoists and radical movements around the world. Again, in arming the USWA in Myanmar, China's political aim is to disrupt US-Myanmar congruence and 'discipline' Myanmar should the latter not toe the Chinese line. The Indian Maoists (whose brain is in Beijing), supported by both China and Pakistan, plan to establish their rule in New Delhi only by 2050, which is far off but is being worked upon, one indication being the dangerous Maoists-Indian Mujahideen nexus already developing in Bihar and Jharkhand.

Ambiguity vs Political Objectives

If one may surmise that the US action in Syria is actually targeting Iran, it may also be argued that global powers may never disclose what their actual political objectives are – short, medium or long term. They would like ambiguity to prevail even at the risk of criticism of failure. Take the case of Afghanistan. General David Petraeus, in his first extended public interviews as chief US and NATO Commander in Afghanistan talked of a mismatch between US political objectives and US military's operational objectives, the war having stalemated like in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive of 1968. Compare this with the fact that the Taliban were created in the first place by the US (and covert support of China) through Pakistan to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan, the bigger threat being that Soviets may cross the Afghanistan borders and embed themselves on the Indian Ocean.

Today, it is China that has become the main adversary of the US, economic interdependence notwithstanding. Hence, the US need to rebalance and "Pivot Asia" etc. As far back as 1904, HJ Mackinder wrote in his article 'The Geographical Pivot of History' in The Geographical Journal, London, "Chinese might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom, just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region". More recently, Robert D Kaplan in his book 'The Revenge of Geography' writes, "Pressure on land can help the United States thwart China at Sea". That is why increased US engagement in Myanmar and Nepal plus engaging Taliban (the main reason for US invasion) to join the political process in Afghanistan knowing they won't

and Taliban eventually controlling South and East Afghanistan plunging these regions in chaos, which in turn coupled with Baluchistan would retard Chinese advances to Gwadar, Chahbahar and Bandar Abbas. US scholars maintain US is not bothered about Chinese advances on land but the fact is that US and her allies would be deeply concerned with China developing an oceanic front on the Indian Ocean even if that possibility is a decade or two away.

Political Objectives through Modern War

Analyzing success or failure to achieve political objectives through modern war is dependent on a number of variables: *first,* what is 'modern war'? Are we talking of conventional war or are we talking of asymmetric, proxy war using irregular forces, terrorism mixed with application of high end technology and all other means to wage political warfare; *second*, are we certain what the political objectives are? What can be the hidden agenda or rather the 'actual' political objectives that are shrouded in ambiguity and to that end, can we accurately pinpoint the latter; *third*, is there a time-plan to achieve the political objectives, against whose background one can assess success or failure? Wars are becoming more and more 'indirect'. Ground realities have forced even a superpower like the US to dispense with the policy of 'boots on ground' and instead use irregular forces for subtle background manipulation. The days of regime change through direct conventional attack appear passé. Pakistan's bid for strategic depth in Afghanistan post US withdrawal is similarly aimed.

On balance, it may appear that success or failure in achieving political objectives through war between two conventional forces may be easy to define. However, the character and conduct of wars have undergone changes; political objectives can be ambiguous and even without any time frame. In case of the latter, an accurate analysis of the end result may not be possible beyond varied assessment by multiple scholars, security and political analysts.

Conclusion

Attainment of political objectives through 'all' available means is not a new phenomenon. Political warfare too is age old but the advent of proxy and irregular forces couple with advancements in technology have changed the mechanics of war and application of force. Proxy forces (available on hire) hitherto used

by conventionally weaker nations are equally being exploited by global powers as the currency of terror. Pursuit of political objectives through such means will continue generally with longer or without time stipulation. Identification of 'actual' political objectives may be complicated and success or failure of these may be difficult to define accurately as well.

War: Relevance in Contemporary and Future Politics

Brig (Retd) Rahul K Bhonsle

"[T]here is nothing new under the sun."

Ecclesiastes 1:9

The Contraindications

The Theory of Non Relevance of War

The relevance of war as an instrument of state policy the central theme that was propounded by Clausewitz which survived two centuries has come up for debate in the post modern World. There are numerous reasons propounded for relegating war as a policy option by a modern state. Unaffordability both in terms of human lives and material costs of wars is seen to act as a restraint for employment in pursuit of, "politics by other means". This is more so where two states are nuclear armed, mutually assured destruction and spread of collateral radiation implies that not just adversaries but others who will feel the impact resist an event seen as having cataclysmic effect.

The emergence of political consortium as the supra state in the form of the European Union (EU) an erstwhile grouping of warring states has reduced propensity for conflict in the West. The death of colonialism, in which countries as India have had a seminal role to play has also meant that extra territorial expansion of state power is restricted today to the economic rather than political

domain. A new form of colonialism dictated by trade interests has emerged with ironically the EU retaining the lead as the world's largest trading block. War or even internal conflict is abhorred as it will lead to reduction of trade.

Yet the reduction of scope for war has been restricted because of completion of the process of state formation after the Second World War. Apart from former Yugoslavia, Europe's nation states have firm national boundaries and solidified their sovereignty over territory which has been the main cause for wars in the past. Where such a process is incomplete as in much of Asia, there continues to be scope of war for settlement of disputes over territory and boundary, other factors remaining constant. These contra-indications cannot be ignored by countries as India which are in the midst of a vortex of regional political challenges.

Another factor is loss of monopoly of the Westphalian state on war to non state actors. This has resulted to emergence of a new form of sub optimal violence which has been variously framed as low intensity conflicts, non-wars or hybrid wars. Location of bloodshed of these conflicts in the populated space implies that the moral support of a modern state to employ maximum force which was a principal element of success identified by Clausewitz is no longer possible. The growth of the Widener's school in security studies led by Barry Buzan amongst others have postulated that security of a state also implies elimination of apart from military, political, economic, environmental threats amongst others. This has relegated war as a principal element of national security to the background. Espousal of concepts as comprehensive national power and its quantitative measurement in China has added to this trend. Thus the growth of theory of non relevance of war has found some acceptance in contemporary times.

Yet the contra-indication is emergence of a new form of war- fought by a state supported non state actor, which has not been holistically defined so far. Such a war is ongoing in Syria today resulting in the death of thousands of combatants and non combatants alike.

The Dissimulation of War

While the classic form of war defined as armed combat between military forces of two states employing maximum force has declined, alternate forms of use of 6state-supported non state actors.

The Budgetary Contraindication

There are contra-indications as well which need to be examined in some detail. While a school of theorists have subordinated war to bloodless or less bloody conflict, the practitioners and pragmatists continue to invest in the instruments of war making at levels that are unprecedented in human history. The military expenditure of the United States for instance has remained above the $ 500 billion mark for the past decade plus and averages approximately $ 618 billion from 2004 to 2011 as per SIPRI data at constant 2010 prices. For the year 2014 this exceeds $ 650 billion despite sequester that has been exercised due to financial constraints by the Obama Administration. The military expenditure of People's Republic of China during the same period has doubled from $ 57.5 billion to $ 129.2 billion averaging $ 93.7 billion in the same period. Quite apparently the spending on defence of the world's largest economies does not reflect expectations of reduction in the possibility of use of war as a tool for attaining political objectives.

The defence expenditure of India on the other hand has grown from 2004 to 2011 at a much lower scale from $31.6 billion to $ 44.2 billion or average of $38.6 billion as per the SIPRI. This despite the period being when growth of GDP in India averaged around 8 percent. There could be other factors that may be responsible for this contradiction in India's case. During this period 2004-2011 or its approximate India has emerged as the world's largest importer of arms. Lack of adequate capacity for conversion of budgetary resources for defence to accoutrements for war fighting may have been the principal reason for the lower growth of India's defence spending. This may be borne by the fact that surrender of funds allotted for capital expenditure mainly procurement of arms and munitions has been approximately 10 percent or more during this period.

A comparison of defence expenditure of the big spenders in Europe during the same period may be relevant. The budget of France from 2004 to 2011 has declined marginally from $ 60 billion plus to $ 58 billion at an average of $ 60.9 billion. Germany has fallen from $ 45.9 billion to $43.4 billion at an average of $ 44 Billion. UK budget expanded from $52.5 to $57.8 at an average of $ 56.2 billion. This is during a period when these European countries had substantial foreign commitment in Afghanistan and in the case of the UK in Iraq as well.

One inference from the above could be the relative high cost of modern weapons and equipment with the industrial age content supplemented by information one or the surveillance and communications content of platforms adding to the overall price of systems. On the other hand questions can be raised over heavy defence expenditure by countries which are not expecting to fight a conventional war given the trends implied by theorists. There is a dissonance between theory and practice.

The Contradiction of Contemporary Military History

Contemporary military history decrees relevance of war in attaining political objectives. The 1971 war of Liberation of Bangladesh is a key example which perhaps needs no elaboration. Relieving the people of Bangladesh from the tyranny of rule from then West Pakistan could be achieved only by launching a military operation. Gulf War 1991 is another prime example where war was waged to evict Saddam Hussein led aggressors from Kuwait, a political objective that was achieved by an international coalition led by the United States. The eviction of al Qaeda from Afghanistan was a political objective which was secured with minimal effort, once the main aim was lost sight of; Clausewitzian dictum of use of maximum force was abandoned leading for resurgence of the Taliban. Political objectives of Iraq War 2003 have been disputed, the end state is also questioned, yet success of the military conventional operation is undeniable. These examples underline the significance of war consummated adhering to well worn principles to achieve political objectives which are morally justified.

Future Case for War Option by India

Extrapolating Contra Indications

Extrapolating the four contraindications discussed above, theory of non relevance, dissimulation, defence budget and expenditure and examples of contemporary history to the future in the Indian context may be revealing. A brief overview of application of force in the military context would be relevant. This could be envisaged where an existential threat to the Indian state is envisaged. Territorially sovereignty as defined by the Indian Constitution and the Parliament defines sovereignty. With major territorial [as opposed to boundary] disputes with China and Pakistan loss of whole of part of Indian Territory claimed by

these two nations could provoke war. Public uproar over recent transgressions on the India China Line of Actual Control (LAC) and cross Line of Control (LOC) actions by Pakistani forces would denote that there is strong approval for use of force to protect territorial interests of the country to the extent of disturbing the status quo.

While the present Indian military objective is restricted to deterrence and war avoidance, the scenario could change in case territorial sovereignty is threatened. Progress in resolving the boundary disputes with China and Pakistan has been slow. The present approach is to maintain the status quo and manage the dispute given intractability of resolution. If any one side changes this to alter the same in its own favour use of force may be foreseen. Under the circumstances the security dilemma before the Indian national leadership would be to wage a limited or full scale war depending on the level of contestation by the adversary or accept loss of territory. Overall present national consensus dictates that going to war will be the option that will be exercised by the leadership.

Implications of Reluctance for War

Current military strategy is underlined by deterrence and war avoidance. Part of this is dictated by the necessity to avoid escalation to the nuclear ladder. The Cold Start doctrine partly reflects this dilemma. On the whole this denotes a reluctance to go to war. When supplemented by the theory of non relevance of war it may set dangerous portends for the military where the objective of avoiding war translates in reluctance for combat resulting in armed forces with compassionate intent, which is supplemented by a long standing commitment to counter insurgency operations resulting in focus on minimum force. An attendant outcome of this situation would be to structure political objectives which cover reluctance of the military to go to war. Nuclear escalation provides a convenient fait accompli, abjuring of the Cold Start doctrine indicated in some discussions is a pointer towards the same.

Conclusion –Theory of Non War Age in Perspective

To summarise the discussion above it would be evident that the theory of non wars is irrelevant particularly in the Indian context. This is breeding a status quo approach in decision making for employment of force which may be detrimental

to national security creating existential gaps which need to be avoided. War as a means to achieve political objectives may be irrelevant in the context of nation states in Europe, in the developing world particularly in the Indian milieu, war remains an option to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity. Abdication or an impression to do so may create vulnerabilities in the future and thus should be avoided. Preparedness for war has to be supported by a belief that war is inevitable rather than avoidable.

The Spoils of War

Vijai S. Chaudhari *

The Art of War, a timeless classic, opens with these well- known words[1]:

> "Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which on no account can be neglected."

Sun Tzu leaves no doubt that war is among the most important areas of inquiry, in which decision-makers of a state must engage. Two centuries later, Kautilya held similar views. He was more specific and perhaps more hardheaded in describing the principles of foreign policy[2]:

"The guiding principles which govern the Kautilyan theory of foreign policy are:

(i) a king shall develop his state. i.e. augment its resources and power in order to enable him to embark on a campaign of conquest.

(ii) the enemy shall be eliminated.

(iii) those who help are friends.

(iv) a prudent course shall always be adopted.

(v) peace is to be preferred to war; and

(vi) a king's behaviour, in victory and in defeat, must be just."

Many centuries after Kautilya, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) offered

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succinct advice on the centrality of armed conflict in the affairs of a state: "Before all else, be armed." Over the centuries, this has remained the dominant theme as far as the influence of armed conflict on national objectives is concerned[3]. However, events of the past six decades have raised questions about both the utility and the role of war in state policy. In large parts of the world, an entire generation has grown from childhood to retirement without personal experience of war, a situation that is unprecedented in human history. Other factors have also contributed to make the link between the military and the political leadership more tenuous than it has ever been before. The combination of military and political leadership that was commonplace until the Middle Ages has all but disappeared. Since, Medieval times, the police has evolved into a specialized organisation, distinct and separate from the army. The shift, in most countries, from widespread conscription to all-volunteer armed forces has reduced the number political leaders with personal experience of military service. Added to these are the forces of globalization and periodic 'outbreaks of peace', like the end of the Cold War. However, nuclear weapons have raised the most significant questions about the role of war and the future of the state. This is a short examination of the extent to which war stands marginalized in the 21st Century.

Human suffering and destruction have always been inseparable from warfare. The repugnance that this causes has made the search for alternatives to armed conflict as old as the study of war. Thus, even Sun Tzu extols the benefits of the skilful leader who ". . . subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; . . . captures their cities without laying siege to them; . . . overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field."[4] Kautilya also endorses the view that "peace is to be preferred to war"[5] in matters of foreign policy. However, it was only in the 20th Century that this general sentiment led to international action. World War I was the first war fought in Europe that used advances made possible by the Industrial Revolution, modern communications and mass production for waging war. This 'industrialized' warfare inflicted casualties on an unprecedented scale. Eight and a half million soldiers lost their lives and an estimated 21 million were wounded. Civilian casualties amounted to roughly 10 million more deaths. These overwhelming casualties brought 42 countries together at the end of the Great War to form the League of Nations. It was the first international organisation whose main mission was to maintain world peace. The League's primary goals included preventing wars through collective security

and disarmament. This was a fundamental shift from the past as the League was to help in settling international disputes through negotiation and arbitration. The League depended on the Great Powers to implement its resolutions, enforce its economic sanctions, and to provide an army when needed.[6] However, the League of Nations could not live up to its high principles as the Great Powers continued to place national interest above their obligations to the comity of nations. The outbreak of World War II only confirmed this turn of events.

After World War II, 51 states got together to form the United Nations as a successor to the ineffective League of Nations. A major purpose behind the organisation was to prevent another conflict like World War II. Towards this end, Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations requires that, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The charter thus rules out aggressive war as a lawful means for states to conduct international relations. However, under Article 51, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . ." These provisions leave a number of loose ends that are open to various interpretations. Firstly, the UN Charter concentrates largely on Member States. Applicability of various clauses to armed irregulars remains unclear. Domestic or transnational insurgent groups, who have been key players in many recent conflicts, also remain outside the scope of the definition. This leaves states as the only participants liable for acts of aggression. Secondly, the charter does not clearly specify the level of 'involvement' in aggression that would make a state liable for its actions. Thirdly, the definition of 'aggression' has also proved problematic.

A war of aggression[7] is a military conflict waged without any justification of self-defence. Territorial gain and subjugation are common objectives of such wars. This is a major departure from past practice as, throughout history, there were frequent wars of conquest. The UN Charter prohibits wars of aggression and, since the Korean War; they are a crime under customary international law. However, the fact that a war neither is for self-defence nor sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council does not necessarily make it a war of aggression. For example, a war to settle a boundary dispute where the initiator has a reasonable claim and limited aims would be difficult to place in any of

these categories. Besides, the definition of Aggression also does not cover acts by international organizations. This places non-state parties like NATO and the former Warsaw Pact beyond the scope of the Charter. The definition also does not fix responsibility on individuals for acts of aggression. The interpretation is also not binding on the Security Council, as it is only guidance for determining acts of aggression. The Security Council is free to apply or disregard this guidance as it sees fit. Only a more comprehensive definition can serve as a framework for analyzing the state of war.

In the 1832, Prussian military general and theoretician Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."[8] The International Committee of the Red Cross takes the position that "International humanitarian law distinguishes two types of armed conflicts, namely:

- international armed conflicts, opposing two or more States, and
- non-international armed conflicts, between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups, or between such groups only. IHL treaty law also establishes a distinction between non-international armed conflicts in the meaning of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and non-international armed conflicts falling within the definition provided in Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II."[9]

Legally speaking, no other type of armed conflict exists. It is nevertheless important to underline that a situation can evolve from one type of armed conflict to another, depending on the facts prevailing at a certain moment. However, Blacks' law dictionary[10] simply defines war as "Hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state." 'War' does not come into existence merely because the military forces of another nation have launched an armed attack. It must await recognition or acceptance by the government of the country attacked. This would happen through either a formal declaration of war or other acts demonstrating that such a state exists. The significance of this measure extends beyond international relations to areas of domestic law such as administration, finance, insurance and contracts. For example, courts will uphold seizure of a ship carrying contraband only if a state of war exists. Because of such ambiguities, the term 'armed conflict' now covers "hostilities between states at least one of which has resorted to the use of armed force."[11] The term also

describes hostilities between a state and organized, disciplined as well as armed groups operating within or outside the state. Analysis of trends in this entire range of 'hostile contention' can provide some clues to the future of warfare.

In the year 2000, the Israeli military historian and theorist Martin van Creveld published a landmark study about trends in warfare, covering the past millennium.[12] The study starts by tracing the development of major war from about A.D. 1000 to 1945. The second part examines the impact of nuclear weapons. The third part shows that while major war wanes, other forms of war are beginning to dominate. The study concludes with observations on the future of war. Creveld's major findings point towards the state of war at the beginning of the 21st Century.

Progressive consolidation was the most significant development in warfare during the thousand years leading up to 1945. At the beginning of this period, many different types of political organizations could and did wage war. Though many of them were secular, they represented a wide variety of organizations from religious to feudal and even tribal. The one thing they all had in common was the wherewithal to defend themselves. Over the centuries, there has been a steady decline in the types of political organizations with the ability to wage war. This process of political consolidation was associated with growth of economic power. Initially, the monarchs became much richer than their subjects. By the second half of the 18th Century, the personal resources of even the monarchs were becoming insignificant compared with the resources of the state. The industrial revolution that began around 1750, the transport revolution that followed it, and the simultaneous communications revolution reinforced these trends. When World War I broke out, states were richer and more powerful than ever. New administrative techniques made it possible for them to take away as much as 85 percent of the state's wealth for waging 'total' war.

Political and economic power is the basis for a state's military power. During the Middle Ages, even the most powerful feudal lords in Europe could only raise a few thousand troops. By the 18th Century, armed forces numbered in the hundreds of thousands. As these armies shifted to recruiting long-service professionals, the army's entire strength remained available in war as well as peace. By 1860, the railways and the telegraph had made it possible to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people, including a large proportion of conscripts.

This trend peaked during 1914–39, when the main belligerents mobilized over a hundred million men (besides two million women), to join battle on an unprecedented scale.

Technology allowed the modern state to accumulate unprecedented political-economic-military powers. After a thousand years of technological progress, the tank had replaced the horse as the most powerful weapon on land. Numerous other advances such as aircraft, machine guns and submarines had transformed 'pre-industrial' war to a deadly new avatar. Slowly but surely, the tide of war was turning from tactical manoeuvre and battlefield tactics to strategic manoeuvre and attrition. Many of the developments that drove this transition occurred during the industrial revolution and in the first half of the 20th Century. However, others, such as gunpowder and firearms were earlier inventions that continued to be refined. The result was huge increases in the power, speed, range and accuracy of weapon system, supported by vast advances in associated fields such as communication, transport, production and computation. All these developments came to a head during World War II. Seven powerful states battled each other for six years. The Soviet Union alone called up almost thirty-five million men. The 'total war' was so ferocious that it claimed the lives of forty to sixty million people and reduced large parts of Europe to rubble. Then, on August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb changed warfare forever.

For a thousand years, war had grown in size but, in 1945, nuclear weapons reversed the trend. According to van Creveld, this is the second major trend in warfare. From the beginning of history, a country going to war could be sure of surviving if it emerged victorious. With nuclear weapons, if the defeated side retains even a few useable weapons, the victor cannot take self-preservation for granted. More alarming, greater the margin of victory, greater is the chance that the losing side will use any nuclear weapons that it has. Strategic thinkers, with the possible exception of Bernard Brodie[13], took more than two decades to appreciate the significance of this break from the past. Brodie later took an even more cautious approach, advocating continued funding for conventional military forces to contain communism through limited wars and to fight total war if deterrence failed.[14] Meanwhile, many strategist continued the futile search for ways to use the 'ultimate weapon' that was actually almost impossible to use. Ever since, the search for ways to engage in nuclear war fighting has continued even though Brodie predicted as early as 1946:

> "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."

The arrival of nuclear weapons dramatically skewed the competition between offensive and defensive weapon systems. During World War II, a combination of radar, fighters and antiaircraft artillery often destroyed as many as a quarter of the bombers attacking a target. These huge losses did not dissuade the Allies from repeatedly launching multiple 1000 aircraft raids in a single night, against Germany, without achieving decisive results. However, in an attack with nuclear weapons, the outcome could be quite different. Even a defense capable of shooting down 90 percent of the incoming strikes would be pointless. This makes deterrence or the prevention of war the main if not the only currently feasible role for nuclear weapons. Deterrence is a relatively new concept because before the advent of nuclear weapons military theorists seldom even mentioned the term (the first known use of the term only dates back to circa 1547[15]).

By the beginning of the 21st Century, the number of nuclear powers had increased from just one to at least nine. The new nuclear states obviously did not find favour with the existing nuclear powers. The original nuclear powers, seeking to preserve their monopoly, opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons; claiming that they were too dangerous in the hands of aspiring nuclear powers. However, the spread of nuclear technology has proved difficult to stop and the number of states with nuclear weapons remains limited to nine more due to lack of will than any lack of capability on the part of potential proliferators. Besides, van Creveld points out that ever since the Soviet Union tested its first atom bomb, the status quo powers continue to exaggerate the dangers of nuclear proliferation.[16]

Instead of increasing the possibility of war, nuclear weapons have tended to inhibit inter-state wars, both nuclear and conventional. Since 1945, first and second level military powers have found it increasingly difficult to fight each other.

ARMED CONFLICTS BY TYPE[17]

1946-2006



The decline in inter-state armed conflict is reflected in the declining numbers of armed forces personnel in the developed countries. In 1939 France, Germany, Italy, the USSR, and Japan each possessed ready-to-mobilize forces numbering several million men. When the numbers peaked in 1944–45, the six main belligerents had forty to forty-five million men under arms. Since then, as van Creveld points out, world population has tripled along with the number of states. At the same time, international relations have been far from tranquil. Yet the size of regular forces fielded by most powers, including China, has declined.[18] In 1941, Germany invaded the USSR with 144 of the approximately 209 divisions in the *Wehrmacht*. The Soviet Union responded with even larger forces. Since 1945, no state has used more than twenty full-size divisions in a single campaign. In1991, a coalition that included three of the five permanent UN Security Council members fielded just about 5, 00,000 troops against Iraq. The future of huge armies, consisting largely of low-technology infantry, armed much like their counterparts in World Wars I and II, is increasingly doubtful.

Such forces may prove more suitable for maintaining internal security than for waging war against a major military power.

While the numbers of troops have declined, the reduction in major weapons and weapon systems has been much greater. From 1942 to 1945, the United States alone produced an average of 75,000 military aircraft each year. The U.S. Air Force currently buys roughly 125 to 350 aircraft each year. The number of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers has reduced from almost a hundred in 1945 to ten in active service. Some of this decline in the size of armed forces is due to escalating costs of modern weapons. For example, an M4 Sherman, the primary battle tank of the United States and other Western Allies in World War II, had a unit cost of US$ 33,500. A contemporary M-1 Abrams tank costs US$ 8.58 million, an increase of more than 240 times. Another explanation for declining numbers is that vast improvements in quality and reliability make large numbers unnecessary. The argument may be justified where precision guided munitions have replaced ballistic weapons such as older artillery and rockets. This greatly reduces the number of rounds necessary to destroy a target. There is much support for this explanation in the results of the two Gulf Wars, the 1999 air campaign against Serbia and in Afghanistan. However, for every modern weapon, with the exception of nuclear weapons, a counter usually exists. Thus, between evenly matched adversaries, attrition is heavy as was evident from results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1982 Falklands War. This suggests that states should be producing and stocking larger numbers of weapons, not less. The fact that this is not the case probably shows that many states are either unable or unwilling to prepare for wars on a large scale. Finally, cost could be the deciding factor. Vietnam and Afghanistan came close to bankrupting the two largest military powers, the United States and the USSR respectively.

Large thrusts into enemy territory, led by armoured formations, may be receding into history. During World War II, enemy forces occupied the capitals of four out of the seven major belligerents. Aerial bombing caused severe damage to two more capitals, London and Moscow. Only Washington, D.C. escaped destruction of any kind. Since then, no first or second level power has had large-scale military operations waged on its territory. In fact, most countries involved in wars were small and relatively unimportant. Even when the countries involved were of some importance, as with India and Pakistan, military operations did not extend beyond border incidents that never threatened the capitals. At

beginning of the 21th Century, major inter-state wars are rare. In terms of size, forces involved, scope of military operations, or threat to existence, subsequent conflicts have rarely come close to World War II levels. The world clearly continues to be a dangerous place but new forms of armed conflict appear to be taking the place traditional warfare.

Just when the state monopoly on armed violence seemed close to becoming complete, new actors have joined the fray. Nuclear weapons introduced doubts about the ability of 'total' war to resolve differences between states. However, these weapons have clearly not ended armed conflict between states.

NUMBER OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND NEW CONFLICTS [19]

1950-2006

New forms of armed conflict are taking the place of inter-state war. This is the third major trend identified by van Creveld. It is not that major war between states has entirely disappeared but that a different kind of armed conflict has gained ground. State forces, notably from Europe, dominated armed conflict until 1914 because they were more than a match for non-state actors as well as for traditional armies in other parts of the world. For example, during the 'scramble for Africa', at Omdurman in 1896, a few thousand Europeans armed

with Maxim guns and modern rifles wiped out entire columns of Sudanese dervishes. However, the armed insurrection that T.E. Lawrence helped organize in Arabia, just two decades later, was a clear sign that the tide had again begun to turn against the state monopoly of armed violence.

During World War II, German and the other occupying forces found that the most powerful elements of their armed forces were of least use against insurgents. Tanks, artillery, fighters, and bombers were essential against powerful armies. However, they were ineffective against small groups of guerrillas who did not wear uniforms, did not fight in the open, and tended to melt away into the countryside or surrounding populations. German forces found that in a counterinsurgency, lightly armed police, light infantry, mountaineers, Special Forces, signals units, and intelligence personnel of every kind were those that mattered. These forces operated on foot or travelled in light vehicles. In the countryside, reconnaissance aircraft could reinforce the counterinsurgency forces. On the rare occasions that insurgents attacked in strength, small detachments of artillery and tanks became relevant. There was no role in such operations for the *Wehrmachts* renowned armored and mechanized divisions or for large formations.

After World War II, the wartime lessons of the German, Japanese and Italian forces were repeated in other parts of the world. The French and the British were among the first to encounter guerrilla warfare after World War II. French attempts to retain control of their former colonies, with modern weapons, ultimately failed despite large-scale death and destruction. British efforts were less strenuous but also ended in failure. As van Creveld concludes, "... against enemies so dispersed and so elusive that they could barely be found, the most powerful weapons of all, nuclear ones, were simply irrelevant." Over the years, the Dutch, Belgians, Spanish, and Portuguese also had to give up their colonies despite having superior forces on their side. US forces replaced the French in Vietnam only to share a similar fate. Even after deploying up to 536,100 troops, supported by the most advanced military technology in the world, success proved elusive. The Vietcong suffered between 400,000 and 1,100,000 fatal military casualties. However, though much smaller, US casualties were also significant with 58,220 killed and 303,644 wounded during more than 13 years of involvement. These losses were enough to break USA's resolve. Since then, the limitations of conventional military forces in counterinsurgency operations

have emerged in conflict after conflict across the world.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet army left after eight years of inconclusive fighting. A second intervention by an US led coalition is still unfolding. The second Iraq War, the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka as well as the interventions in Somalia, Namibia, Eritrea and numerous other conflicts have only confirmed the limitations of conventional forces. Whenever modern well-equipped military forces took on an insurgency, victory proved elusive. Besides, guerrilla actions and terrorist violence have tended to occur most often in third-world countries. These actions either were the result of aspirations for a separate state or took place when the state allowed its monopoly over violence to wither. However, developed states have also had their share of terrorism. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Britain, Ireland, Japan, Russia and even the United States have experienced terrorist violence. Despite strenuous efforts and provision of large resources, the threat of intra-state armed conflict continues to persist.

Armed conflict continues to evolve along two different paths. Rupert Smith describes them as 'industrial war' and 'war amongst the people'.[20] According to Smith, industrial war emerged during Napoleonic times and dominated armed conflict until the beginning of the Nuclear Age. Its main characteristic is the decisive use of military force for clear political objectives. Industrial war relies on the destruction of enemy military objectives to attain its aims. Victory is therefore as much a matter of having superior means for waging war as actions on the battlefield. For countries to become better at waging industrial war, all of society had to be militarized and dedicated to supporting the war effort. Thus, all of society became a valid target while waging total war. Just when nuclear weapons raised industrial warfare to a new level of destructiveness, a new paradigm emerged. Industrial war now faces a robust challenge from intra-state war. This new challenge to the might of the state makes the huge destructive power of its armed forces irrelevant by attacking the will of the people. However, far from marginalizing conventional military forces, countering intra-state war requires much closer integration of the armed forces with the rest of society.

A military response is just one of an array of resources needed to quell a war amongst the people. Clausewitz made this amply clear with his much-quoted observation about war being a continuation of politics carried on with 'other

means'. However, the implications for armed forces are profound, particularly in terms of the conflicting requirements that they must now address. The most obvious requirement is to operate in far closer coordination with other arms of the government than was necessary for conventional war. The difficulties in prosecuting war amongst the people are compounded by the fact that armed forces configured for anti-insurgency operations are closer in nature to police forces than conventional armed forces. This would not be major issue if it were not for the fact that such forces would be hopelessly outclassed in a more traditional inter-state armed conflict.

Against this backdrop, the Indian approach to armed conflict presents a study in contrasts. From the first years of independence, India has been embroiled in inter-state as well as intra-state armed conflict. The country generally holds the armed forces in high esteem and defence expenditure has support from across the political spectrum. These factors may give the impression of clear understanding about matters related to armed conflict and appropriate use of hard power by the national leadership. However, the reality has been shaped by a variety of historical, cultural and political influences. The uprising, in 1857, against the East India Company's administration, ended the easy intermingling between British and Indian citizens. The Army came to be cloistered in cantonments, well insulated from political influences. Later, it was a short-lived revolt by ratings of the Royal Indian Navy, in 1946, that hastened the end of British colonial rule in India. In the years following Indian independence, many newly independent former colonies came under military rule. Meanwhile, Indian foreign policy was taking shape under influences such as the non-aligned movement and the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Amidst these developments, the bureaucracy was jostling for a place in the newly independent country's power structures. The outcome of all these influences was twofold. Firstly, civilian control of the armed forces became a fetish with the decision-making elite. This preoccupation ignored the staunchly apolitical character of the Indian Armed Forces and placed all matters related to them within a firewall of generalist bureaucrats. In the process, civilian control soon amounted to control by civilians and more often than not by as many civilians as possible. The second outcome was a result of the first. The smothering layers of bureaucracy, that were found necessary to assert the principle of civilian control, created an ever-widening chasm between the political leadership and the armed

forces. This prescription is also used to fill the highest positions, in advisory structures meant to bridge this chasm, exclusively with former bureaucrats, diplomats and police officials. Far from indicating a marginalization of war, this situation only underscores the need for reform. Unfortunately, India is located in a troubled strategic neighborhood with numerous simmering tensions. Under the circumstances, it is inevitable that the country will occasionally experience the reality behind the adage[20]:

"You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you."

Moving into the 21st Century, armed conflict continues to be a core concern for the state. Not only is it distressingly frequent but war amongst the people also poses a concurrent threat to the authority of the state and the safety of its citizens. Armed forces that are often numerically smaller and armed with smaller inventories of weapons than in the past must also deter conventional and nuclear attacks. Only a viable capability for industrial war can fulfill this mission requirement. At the same time, armed forces must operate in close coordination with other instruments of the state to facilitate missions such as compellence, persuasion, coercive and non-coercive diplomacy besides augmenting hard, soft and 'smart' power of the state. Thus, far from being marginalized, the study, prevention and conduct of war continue to be a vital matter for the national leadership.

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India and China in South East Asia:* Competition or Cooperation?

Col MD Upadhyay **

The book – India and China in South East Asia: Competition or Cooperation has been authored by Dr Pankaj K Jha. The author is a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has been associated with Indian Council of World Affairs as a Research Fellow. He has also worked as Associate Fellow at IDSA from 2005 to 2011. He is an expert on Southeast Asia Politics and Economy; Regional Organizations, Terrorism; Diaspora Studies, Defence Cooperation. The author has written a number of books on South Asian affairs and India's relations with the neighbouring countries. Dr Jha has also contributed numerous articles on India – China relations with reference to Southeast Asia.

Due to lack of clear policy, India has been facing absence of tangible deterrence against China. Indian policy-makers are wary of China and view its growing economic and military power with suspicion. The discussions and arguments on China can become informed only after an effort is made to understand the deep thought and far sight with which China has planned its every move. The book addresses the debate about the intense competition and occasional cooperation between India and China with a focus on Southeast Asian region. The competition between two nations has intensified for gaining access to the markets and larger stakes in mineral and energy resources, to fuel respective economic growth and development. However, the effect of this

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* **India and China in South East Asia: Competition or Cooperation,** *by Dr Pankaj K Jha,, (Manas Publishers), Rs 795.00*

** **Col M D Upadhyay** *is a senior Fellow at CENJOWS.*

economic trickledown has reached remote regions of South-eastern China and Northeast India, forcing the two countries to engage and cooperate with the countries of Southeast Asia. Conversely, with China's increasing assertive behaviour in its contiguous maritime zones i.e., East China Sea and South China Sea as well as US 'pivot' or rebalancing policy in Asia, the power configuration between India and China has been getting more complex. The book attempts to assess the weightage of irritants like China's occupation of Tibet, Brahmaputra diversion, South China Sea and China's support to North-eastern insurgency and equates those with India's hosting of Tibetan refugees and Dalai Lama, proximity with US, interactions with Myanmar and role in multi-lateral institutions to decode the functional possibilities between the two nations. Highlighting varied tactical compulsions, it discusses how India and China are going to manage the numerous dimensions of strategic hedging, economic cooperation and tangible leverages to their advantage and whether it would translate into competition or cooperation.

The book is structured on debate about the issue of rise of China and its interpretations by Asian and western scholars. To understand the subject, the book has been divided into four sections. The first section deals with rise of China, resultant military modernisation in Southeast Asia to counter China's rise and China's efforts to assuage this feeling of threat. The second section deals with India's interests in Southeast Asia and success of India's 'Look East' policy. The third section highlights the areas of competition and cooperation between the two nations. It also discusses the various regional multilateral mechanisms which the two countries have adopted to consolidate their influence in the region. The last section of the book debates on areas of cooperation and contest between the two nations. It magnifies the increasing connectivity initiatives undertaken by the two nations.

The book has been written in simple language and the contents are exhaustive and detailed. It makes an engrossing reading. In his endeavour to provide relevant information, the author at times appears to get repetitive. Use of a few relevant maps and statistical data might have made the book even more useful. It has been published by Manas Publications and quality of publication is satisfactory. The cost of the book is Rs 795/-. The book is recommended for all dealing with the subject.

India and Africa Enhancing Mutual Agreement*

Col Amit Sinha **

General

The book India Africa – Enhancing Mutual Agreement is a collection of papers written and contributed by various eminent personalities each of whom are specialist in the field of India Africa Relations. The book has been edited by Ruchita Beri who incidentally has also contributed by her paper on India Africa Security arrangement. The book has been laid out in 13 Chapters which are papers presented by different personalities. The chapters are so structured that each is linked to the other and makes a continuous and interesting reading.

About the Book

The book represents an effort to build on existing partnership between India and Africa and forge new areas of convergence and mutual engagement. It brings together India and Africa perspective on a plethora of domestic, international, economic issues relevant to both sides. The book initially brings out the African Perspective of various emerging global challenges and tries to bring out similarity how India too in more than one issue is facing them. It also seeks to answer several bilateral and regional issues, such as how successful have the UN peace keeping been in resolving conflicts in Africa. It also brings out the relevance of African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and

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* **India and Africa Enhancing Mutual Agreement**, *Edited by Ruchita Beri, (Pentagon Press, 2013), Rs 775.00, ISBN 978-81-8274-751-7*

** **Col Amit Sinha** *is a senior Fellow at CENJOWS.*.

focuses on the role of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It brings out that for enhancing the conflict resolution in Africa, there is a need for coordination and integration of conflict resolution mechanisms of AU, RECs and the UN. Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar in his paper addresses the issue of successful conflict preventive diplomacy and recommends setting up a team under the African Union comprising of world class experts on issues of power sharing, constitutions, and cease fires who can be deployed on call to help envoys in field.

The book addresses the causes of the rise of piracy in the Indian Ocean Region and whether a regional solution in sight. It highlights the impact of piracy on the region and in Somalia, regional and international response and the Somali inland strategy to counter piracy. The book further highlights the emerging socio-economic trends like demographic trajectory, urbanisation, rise in the African middle class and convergence between banking and mobile telephony in Africa which needs to be taken note of. The book endeavours to address that since economic engagement has been seen as crucial driver of relation between India and Africa, how can this cooperation be increased. With regard to India Africa Security cooperation, the book examines the historical evolution of India Africa security cooperation, the dynamics of such cooperation and the challenges associated. In this regard the book brings out the necessity for the creation of frameworks for international economic, technological and humanitarian interaction that are aimed less at militarized international relations, and more at enhanced technological innovations and better human life conditions that are both environmentally sustainable and resource efficient.

In so far as India Africa Security Engagement is concerned, the book brings out that despite the creation of African Union and regional organisations, renewed efforts towards stability and conflict resolution, Africa continues to face ever increasing security challenges. The continent has not only witnessed widespread inter-state and intra-state strife, it also faces numerous non traditional threats such as terrorism, poverty, disease and environmental decay.

The book has two chapters on Indian Diaspora. It brings out the importance of the Diaspora community in overall dynamics of bilateral engagements between states. The book brings out the important role played by them in colonial economies especially in the commercial and business structures. The last

chapter of the book deals with the character of Indian Diaspora in other countries and compares them with those living in Africa and the role played by them. The book also brings out interesting incidents with regards to Indian Diaspora with particular reference to those living in Uganda and Kenya. Interestingly it also brings out that it would not be fair to compare the Indian (NRIs & PIOs) in US with those in Africa as it involves addressing them as living in one country US unlike those in 54 Nations in Africa. The chapter brings out the strengths and weaknesses of the Indian Diaspora and recommends measures as to how they could be leveraged for enhancing India Africa mutual agreements.

The book makes a very interesting and educative reading. The contributors have put forward their points of view logically and dispassionately. The book makes good reading. It is highly recommended as a reading material and certainly a possession in the library.

BRICS and the China - India Construct A New World Order in Making?*

Col MD Upadhyay **

BRICS and the China – India Construct; A new World Order in Making is an IDSA Monograph published in Sep 2013. The author is Dr Jagannath P Panda who is a Research Fellow at IDSA, New Delhi since Aug 2010. Dr Panda has done his PhD from Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies (SIS), JNU, New Delhi in 2006-07. The author is also the Centre Coordinator for East Asia. As the coordinator, he is in charge of Center's academic and administrative activities, including TRACK-II bilateral dialogues with China, Japan and South Korea. Dr Panda has been working on different aspects of Sino-Indian relations. He is also affiliated to the Institute for Transnational Studies (ITS), Germany/Italy and Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm, Sweden. He has received several international fellowships. He was Asia Guest Fellow at ISDP (STINT Fellow, Sept-Dec 2010), Stockholm in Sweden; Carole Weinstein Programme Visiting Faculty at the University of Richmond, Virginia, USA (Jan-May 2012), affiliated Visiting Scholar (2012) for the ACDIS of the University of Illinois in Urbana Champaign (USA), Visiting Professor at National Chung-Hsing University (NSC Fellow, May-August 2010) in Taichung (Taiwan); Institutional Fellow at Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) in Shanghai, China (May-July 2009).

Dr. Panda has traveled extensively in USA, Europe and Asia for numerous

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* **BRICS and the China- India Construct : A New World Order in Making?,** *by Jagannath P Panda, (IDSA monograph), Rs 270.00*

** **Col M D Upadhyay** *is a senior Fellow at CENJOWS.*

bilateral dialogues, talks and seminars/conferences. He has been a member of IDSA delegation for TRACK-II dialogues with various Chinese, Japanese and Korean think-tanks. He has earlier worked with IDSA as Research Assistant from Oct 2006 to Sep 2007. Prior to this, Dr. Panda was Centrally Administered Fellow at the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), Ministry of HRD, Govt of India from Jan 2005 to June 2006. He is a recipient of V.K. Krishna Menon Memorial Gold Medal in 2000 from Indian Society of International Law and Diplomacy, New Delhi. He has also received academic excellence award in1999 from Ramjas College in Delhi University. The author has contributed extensively in a number of journals dealing with China – India relations and BRICS.

Experts across the world are trying to comprehend the various dynamics of BRICS which is a new arrival on the global scene and the contours that are attached to this recent multilateral grouping. Among the attractions that BRICS holds is the construct of China- India, two of the most populous societies and attractive economies of the world. Given the dynamism that these two Asian countries hold in world politics today, their bilateral ties always merit policy debate and academic attention. However, to what extent the two countries accommodate each other's strategic interests in a rapidly emerging multipolar global order and in various emerging politics have not received adequate attention.

The monograph under review aims to understand and contribute to the strategic analysis of foreign, security and economic policy issues that are attached to the rise of BRICS. This is not only a study about BRICS but also on China and India who are the two most vital powers of this group. An attempt is made to examine, assess and understand the discourse of BRICS and China's multilateral drive with regard to the BRICS grouping. The study has been written in the Indian context and has tried to research the China-India course within BRICS. It explores the rise of BRICS in the context of emerging powers or the developing world's dialogue, particularly of China and India, while contextualizing the complexity of mutual settings of these two countries. Whether BRICS can produce any constructive results in favour of the South will depend heavily upon the rational and foreign policy conduct of these two eminent countries of Asia.

The study is structured in three parts. The first part brings out a theoretical and conceptual dialogue about the rise of BRICS and places it in the context of the emerging powers, to distinguish the uniqueness of the rise of BRICS and

China. The second part analyzes China's approach to BRICS. It debates that China sees the rise of BRICS as an opportunity in the context of cross-continental politics as well as in China's broader global aims and foreign policy objectives. The third and final part deliberates on India's approach to BRICS in the context of China-India relations, future of BRICS, and policy imperatives for India. The study concludes that there is the need is to assess and review the strengths and weaknesses that both China and India hold towards each other within BRICS. The identity of BRICS lives more with China-India politics than any other politics, justifying the notion that the world structure is very much multipolar, where both these countries constitute two different poles on their own. A new world order will always be possible with China-India association and not in China-India isolation or division. Further, India's rise and prominence within BRICS needs to be recognized by China. China and India also must set an example for BRICS and developing countries on how to maximize and promote collective thinking and common objectives.

The book has been written in simple language and the contents are exhaustive and detailed. It makes an engrossing reading. It contains 124 pages and has been printed by M/S AM Offsetters, Noida and quality of publication is satisfactory. The cost of the book is Rs 270/- and is recommended for all dealing with the subject.

Developments in the Gulf Region Prospects and Challenges for India In the Next two Decades*

Col Navjot Singh **

The Gulf region comprising of Iran, Iraq, the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Yemen forms part of India's extended neighbourhood. The region is the principal provider of India's energy needs, home to about six million expatriates, a major economic and political partner and presents great security and economic challenges for India. This book examines the geopolitical undercurrents and maps the contours of the emerging regional order to provide a holistic appraisal of the entire spectrum of India's Gulf politics. The uncertainties for the region created by the "Arab Spring" have also been factored while carrying out the analysis. Facts and perceptions on specific issues and critical drivers that are likely to have a bearing on the future developments have also been considered. The book has been structured into five chapters followed by a final chapter on scenario building where three plausible scenarios in the region post 2030 have been discussed and the chapter wise comments have been given in subsequent paragraphs.

The first chapter pertains to "Strengthening Political and Strategic Ties". This chapter attempts to analyse the current state of relationship between India and the region, and explore the possibilities of deepening the engagement to a

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* **Developments in the Gulf Region: Prospects and Challenges For India In The Next Two Decades,** *Edited by Rumel Dahiya, (Pentagon Press, 2013), ,pp 177, Rs.695-/ ISBN: 978-81-8274-745-6.*

** **Col Navjot Singh** *is a senior Fellow at CENJOWS.*

much higher level. The state of relations between India and the countries of the Gulf region have been analysed in detail, country specific irritants/ stumbling blocks have been identified and specific recommendations provided to leverage the present relationship (which is presently limited to the economic sphere), to the political and strategic fields. The chapter also advocates looking beyond traditional ties and look at active co-operation with the Gulf countries in in issues in issues other than trade to include Anti -Piracy Operations, cultivating a deeper political understanding & military engagement to forge a strategic partnership. The Gulf countries play an active role in multilateral organisations like Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League and it is thus important for India to tap this crucial political support. At the same time as the relationship between various nations of the Gulf have been marked by competition and rivalry,hence it has been correctly advised that India needs to maintain a balanced relationship with all the countries. It is also brought out that India is strongly positioned to play a role in the region and there is a need to deepen the relationship beyond trade and energy. For the GCC nations India is an emerging global power with stakes in the security of the region. Accordingly it is felt that India should contribute to the Gulf security. However it has been brought out that India is accused by the GCC of not being bothered about the region's security and lacking the political will and enthusiasm for further strengthening the relationship in political and strategic fields. The chapter also deliberates upon the factors which have hindered the development of relationship between India and the Gulf nations and lists out drivers which are likely to shape the political future of the region and provides some extremely relevant recommendations in this regard.

The next chapter "Security in the Gulf Region and India's Concerns, Vulnerabilities, Interests and Engagement Options" addresses how India's role in the security dynamics of the region would depend upon its core national interests in the region and how it views its engagement. The security environment in the region has been critically analysed and some of the developments and key factors in the region which are likely to have a major effect on security have been analysed in detail. While discussing the major potential security challenges, the Iran- GCC issue, the sectarian conflict and the threat of proliferation of WMDs have been analysed in the context of engagement options for India, based on perceptions in the region.

The "India West Asia Energy Dynamics" are then discussed which highlights India's energy dependence on West Asia and dwells upon the key drivers which affect India's energy ties with the region. The regional geopolitical complexities are explained and the need to provide security to the SLOC is emphasised upon. The book dwells on the issue of "Regime Stability", which the leaders of the Gulf region are grappling with. It is explained that India's energy supplies from the region were not impacted due to the "Arab Spring" and that this situation is unlikely to change in the future, except in case of a catastrophic development like a war with Iran. A peep into China's foray into the energy sector and recommendations for an enhanced energy security for the country are also provided by the authors which merits serious deliberation.

While discussing "India's Trade Relations with the GCC States", it has been explained that the 6 million strong Indian work-force in the Gulf has also created a significant market for Indian goods in the region. The report goes on to explain that the time is ideal for upgrading the India- Gulf trade relationship substantially over the next two decades, based on shared complementarities and improved political and security ties. India's major trade and investment challenges in the GCC have analysed in detail, bottlenecks identified, major drivers of trade and economic relations between India and the GCC have been deliberated upon and country specific recommendations provided to enhance the present volumes of trade.

The issue of "Indian Migrants in the Gulf Countries" has been analysed from the perspective of a mutually beneficial relationship between India and the Gulf states. The profile of Indian migrants in the region is analysed in the backdrop of the renewed indigenisation policies, political uncertainties and possible contingencies in the future, including the need to carry out large scale evacuation from the region. Certain key drivers affecting migration have been dealt with in detail and the implications of large scale return of migrants from the Gulf have been analysed. Certain country specific labour reforms required to be made in GCC nations have been spelt out and certain recommendations have been provided in the backdrop of the large diaspora and the volume of forex remittance made by them.

Finally three plausible scenarios likely in 2030 have been developed by the authors as it is felt that the Gulf region of 2030 will be shaped by the complex

interaction of a multitude of factors at internal and external levels. While one scenario is an extrapolation of current trends, the other two provide variations which may occur. The book goes on to explain that irrespective of which scenario becomes real, balancing the relationship between GGG on one hand and Iran on the other will remain a challenge for Indian foreign policy. India will also have to contend with a highly unpredictable and unstable political and security environment in the Gulf.

The book has brought in focus a very important aspect of relationship between India and the Gulf region and the pressing need to explore the possibilities of deepening the engagement to a much higher level. The issue has at least been discussed but needs the state's attention so that we look beyond traditional ties to explore active co-operation with the Gulf countries in issues other than energy & trade and are also amply clear of our national interest. The authors of the articles are of credible standing and the entire script is well edited and put forward in a lucid style that even a layman can understand the strategic importance of the issue. The book is recommended for reading and should find a place in the reference section of the libraries of policy makers and various government and civil organisations dealing with the Gulf region.

Interaction with Kenyan Delegation

A delegation from the Kenyan Joint Warfare Centre had an interaction with the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) on 09 Sep 2013. The Kenyan delegation comprised of the following:-

(a) Brig Charles Tai Gituai – Comdt, Kenyan Joint Warfare Centre.

(b) Brig Francis Maina Murgor – Brig i/c Collective Trg at the Ministry.

(c) Col Patrick Ablel Amogola – Defence Attache (based in Delhi).

(d) Lt Col Abraham Kipchirchir Biwot – AF rep at the Joint Warfare Centre.

(e) Lt Col Walter Kenaiyaa Mukoma – Naval rep at the Joint Warfare Centre.

Maj Gen (Retd) KB Kapoor, VSM, Director CENJOWS having introduced the faculty of CENJOWS gave brief presentation on the background, Aim, Focus areas of CENJOWS and also explained the methodology of execution to achieve the desired aim.

It was also clarified that CENJOWS is an autonomous think tank and enjoyed considerable academic freedom and views expressed by its scholars are not necessarily views of the Govt.

During the interaction, the issues which were deliberated upon are as listed in the subsequent paragraphs.

Network Centric Warfare

The concept of Network Centric Warfare, where in various sensors are integrated, the info is analysed and acted upon was brought out. It was explained that the network is but an enabler/tool and the shooter platform needs to be enabled by

the inputs from the sensor network. It was explained by the Addl Dir CENJOWS that the ICT network is as good as its ability to create effects. The network is a tool which we can't do without but it is ultimately just an enabler. This is required because the ability to strike has outstripped the ability to decide and discern. Thus the network helps to make sense of information and direct it to the person who is required to act upon it.

Joint Training and Challenges in Ushering Jointness

The Kenyan delegation explained their model of joint training and were informed that in India jointness began from Pre Officer (ie Cadet) training during NDA itself. Tactical training is then imparted to the mid level Officers during DSSC course. Later, Senior Officers are imparted training at operational and strategic level, during HC/HDMC course after they finish command of their units. Finally selected Offrs are imparted training in National Policy making at the NDC, which is also attended by Civil servants and Bureaucrats.

Challenges / Impedements in Ushering in Jointness

It was explained that in the CDS ethos, the Ops are controlled by the CDS & respective Service Chiefs are merely resource providers. However, in the Indian Context, each service Chief is responsible to both train his service and also employ them for operations. Thus the transition from a non CDS to CDS scenario will take time to mature.

Functioning in the Absence of a CDS

The Director explained that in the Indian context the Chairman COSC is the senior most service Chief and acts as the defacto CDS. There is however a proposal to appoint either a CDS or else a separate Chairman COSC, who will also be a four star General and will be equal in seniority to the three Service Chiefs ie one amongst equals. It was explained that everywhere in the world where CDS has been created, it had been a decision thrust down by the political hierarchy. However, in the interim period in India, we are able to achieve synergy in operations even in the absence of CDS primarily as we do not have global aspirations.

Analysis of Increasing Chinese Aspirations & Presence in the IOR

The Chinese mov to increase its presence in the IOR is primarily to secure its SLOC and energy supply. China may have helped countries to develop ports in the Indian Ocean Region but whether these nations will allow their land / ports developed, to be used as a base by China and allow presence of Military personnel is another issue and both need to be analysed separately. However, it was explained that in naval matters there are no half measures – either a nation has a coast guard and a coastal water navy or else a blue water navy of international standards. Either way, our nation is well prepared.

Measures Taken to Address the Piracy Problem in Somalia

In response to a question put forth by the Dir CENJOWS, the Comdt Kenyan Joint Warfare Centre explained that the piracy problem in Somalia was caused due to breakdown of authority in that region. Statistics however showed that barring the Gulf of Eden, the problem had since reduced. This had been helped to a large extent by the patrolling being carried out by the Indian Navy and other nations. However, if Somalia is liberated from the control of various militant groups, then piracy will end. Wherever Army Zone is effective, there is no piracy. This leads to the conclusion that control of land will ultimately solve the problem of piracy.

How Somalia is seen to Hold up in Future

The Kenyan delegation elaborated that Somalia was an Egalitarian Society where clan / regional affiliations run deep. Though it is unlikely to survive as a nation in its present from, yet what is likely to emerge as is a loose federation of strong clans / regional groups. Each clan will be ruled by the clan elder (apparently throwing conventional democracy to the winds) and these clan elders will select / elect the structure of the federal outfit to govern the nation.

Proceedings recorded by Col Navjot Singh, Sr Research Fellow, CENJOWS)

Articles For Synergy Journal

Articles, Research Papers, Book Reviews pertaining to issues related to defence, national security, international relation and other matters professionale; in original may be forwarded to the Editor SYNERGY, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi - 110 011 as per following guidelines:-

- Printed in double space on A-4 Size paper
- Printed on one side of the paper
- Preferably less than 3000 words
- Arial Font with Font Size 12 in Word Document
- Forwarded alongwith a CD.
- Copy should also be sent on e-mail to cenjows@yahoo.com
- Abbreviations may please be avoided
- No classified content should form part of the article
- End Notes and Bibliography, if applicable, should be attached
- Contribution should not have been offered to other journals
- A brief CV of the author should accompany the article.

A certificate from the author certifying that the article has neither been published in any other journal / magazine / book nor has been offered for publication should also be sent alongwith the article. Serving officers should enclose a “No Objection Certificate” from their immediate superior wrt publication of the articles.

The author will also receive a complimentary copy of the Journal in which his/her article appears.

Suitable honorarium will be paid to the contributors for their articles.

- Editor

CENJOWS Publications

Seminars

		Price (Rs)	Year
1.	Indian Way of War Fighting Proceedings of the Seminar compiled In the form of a Book.	395/-	2008
2.	Indian Experience in Force Projection Proceedings of the Seminar detailing First hand account by those who commanded/ Participated in IPKF Operations in Sri Lanka And Maldives.	300/-	2008
3.	War Against Global Terror Proceedings of the Seminar compiled In the form of a Book.	495/-	2008

Study Reports

1.	India's Comprehensive National Power: Synergy through Joint Decision Making - Study Report.	800/-	2009
2.	Uniform Code of Military Justice	100/-	2009
3.	India's Strategic Stakes in Afghanistan	295/-	2010
4.	The Armed Forces Tribunal Act	100/-	2010

5.	Defence Industrial Base - 2025 (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	850/-	2010
6.	Integrated Force Projection by India (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	750/-	2011
7.	Space Security: Indian Perspective (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	550/-	2011
8.	Employment of Special Forces: Challenges and Opportunities (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	795/-	2012
9.	Indo- US Defence Cooperation (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	225/-	2012
10.	Water: A Source for Future Conflicts (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	995/-	2013
11.	Implementation of RTI Act 2005 in the Armed Forces and its Implications (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	450/-	2013

Issue Briefs

1.	Role of Pakistan in India's Energy Security Vol I. No. I. 2013 (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	450/-	2013
2.	India's Defence Procurement: Issues and Prospects Vol I. No. II. 2013 (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	150/-	2013
3.	India's Quest for Defence Equipment Policy Vol I. No. III. 2013 (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	150/-	2013
4.	Chinese Chequers in the Indian Ocean Region Vol II. No. I. 2014 (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	195/-	2014

5.	Understanding Iran Vol II. No. II. 2014 (*available from Vij Books India Pvt Ltd*)	150/-	2014

Synodos Papers

1.	LTTE & Sri Lanka : A Way Ahead	50/-	2009
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10.	Asia Pacific Region Ballistic Missile Defence Scenario 2020: Recommended Approach for India	50/-	2012
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