

**ANALYZING**  
**INDO – AFGHAN**  
**RELATIONS, PAKISTAN’S**  
**STRATEGY OF**  
**INTERFERENCE &**  
**LESSONS FROM US**  
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# **ANALYZING INDO – AFGHAN RELATIONS, PAKISTAN’S STRATEGY OF INTERFERENCE & LESSONS FROM US INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN**

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**‘Pathans! Your house has fallen into ruins. Arise and rebuild it and remember to what race you belong’**

**Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan**

## **Indo- Afghan Relations**

1. Indo - Afghan relations have always been a matter of intrigue, while Pakistan views it with suspicion, the Afghans and Indians perceive it as that of friendship formed from years of mutual trust and faith. The warmth shared between the two countries can be judged from the various Indian folk tales like ‘Kabuliwalah’ and also from political bonhomie where popular Afghan leaders like ‘Frontier Gandhi’ shared the stage with the giants of the Indian freedom struggle. Even the game of cricket which exudes manic aggression in the sub continent fails to ignite such passions when the teams of both the countries compete with each other. To unravel this brotherhood one needs to go down the passage of history and also discover our common genes.

## **Genetic Linkages**

2. North Indians, East Europeans (Czechs, Poles and Lithuanians) alongwith North Eastern Iranians of Kurdistan share a common gene. The gene mutation known as R1a1a is common to these races separated by thousands of miles.

The genetic link to these vastly separated races is via Afghanistan where its majority population also carries the same haplogroup R1a. There has always been an ongoing debate with regards to the 'direction of flow' of this genetic group; the Europeans claim that it was the 'Aryan Invasion' which led to an eastward movement of genes while the Hindu scriptures claim the opposite route.

3. A study by Peter Underhill published in 2010 in the European Journal of Human Genetics has provided the genetic proof that the **oldest strain of R1a1a branch of genes was concentrated in the Gujarat-Sindh, Western Rajasthan, thereby suggesting that this was in all probability the origin of this genetic group**<sup>[1]</sup>. These findings establish the fact that there were no such large scale invasions by the so called Aryans; a theory propounded by white supremacists for which there is neither any archeological or literary evidence to support it. Having established the direction of the flow of the genes, it implies that the majority of the forefathers of present Afghanistan have traversed from the Indian side and therefore its close descendents. This fact is further substantiated by another study titled **Afghanistan's Ethnic Groups Share a Y-Chromosomal Heritage Structured by Historical Events**'<sup>[2]</sup> the study states :-

**'MDS and Barrier analysis have identified a significant affinity between Pashtun, Tajik, North Indian, and West Indian populations, creating an Afghan-Indian population structure that excludes the Hazaras, Uzbeks, and the South Indian Dravidan speakers. In addition, gene flow to Afghanistan from India marked by Indian lineages, L-M20, H-M69, and R2a-M124, also seems to mostly involve Pashtuns and Tajiks. This genetic affinity and gene flow suggests interactions that could have existed since at least the establishment of the region's first civilizations at the Indus Valley and the Bactria-Margiana Archaeological Complex'.**

4. **The Scriptures**. These genetic findings substantiate what the Hindu civilization was already aware through its oldest scriptures; the Vedas (Rig, Sama, Yajur and Atharva). Though Rigveda vastly concerns with religion, however, it mentions an event known as the 'Battle of the Ten Kings' which occurred on the banks of the River Ravi in Punjab<sup>[3]</sup>. The battle was fought among ten powerful tribes collectively against the Bharata tribe. The Bharata's crushed their opponents during the battle and the opposition fled or got drowned in the river. Some of the tribes which lost the battle got pushed towards present day Afghanistan, one among them was Druhya tribe whose king Gandhara gave the region its name which is presently known as Kandahar<sup>[4]</sup>. There is also a mention in the Puranas of another lost tribe known as the Purus, which is believed to have later fought against the invading army of Alexander in the fourth century BC and are mentioned by Greeks as Pactyians. Comparing these writings of the scriptures and that of genetic findings, there exists a strong possibility that present day Pashtuns might be the descendents of the Puru tribe ousted during the Battle of Ten Kings. The genetic findings and scriptures also strongly suggest that there was no Aryan invasion<sup>[5]</sup> and Pashtuns are related more to Indians than to Central Asians or Arabs as was previously thought<sup>[6]</sup>.

5. This entwined linkage through genes and scriptures does provide logic to the understanding, trust, bonhomie and mutual respect shared among the two countries.

### **Pakistan : A Dysfunctional State**

6. Going by the same logic of genetics and history; Pakistan also should be sharing the same kind of relationship with its neighbors, but in reality it is not so. History is testimony to the fact that generally it is the weak state of the region which pulls its neighbors down, however in the case of SE Asian region it is not so since it is Pakistan which happens to be playing the part of destabilizing the region.

7. While India-Afghanistan and Pakistan are at vastly different stages of political, social and economic development but what they share is a common strategic space. Pakistan's jockeying to seek a wider berth in this space and with its unwavering anti India outlook has tagged the region as the world's most dangerous place to live.

### **Pakistan's Descent Towards Radicalization.**

8. Pakistan's ruling class has been using Islam or its particular brand of 'hardened' version to establish a social system which justifies their control over people, resources and territories through terror and extensive use of force. It is perhaps the only country which was carved to safeguard the interests of upper class gentry (the founding members of 'Muslim League' in 1906 vastly belonged to either rich landlords or were Nawabs). Manipulation of religious sentiments to suit vested interests was started by the founding father of Pakistan, Mr Jinnah.

Extract from two of his speeches spread over mere seven years highlight the manipulations:-

#### ***Extract of Speech by Mr Jinnah in 1940:***

*'It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism.... It is a dream that Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality...they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conception<sup>[7]</sup>.*

#### ***Extract of Speech to Constituent Assembly, 1947:***

*'You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State'.*



9. The manipulations practised right from inception were also followed by subsequent ruling class where they too sought religious endorsement to justify their positions or demands. The frontrunner in introducing stringent form of Islam in Pakistan was Maulana Maududi and his Jammāt-e-Islami. The party proposed the idea of **Objective Resolution** which primarily sought an affirmation that sovereignty over the entire universe belonged to Allah. This single clause conveniently removed sovereignty from the people and placed it in the hands of the clergy who would claim thereafter the only ones who knew the will of Allah. The other clause of the resolution further reinforced the power of one religion over others by stating that 'the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, **as enunciated by Islam**, would be fully observed'. These two clauses mixed religion with politics deprived the people of their right to govern themselves which was not only exploited by politicians and the clergy but also the military rulers who used the notion it to their own advantage and to further own interests<sup>[8]</sup>.

10. The constitutional leveraging towards Islam further pushed the nation towards becoming a theocratic state. Few landmarks amendments are as follows:-

(a) **Constitution of 1956**. Basic features became Islamic in nature. Objective Resolution made as a preamble.

(b) **Amendment to Constitution, 1962**. Pakistan gets a new name; Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Post amendment all laws hereafter were to be brought in conformity with Quran and Sunnah. Institutionalizing of Pakistan as a totalitarian state becomes more prominent where now the constitution directed that only a Muslim can be the President of the state.

(c) **Amendment to Constitution, 1973**. It empowers religion where it directs that the President or the Governor of a province can refer to the Islamic Council

for advice to ensure that the proposed law is inline to the injunctions of 'Islam'.

(d) **Amendment to Constitution- Sep 1974**. The act of 'defining' Muslim bore disastrous consequences as the amendment declared all Ahmediya Muslim Community (Qadianis) or Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement (Lahoris) as non Muslims. The amendment also makes Quran and Islamiyat compulsory.

(e) **Blasphemy laws**. Accordingly, the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) got amended through ordinances of 1980, 1982 and 1986 which declared that anyone implying disrespect to the Prophet Mohammad, Ahlal-Bayat (family members of the Prophet), Sahaba (Companions of Muhammad) and Sha'ar-i-Islam (islamic symbols) a cognizable offence.

11. The Consequences of these amendments led to:-

- (a) Enormous rise in number of religious parties.
- (b) Jihad related organizations increased manifold.
- (c) Rise in Sectarian parties.

### **Fact Sheet : Pakistan**

12. **Pakistan – An India Centric Country**. Everything in Pakistan is viewed through the prism of India. Its sole purpose of existence is based on either emulating or being against India. India with its booming economy and progressive development has created an irreversible tide of leading and gathering influence not only in the region but is also emerging as a major player in global politics. While Kashmir remains as a core issue but it is felt that even if the issue was resolved it is unlikely that Pakistan will drop its anti India stance. **Pakistan will always remain at loggerheads with India.**

13. **Power Struggle in Pakistan.** Since independence the Pakistan Army has vied for power with its political parties. To remain in power it has to create don quixotian fears of Indian aggression which justify their being the top dog of the country. This power also provides them an unchallenged right to run their \$ 20 Billion industrial empire which makes the Pakistan Army Generals the richest sect in the country<sup>[9]</sup>. The power-money narrative is lost if there are no fears of domination and aggression and this is something which Pakistan Army will never let happen. **Pakistan Army will continue to remain the sole decisive authority in the country.**

14. **Pashtun Factor.** Out of the population of approximate 40 million Pashtuns, roughly 26 million of them reside in Pakistan and only 14 million in Afghanistan<sup>[10]</sup>. Also 20% of Pakistan Army's officer corps is made up of Pashtun officers. This large Pashtun population of both the countries is closely affiliated to each other as millions of Afghan Pashtun refugees from Soviet war are married to the locals and are one big extended family. Such bonding across the borders creates an omnipresent danger of Pashtun nationalism or Pashtunistan which cannot be wished away. The other important issue is about the inability of Pakistan Army to take on the tribals in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. For Pakistan Army to merely function in the region it needs to broker deals with violent radicals to forestall attacks or even to get its logistic convoys to reach its isolated bases. Therefore, the policy of appeasement works extremely in favor of Pakistan as Army's presence in the region remains peaceful, keeps the Pashtun aficionados from demanding a separate state, helps it to enlarge its influence in Afghanistan and lastly a powerful ally can always be directed to target India's interests in Afghanistan. **Hence Pakistan needs to appease Pashtuns by playing the Islamic card which not only to keep the country together but checkmates India's rising influence in Afghanistan.**

15. **Strategic Depth.** Since decades Pakistan has been pursuing the policy of fostering Islamic protégés in Afghanistan. Pursuance of this policy is for multiple gains; firstly, it coincides with its Islamic ideology and keeps the country from disintegrating. Secondly, a favorable government in Afghanistan provides the much sought after 'strategic depth' to its western flanks. There has been no change in Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan; it was earlier supporting mujahedeen and post 9/11 is now supporting Taliban. **This policy of supporting a friendly and a willing partner in Afghanistan allows Pakistan to retain it's strategic focus on India.**

16. **Taliban.** Pakistan did not create Taliban, however Since 1994, it acted swiftly to associate itself with the movement and has invested immensely in time, money and military effort in supporting it. For them it has not only been waging a seven year bloody war prior to 9/11 but it is about pursuing a campaign of last three decades of gaining 'strategic depth' and ousting India's influence from Afghanistan. Post 9/11, the US and NATO forces have neither been able to make Pakistan forfeit or abandon Taliban. With such support by Pakistan, Kabul is likely to fall to Taliban; sooner or later. This likely outcome for India needs no vivid imagination. **In the coming years India will have to confront Taliban on its home turf as it is going to be payback time for Taliban.**

17. **Al Qaida (AQ) & Pakistan.** Under pressure from the US, Pakistan has been half heartedly acting against Al Qaida and at the same time going soft on Taliban. While reasons for supporting Taliban are known, however the actions against AQ is what merits attention. This unsupportive policy is primarily due to AQ's ethnic composition and pan Islamic ideology. Most of the ranks of AQ constitute Arabs, Uzbeks and other troubled Islamic countries who believe in ideology of unification of Muslim states sans borders. **This Diaspora of Islamic fighters are firstly, not in sync with Pakistan's**

**terror strategy against India in Kashmir and secondly, it does not provide any tangible assistance to influence the Pashtuns in Afghanistan.**

### **ISI : The State Within State**

**‘Intelligence is neither a Boy Scout game nor a boxing bout fought by the Marquees of Queensbury Rules. It is a job to be done’**

**Allen Dulles  
Director CIA (1953-1961)**

18. **General.** ISI, a Tri-Service organization was raised in 1948 as a consequence of the first Indo–Pak war of 1948. The initial model of the ISI was based on the Iranian SAVAK. The purpose of raising ISI was to focus and gain intelligence mainly on India, other than that the ISI had no intelligence mandate<sup>[1]</sup>. To know its capabilities there is a need to understand its organization and functioning.

(a) **The Organization.** ISI consists of approximately 25,000 employees. It is a tiered organization which remains white at the top and is subject to discipline and accountability. In the middle it starts going gray and then finally fades to black where compartmentalized operations involving mid level officers, civilians, contractors and retirees. These various categories can be broadly summed up as under :-

(i) **Hierarchy.** The hierarchy is made of two and three Star Generals of the Army who serve for a tour of 2-4 years.

(ii) **Mid level.** The second group consists of middle rung military officers permanently seconded to ISI. This category provides ISI stability and continuity as they continue to serve for several years.

(iii) **Lower Level**. The third category is that of the working hands who essentially do tracking and surveillance of targets.

(iv) **Special Category**. This category comprises of retired ISI officers who act as a conduit between ISI and radical Islamic groups. It wields considerable influence over them directly or through bogus upfront NGO's.<sup>[12]</sup>

(b) **Directorates**. Headed by a Lieutenant General, each of its directorate inturn are led by a Major General. There are subsidiary wings to such directorates which are dedicated to Counter Terrorism (CT), Counter Insurgency (CI) and Pak domestic politics. The major directorates are:-

(i) **Analysis Directorate** is a prestigious sub head since it produces memos and manages international liaison.

(ii) **Technical Directorate** deals with basically cyber intelligence and is in concert with Corps of Signals of the Army.

(iii) **'S' Directorate**. The main directorate of concern is the directorate S or S wing or just S. This particular directorate is located at Camp Hamza, ISI compound Rawalpindi. It is responsible for all covert programs outside the country, namely the proxy operations. Out of the various sub branches within the directorate are the ones which handle Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sikhs etc. The directorate is staffed by only two categories; veteran army officers and SSG.

19. **Capabilities.** The three major abilities of ISI which stand out are:-

(a) **Ability to Play Both Sides.** ISI has stupendous ability to 'Run with the Hare - Hunt with Hounds'. It can execute Jihadist guerilla campaigns while at the same time project an image of cooperation and willingness to negotiate for peace. The cases in point are, during Op Enduring Freedom while being an ally of US it was covertly assisting Taliban or with India exporting terror in Kashmir and at the same time showing willingness to open 'Kartarpur Corridor'. Within the gambit of managing terror, it possesses the capability to engage diverse militant groups for different purposes at different times. During Soviet invasion, ISI created seven different Afghan mujahedeen parties to fight the USSR to ensure that none dominated the resistance individually. It also has devious capability to make the groups fight among each other for territory and assassinate rivals to prevent anyone from growing too strong or independent.

(b) **Fine-tuning Extremism & Fundamentalism.** Radicalization which started as a political strategy for the ruling class became an accepted state policy and the country saw an upsurge in religious seminaries. In 1971, there were 900 madrasas registered with umbrella organization; Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris, by 1988 there were 8000 official madrasas and 25,000 unregistered ones, in 2015 there were 26000 registered and 9000 unregistered madrasas in Pakistan<sup>[13]</sup>. Realizing the potential of these madrasas, the ISI has hijacked the control and now uses them as per their requirement.

(c) Prior to understanding the employability of these madrasas by ISI it is necessary to know how Pakistan views fundamentalism and extremism. This can be

understood by the statement of Gen Kayani, Chief of Pakistan Army (2007-13) :-

**“We have to define extremism so that it is 98% against 2%. We can’t define it so that it is 50-50 or 60-40- then we will be fighting a civil war. Different opinions don’t make an extremist. It’s when they take no ones advise, when they arrogate to themselves the right to define who is Muslim or who is legitimate. When the person picks up the gun, he becomes a terrorist. This is how you make it 98 to 2”<sup>[14]</sup>.**

(d) This 98:2 formula forms the essence of ISI functioning as it is the sole organization which exercises control over most of the religious seminaries of the country. The strategy is to keep the majority population at ‘simmering level’ of Fundamentalism (figure of 98%) and the remaining percent (2%) is prepped up to an extremist level for implementing terror policies of ISI in countries like Afghanistan and India. The strategy is best explained with the happenings of 2006 in Afghanistan. The US and NATO forces by then had realized that to win the ongoing campaign it was essential to dislodge the Taliban from Southern provinces. Consequently, Op Mountain Thrust, Op Medusa, Battle of Panjawi, Op Mountain Fury were launched in five Southern provinces to oust the Taliban from their concentrated areas. Having dealt with Afghanistan for decades, the ISI knew very well that if the Taliban lost the Southern provinces, the war would be over for them and a victory to the US. It went with no holds barred by augmenting the Taliban rank and file to counter NATO surge. Taliban strengthened by ISI, swelled up to a strength of almost six thousand fighters, about same as the coalition forces. This enormous strength of jihadi fighters **were provided from ISI controlled madrasas** which



were emptied and students dispatched to fight. As a result hundreds of students found their way in South Afghanistan to fight the US and NATO troops<sup>[15]</sup>. The operations launched by the ISAF ended in a stalemate with no tangible gains.

(e) **Managing the Terror Factories.** To avoid any comebacks, the control of these madrasas is exercised indirectly through the special category of ISI employees (retired service personnel, civil contractual agents, NGOs and religious heads) which have been explained in earlier chapter. In return, terror factories like that of Saeed Hafiz's 'Jammata-i-Islami' or Lal Masjid organization are bestowed with privileges and sanctions for fund raising and recruitment. In case of Taliban, they are provisioned with much sought out I-cards, subsidies and the right to live freely in Pakistan. All this gratifications are subject to following the edicts laid down by the ISI. The ISI can intensify, moderate or temporarily dormant their activities as the situation warrants.

20. **Analysis of Capabilities.** Having such abilities provide three distinct advantages to ISI; **firstly**, the majority of population remains indoctrinated which keeps the country engaged and united through religion. **Secondly**, it assists in deflecting the focus of the public from essential government responsibilities of education, poverty, economic growth etc. and **lastly**, it is in sync with ISI's terror policies where the extremist level of indoctrinated youth are utilized in exporting lethal energy towards its neighbors.

## **US INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN**

**‘God created war so that Americans would learn Geography’.**

**Mark Twain**

21. Since the launch of Op Enduring Freedom from 2001 till its closure in 2014, approximately 149,000 people including soldiers, contractors and civilians have lost their lives and the cost of war is estimated at \$2 trillion <sup>[16]</sup>. The irony is that in spite of incurring such a heavy cost the Taliban seems to be regaining lost ground while US and its allies are on the backstep. The war which peaked with 55-60,000 ISAF troops has now dropped down to mere 15,000. Op Enduring Freedom has transformed into a supportive role and is now Op Resolute Freedom.

### **Analysis of Military Operations**

**‘One of the lessons of Vietnam, which we failed to heed in the Iraq war and the Afghanistan surge, is that before you commit US military forces to aid or assist, it is essential to know what you want them to achieve’**

**Kathleen Troia McFarland  
Deputy National Security Adviser**

22. **Conflicting view of Terrorism & Insurgency.** One of the reasons for the marginal outcome of the Afghan intervention is perhaps due to the perceptual differences between Afghan Government and the US toward their approach to defeat Taliban. While the Afghan Government views it as a case of ‘International Terrorism’, the US approach on ground has been that of fighting a full fledged Counter Insurgency (CI) Campaign. These perceptual differences are explained as under:-

(a) **Government of Afghanistan.** The Afghanistan government's view is explained in the words of the erstwhile President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai (2002-2014) :-

**'An insurgency, as I understand the meaning, suggests there are citizens of a country who are fighting against the government because they think the government is illegitimate. If they are fighting against an illegitimate government, then who are you, the US? You are propping up an illegitimate government. No there is no insurgency. There is a problem of international terrorism'** <sup>[17]</sup>.

(b) **US.** The military objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom, as articulated by President George W. Bush in his Sept 20<sup>th</sup> Address to a Joint Session of Congress followed by 7<sup>th</sup> October 2001 address to country was about **destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan the capture of Osama Bin Laden (OBL) and Al Qaeda (AQ) leaders, and cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan**<sup>[18]</sup>.

(c) What commenced as a Global War on Terror (GWOT) changed somewhere down the line when US started getting embroiled in fighting Taliban and reconstructing the country. It needs to be understood here that Taliban, firstly, had come into being largely on the popular demand of the Afghanistan society. Secondly, their actions were legitimized by faith and ethnicity. Hence any fight against them was not a GWOT but a campaign against the popular wishes of the people.

(d) **Taliban Stand.** On the other hand the stand of the Taliban remained consistent; for them protecting AQ was 'pashtunwali' and with US a war of liberation against the 'invading american infidels'.

## **Analysis of Divergent Perceptions.**

23. For any CI campaign to become effective it is essential that the civil administration and the military have coordinated functioning and are synergized in their approach. In case of Afghanistan, the relationship between the Government of Afghanistan and ISAF has always remained belligerent. Their perceptual differences, suspicious attitude and poor relations resulted in uncoordinated functioning between the civil government and ISAF. Such detached and isolated functioning benefitted the Taliban immensely and ultimately the public support too shifted towards them; yet again.

24. Initially, the US troops did meet with success which can primarily be attributed to the cooperation of newly formed Afghanistan government and the support of the public who initially thought them as their savior. This bonhomie started dissipating soon after AQ followed by Taliban vanished in Pakistan and the collateral damage by ISAF started escalating. The shift in the nature of operations from anti terrorist to a CI campaign without any major shift in strategy pulled the US in Afghan vortex and the success slowly spiralled to a stalemate and finally crashing towards a virtual defeat. Why different approach is essential for these fundamentally different campaigns is broadly explained as under:-

(a) **Terrorism**. Terrorism is an act of coercion which attempts to **intimidate the population** to influence the government or its policy. In simple terms it is against the people's wish.

(b) **Insurgency**. In 1890s, the French were the first to recognise insurgency as separate kind of warfare. They came up with the theory of winning the 'hearts and mind' and 'peaceful penetrations'<sup>[19]</sup>. CI is a combination of a civil-military campaign, which is more about delivering good governance and 'pacifying' the population rather than a slug fest between warring forces.

(c) **Differentiating between Terrorism & Insurgency**. They can be broadly classified as follows:-

(i) Since terrorism seeks to intimidate and coerce the masses into submission, it has violence associated to it; insurgency on the other hand erupts through poor governance and has a resonance of an upheaval from oppression. While terrorism can be broadly classified as materialistic; insurgency is all about masses and a 'cause'.

(ii) Terrorism seeks people's submission through fear while insurgency creates willing support of masses as it has come to fore on popular demand of the people.

(iii) Counter Terrorism (CT) will invariably have a military outlook to decelerate the momentum of terrorists; CI on the other hand is about loosening the insurgents grip through good governance alongwith precision military strikes. CT will predominantly be steered by the military, while CI being of governance, the civil administration will be at the forefront.

(iv) Compared to Insurgency, CT is a war which might have a smaller troop involvement as the nature of their task is restricted to neutralizing the terrorists with minimum participation in governance. On the contrary, CI is a campaign and would not only require military involvement in neutralizing the insurgents militarily but seek their assistance in providing relief, infrastructure development and other constructive projects for re-establishing the civil administration and law of the state. The troop requirement in CI will go manifold up as compared to CT operations.

- (v) The common factor for these two variants of warfare is that counter operations for both would get prolonged if the terrorists/insurgents enjoy a cross-border sanctuary.

### **Analysis of Military Factors**

25. **Op Tora Bora (2001)**. The operation was launched in Tora Bora mountains against Osama Bin Laden (OBL) and AQ. The operation's ground offensive elements comprised of 'jawbreaker' teams of CIA, Special Forces (SF) and Afghan militias who were to laser designate the enemy positions while the Air Force pounded the 'illuminated' targets. For the operation, the blocking positions were to be provided by Pakistan's XI Corps to cut the enemy's escape routes. Due to poor reliability factor, the Pakis were incorporated into the plan only after the operation had commenced and major bombings had started<sup>[20]</sup>. Factors like delayed involvement, non availability of helicopters for induction, 150 valleys to be covered around Tora Bora provided the Pakis with valid reasons to pussy foot their involvement against AQ. Without any blocking positions to hinder their dissipation; hundreds of Uzbeks, Chechens, Arabs and other foreign fighters from Eastern Afghanistan poured into tribal areas of Pakistan.

26. **Op Anaconda (2002)**. It was the biggest military operation launched after the Gulf War and was also the highest altitude battle ever fought by the US. As per plan, once again the US SF along with Afghan militias attempted to launch attack across the Shahi-i-Kot Valley on to the positions held by the AQ and Taliban. Hesitation in committing reserves, lack of unified command, incorrect intelligence and assessment of situation<sup>[21]</sup> (the caves to be flushed turned out to be four time more, contrary to assessment the militants stood their ground instead of running away) led to marginal success. Anaconda like Op Tora Bora further pushed the remaining hardcore terrorists towards Pakistan there by adding to the already formidable strength of radicals who had escaped earlier.

27. **Analysis & Outcome of Ops Tora Bora & Anaconda.**

The failure of these two largest and most important military operations led to the **beginning of a catastrophic situation where it connected the AQ's international ideologists with indigenous radical networks and forever altered the course of conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism** [22]. The conglomeration of Taliban and AQ radicals within the borders of Pakistan who as it was not in position to control the tribal areas resulted in them renewing their ties with Taliban. What followed thereafter was a considerable shift in Taliban strategy , the changes were:-

- (a) Taliban fighters rotated for rest and recoup in Pakistan followed by deployment in Afghanistan.
- (b) Considerable drop in suicide bombing and utilizing them only for specific strategic target.
- (c) Reduction in mass attacks thereby reducing effect of air strikes.
- (d) Increase in IED attacks.
- (e) Modernization of weaponry.

28. **Conflicting Strategies.** On the arrival of Gen McChrystal, Commander of US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2009, the ongoing operations in Afghanistan were finally accepted as CI in principle. The brilliant general formulated a strategy of '**Clear, Hold and Build**' which was as follows :-

- (a) **McChrystal Strategy.** The strategy was based on the assumption that military defeat of Taliban was not possible as the required quantum of troops (80,000) to secure entire Afghanistan would never be made available. McChrystal solved the non availability issue by identifying 80 'key terrain districts; out of the total 400 districts of Afghanistan. In addition to the key

districts he further highlighted 41 districts as 'Areas of Interest'. Most of the identified key territory lay in Southern districts of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan. His strategy aimed to secure these districts and then link them **through good governance, aid and security**. Consequently, Op Khanjar, the largest Marine offensive since Battle of Fallujah, Iraq in 2004 was launched. The excellent strategy of McChrystal strategy ran aground because the dots linking Kandahar – Helmand passing through four districts of Arghandab, Panjwal, Zhari and Maiwand (Taliban's birthplace) never got connected due to stiff opposition. The strategy would have certainly succeeded but for the non availability of required additional troops, announcement of troop withdrawal by the President of US and finally the sacking of Gen McChrystal.

(b) **Gen Petraeus Strategy**. Gen Petraeus followed Gen Mc Chrystal as force commander in Afghanistan. The General formulated a strategy which in principle was more or less on similar lines of McChrystal's strategy of attacking corruption, promoting good governance and reducing collateral damage. In Afghanistan, however, maybe due to battle fatigue of four overseas deployments in last seven years, health issues and having an urgency to 'wrap things up' prior to troop withdrawal led to him unleashing the entire military power he had under his command. His strategy was to hammer the Taliban into submission where they would get subdued due to enormous pressure of the US. The intensity of operations resulted in high collateral damages which further isolated the public and even their Afghan compatriots.

29. **Result of conflicting strategies**. Implementing of these two opposing strategies in succession led to unleashing of lethality never experienced before. The campaign which



was to follow the winning of 'hearts and minds' strategy ended up doing the reverse. The ramifications were as follows :-

- (a) Highhandedness and disrespecting of the local social and cultural norms.
- (b) Increase in accidental killings of civilians.
- (c) High collateral damage due to drone attacks led the public virtually demanding Taliban back and the tide of sympathizing started tilting towards Taliban.
- (d) Belittling their Afghan counter parts, violent night raids, home searches, disrespecting Afghan women by photographing them, firing weapons recklessly when attacked led to increase in fratricide cases where Afghan soldiers started turning their guns on their foreign allies<sup>[23]</sup>.

### **Analysis of Non Military Factors**

**'The West has to ask itself: How many times in its history with Pakistan have they been deceived'**

***Amarullah Saleh,  
Chief of Afghanistan National  
Dte of Security***

30. **Radicalization of Afghanistan.** The radicalization of Afghanistan commenced somewhere after Soviet invasion in 1979. Jimmy Carter's administration launched 'Op Cyclone' with a hedge fund of \$500 million to create terror outfits to fight the Soviets. Reagan administration continued with the operation and Saudi Arabia was also roped in where they provided \$3.5 Billion to General Zia's regime, for funding of madrasas for the Afghan Jihad. CIA commenced with mujahedeen training at their Brooklyn School in New York and Virginia while in Pakistan, the ISI was getting trained by British MI6. <sup>[24]</sup>.

31. In 1984, US decided to actively join hands with the mujahedeen and ISI to fight the Soviets. At the behest of CIA, University of Nebraska, Omaha started publishing special textbooks in Dari and Pashto with an aim to promote jihadist values in Afghanistan. From 1984 to 1994 through USAID a tune of \$ 51 million were used by the University for 'Education' Programs in Afghanistan <sup>[25]</sup>.

32. The frontrunner madrassa for spearheading the Afghan jihad was Darul Uloom Haqqania. The madrassa was controlled by faction of JUI, a mainstream religio –political party that was part of six party conservative alliances known as Muttehida Majilis Amal (MMA). This party became the most important face of Afghan jihad <sup>[26]</sup>. During this period of Islamic fervor another landmark beginning took place; creation of a new group called Al Qaida<sup>[27]</sup>.

33. **Repercussions.** The repercussions were as follows:-

(a) The entire region became highly radicalized.

(b) During the Taliban resurgence in 1994, the same text books provided by US were now being used by the Taliban against them.

(c) The then MMA which lead the fight against the Soviets turned a new leaf and metamorphosed to the notorious 'Quetta Shura' which is now leading the fight against the US.

(d) The Haqqani madrassa expanded their network and turned their guns against the very country which had brought them to the fore.

(f) And last but not the least, the US and British trained ISI transformed into a more potent jihad controlling agency and started their campaign against their all time ally – the US. The US realized the Machiavellian ISI policies very late. Realising

their mistake, the famous US diplomat, ex Assistant Secretary of State, Special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan late Richard Holbrooke remarked that **‘We may have been fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country’**.

34. **Peace Overtures & Bonn Agreement**. In November 2001 Mullah Fazel Mazloom, Deputy Defense Minister in the Taliban regime and commander of all Taliban forces in Afghanistan and Mullah Noorullah Noori, Taliban Governor of Balakh surrendered alongwith his troops to General Dostum of Northern Alliance. The surrendered militants were mostly massacred and the two leaders were handed over to US forces who shifted and imprisoned them at Guantanamo Bay prison<sup>[28]</sup>. After the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, the Taliban head, Mullah Omar had reached out to Karzai repeatedly for safe passage of the leaders and surrender of troops at Kandahar. For negotiations a delegation led by Abdul Waheed Baghrani, a senior Taliban leader and Amir Mohammad Agha, Father - In-Law of Taliban leader Tayeb Agha were nominated and the negotiation proposed that Mullah Naqibullah a powerful opposition figure should take charge of Kandahar. For acceptance of this proposal they had come with a signed letter of surrender from Mullah Omar agreeing to hand over the city in three days. Karzai refused to accept the letter. The Taliban did not wait for the reply and vanished towards Pakistan<sup>[29]</sup>.

35. By 2002 Al Qaida had abanded Afghanistan and so had Taliban. Bonn Agreement under Karzai had commenced the constitutional process to determine the form of national government. Credible Taliban leaders continued to reach out to both Karzai and the US despite repeated rejections. Tayeb Agha, a political and press aide in Mullah Mohammed Omar regime, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, military deputy to Omar made overtures for peaceful negotiations but were turned down. Bashir Noorzai, Taliban fighter turned over by CIA, offered second opportunity by approaching Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, the last Taliban foreign minister to meet

the Americans in Kandahar. Mutawakil was arrested when he came to the meet at Kandahar. Again Noorzai persuaded another Taliban ally, Haji Birqet Khan to return to Kandahar, however while contemplating his move he was killed by helicopter raid which also wounded his wife and son, two grand children died when they jumped into the well to save themselves. Due to the raid the entire Khan's tribe turned hostile towards the US <sup>[30]</sup>

36. **Analysis of Non Negotiations.** Such rigid and non negotiable actions might have led Taliban to strengthen their resolve to engage US militarily as they apparently felt they had no role in Afghanistan anymore. As mentioned earlier, Taliban was an indigenous movement which constituted a large part of Afghan society, were legitimized by their fighting during the anti-soviet war, and most importantly were brought in by the people; a fact ignored by the US. There is a strong possibility that if they were persuaded they might have come around like Mutawakil and brokered for peace. Analysis of non negotiations is as follows :-

(a) **When to Negotiate.** The biggest dilemma in such situations is when to negotiate for peace. While there are no set solutions, however an examples from the Bangladesh War of Liberation of 1971 and US Vietnam of 1954 -75 War is brought to the fore. Pakistan signed the Shimla Agreement in 1972 after they were defeated decisively and India held 93,000 POWs. On the other hand in 1969, Nixon & Kissinger began negotiating with Hanoi for exploring a peace deal. At that time there were 550,000 US troops in Vietnam, but under domestic pressure, Nixon reduced it down to 135,000. The settlement for peace continued from a weakened position for almost five years and by the time the final deal was made in 1973, US had nothing to offer in bargain and as a result communist took over Vietnam.

(b) Drawing the parallels between the then Vietnam War and present Afghanistan, the US in early and late 2000 were at an all time high where it had 55000 troops in Afghanistan and almost 4/5 of NATO command. On the other side, the Taliban were on the run, had made overtures for peace and even had high ranking defectors approaching to switch sides. The US once again choose not to negotiate from a dominating position but commenced with peace talks when troop the strength is reduced to 15000 with almost half of Afghanistan run over by Taliban. The lesson could be that **negotiations for peace must be made from position of power and dominance and not from a weakened position.**

37. **Nepotism & Corruption.** In 1989, post Soviet withdrawal; the victorious seven mujahedeen parties formed a coalition government at Kabul. Within few months the alliance fell through and Afghanistan slid in civil war as different factions vied for power. Each of the mujahedeen parties had established their own mini fiefdoms to extract the maximum from the population. In 1994, on popular demand of the people, the most powerful and upright leaders got together and decided to organize a force to clear the worst offenders. That's how the Taliban came into being; a movement to oust corruption and weed out the undesirables.

38. **Analysis.** The Taliban once again gathered public support for the very three reasons they were brought into existence; corruption, nepotism and revenge tactics by leaders who were now in power. A popular disgust at Afghan government got formed and public once again probably felt Taliban to be the only alternative to a predatory, corrupt and nepotistic government.

39. **Monitoring the Progress of War.** The US operations relied heavily on an assessment of the situation through a computer based program which later came to be known as

District Assessment Procedure (**DAP**)<sup>[31]</sup>. The program was used for tracking progress by capturing changes in the war's progress empirically. It was a major source of input required for planning the operational strategies during the campaign, however in spite of such hi tech procedures the ground reality could not be correctly assessed and invariable it led to wrong assumptions.

40. **Analysis of Assessment Procedures.** While the need for assessing the progress is an essential part of any military campaign, however during the course of history such computer based quantitative business analysis techniques to warfare have rarely yielded results. The DAP was in no way different to the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) designed by Secretary of Defense, Robert S McNamara during Vietnam War<sup>[32]</sup>. The DAP too failed like its predecessor HES because while it could objectively count factors like numbers of roadside bombings or assassinations but was unable to assess the judgmental factors. The reasons for such programs not yielding desired results could be:-

(a) **Factoring of Non Tangibles.** Failure of such programs has been its inability to factor in issues like intentions, will and loyalties. This has been so because such non tangibles can only be factored in by the men in uniform who have their presence on ground. The irony is that these are the very people who have either negligible or non existent representation in such programs.

(b) **Pressure.** The pressure by decision makers on analysts tends to make them paint an incorrect picture which results in program failure.

## **Analysis of Financial Factors.**

**‘For war we need three things –  
money, money and more money’.**

**Napoleon Bonaparte**

41. One of the major reasons of Taliban’s sustainability in their war fighting potential has been due to their access to equal if not more financial inflow. While the cost of war for US and its allies also included infrastructure development, running of offices, training etc, the Taliban have no such edicts to follow. The few comparative observations accentuate the point :-

(a) **Fall of Najibullah Regime.** During the course of Soviet invasion, the Russians were pouring estimated \$3 Billion to \$6 Billion annually in Afghanistan. The Najibullah regime fell not because of any military defeat but due to closure of financial assistance abruptly due to disintegration of USSR<sup>[33]</sup>.

(b) **Counter Bounty.** When FBI announced a \$5 million reward for Osama Bin Laden’s capture, the CIA picked up reports that he in turn had authorized a bounty of \$9 million for the assassination of four top CIA officers<sup>[34]</sup>.

(c) **US Budgetary Allocations.** In 2001, US administration spent approximately \$ 4.5 Billion on the war in Afghanistan, of which \$ 390 million just to replace its own damaged war equipment. In Feb 2002, the annual budget was to the tune of \$151 million for rendering entire assistance to Afghanistan. This included \$ 1 million for training of the new Afghan National Army. This meager financial assistance caused setbacks to infrastructure development as well as the war waging potential against Taliban. This seeming loss of interest in following through after initial

success could be due to shifting of US focus towards invasion of Iraq.

(d) **Drug Funding.** In 2006 Taliban put approximately 400,000 acres of land under poppy cultivation which is approx 90% of worlds heroin supply and in 2007 land under poppy was further increased to 476,000 acres. After 2011, the estimated total export value of opium production was \$1.5 – \$3 billion. The Taliban imposed two religious taxes on drug economy called Ushr and Zakat. The tax rates for both were 10 and 20 % as prescribed by Koran. Taliban was earning approx \$400 million annually from drug trafficking alone <sup>[35]</sup>. Besides this Taliban had many other sources of income, they taxed other forms of smuggling, had long standing business and preaching networks in Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Gulf countries. In 2009, the US National Security Council also reviewed intelligence reporting on ‘threat finance’, which stated that Taliban’s was earning approx \$ 100 million due to fund raising in the Persian Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and UAE, also there more money flowing from kidnapping, extortions, and protection rackets.

(e) **Low Pay High Risk.** Gen Stanley Mc Chrystal is on record to have testified to the US Congress that the pay scale of the Afghan security forces were ‘almost at par’ with the Taliban foot soldiers. He further stated that there were instances of bribes by Taliban where they had approached the Brigade commander of Afghan National Army (ANA) to quit his job <sup>[36]</sup>. Low grade pay coupled with fear of reprisals and imminent resurgence of Taliban who were willing to pay either equal if not more financial emoluments made the government jobs least lucrative in Afghanistan.

42. **Analysis.** The financial angle in Afghanistan can be analyzed on two platforms. Firstly, its effect on the public and



the other is the effect on war waging capability of Taliban. These could be as follows :-

(a) **Effect on Public.** In a country like Afghanistan which is besieged with poverty where 42 percent of its population is below poverty line and approximately 20 percent just above poverty line<sup>[37]</sup>, money matters. It needs no elaboration that under such circumstances the masses will turn towards better pay masters.

(b) **Effect on War Waging Potential.** It is a well known fact that the sinew of any war is money and if the source of money is linked to drugs it provides an unending source of income. A study by political scientist James Fearon of civil wars concluded that self funding guerilla groups with direct access to drug profits fight for unusually long periods. For example, FARC of Colombia has been battling the Colombian state since 1964<sup>[38]</sup>. With this kind of counter financial narrative by Taliban whose major source of funding is through drugs it would be very difficult for the ISAF to counter their surge.

## **CONNECTING THE DOTS IN KASHMIR**

### **Pakistan Strategy for Kashmir.**

43. Pakistan has been following a twofold strategy for annexing Kashmir; one by providing a **trigger to instigate a mass uprising** and the other to **radicalize and replace the Sufi brand of Islam being** practiced in Kashmir. Acts like tribal invasion, Op Gibraltar and 'theft' of the relic from Hazratbal shrine are instances where attempts have been made in the past to instigate an uprising.

44. **Radicalizing** Kashmir is also a two pronged strategy of ISI where by one terrorism gets projected as a popular Islamic demand for 'liberation' by the masses. This is done by creating 'home grown' terrorist organizations like Hizbul

Mujahedeen (HM) which gets identified with the public as 'one of their own'. Any attempt to neutralize them is viewed as an act of high handedness by security forces, creates anti establishment feelings and generates sympathetic wave which further draws youth in the vortex of terrorism.

45. The other strategy is enforcing radical Islam in the valley by exporting terror organizations like LET, HUA, etc by the ISI. These 'enforcers' eliminate or coerce the moderate voices through **terror** and steer the masses towards hardline Shariah Islam. Since killings of people of Kashmir by local groups would be going against the strategy of 'mass appeal' therefore these acts of terror are executed by foreigners neither identify nor associate themselves with public.

46. As Maulana Maududi's Jammāt-e-Islami was the one which introduced radicalization to Pakistan, similarly Jammāt-e-Islami Kashmir and its ilk is the dot which connects Kashmir terrorism with Islam. It would be recalled that HM raised in 1989 was the 'adopted' military wing of the Jammāt of Kashmir and in 1990 the then chief commander of HM proclaimed the organization as the 'sword arm of the Jammāt' [39]. Jammāt along with its various financed madrasas and terror outfits (JKLF) was responsible for the biggest exodus in the history where approximately 140,000 – 190,000 Kashmiri Pandits left Kashmir.

47. Till lately Pakistan's ISI plans failed to achieve desired results as both the strategies; local and exported had a common play ground and same target population. This resulted in treading on each other's toes invariably leading to friction and rivalry which provided the security forces with ample opportunities to target them effectively. Having two divergent ideologies in one place where one group vied for mass appeal while the other sought subjugation through violence is bound to achieve limited success. Off course the role of security forces in eliminating terrorists has always been the biggest determinant for keeping the terrorism low in Kashmir.

48. Around mid 2000, due to almost wiping off of entire local terrorist groups by the security forces and happenings in Afghanistan which were drawing most of the madrasa indoctrinated Pakistani terrorists led to dormancy and created an illusion of 'normalcy' in Kashmir. This false sense of security made the local politicians demanding reduction in military presence particularly so in areas of influence of Jammāt (South Kashmir). Jammāt and other fundamentalist religious organizations exploited the situation and along with ISI commenced with further radicalizing the region of South Kashmir which once again drew the support of public and caused reemergence of local terrorist organizations. The ISI also improved on its flawed policies where the local terror groups were given the freedom to operate solely in Kashmir and the imported terror outfits were directed towards remaining India.

### **Drawing Parallels with Afghanistan**

49. There exists a connection between Kashmir and Afghanistan. It would be recalled that HM was raised by Pakistan ISI in 1988 immediately after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The initial training of HM was conducted in the facilities under Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatayar's Hezb-e-Islami which ironically were over run during Taliban surge. Now with the kind of relations shared between Pakistan and Taliban it is anyone's guess how the events will unfold for India.

50. It is an established fact that at ISI's behest the Pashtun dominated Southern provinces of Afghanistan are highly radicalized and form the hub of terrorism. It is here where **religion gets mixed with terror**. The US had rightly identified the regions importance and had made massive attempts in 2006 and 2009/10 to dislodge the Taliban from the region. ISI has used the similar strategy where Radicalized South Afghanistan Model gets replicated in South Kashmir with assistance from local terror groups. For any attempt to usher

peace either in Afghanistan or Kashmir, these regions need to be addressed first and foremost. The importance of these regions are elaborated below :-

- (a) Both are the most **prosperous** regions of their country and state.
- (b) Both the regions stand highly **radicalized** by Pakistan's ISI and are hub of terrorist activities.
- (c) In Afghanistan more than 75% of the **violent happenings have** occurred in just **10%** of Afghanistan's Southern Districts mainly Helmand & Kandahar. In Kashmir too, out of 22 districts in the state of J&K, the worst effected districts are that of South Kashmir; Pulwama, Shopian, Kulgam and Anantnag. Adding another three of the Central districts (Srinagar, Budgam and Ganderbal) the approx area under the terrorist threat is also nearly **10%** of the total area of the state but has maximum terrorist incidents..

51. While the effect of Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir can be correlated with Afghanistan, however the approach by respective countries in countering it remains in divergence. These could be identified as follows :-

- (a) India has a fairly strong civil administration structure alongwith an equally strong military back up presence in Kashmir.
- (b) The policy of 'courageous restraint' advocated by Gen McChrystal is actually prevalent in Kashmir unlike what was practiced in Afghanistan.
- (c) There is no invading army in Kashmir.
- (d) The magnitude of India's infrastructural development in Kashmir can be gauged from the following <sup>[40]</sup>:-

(i) **Per capita Assistance.** In 1992-93 the per capita assistance to other states was Rs 576.24 and Rs 1,1137/- in 2000-200. For Kashmiri it was Rs 3,197/- and Rs 8,092/- in the same time duration.

(ii) **Pers Below Poverty Line.** In the year 1980, people living below the poverty line in Kashmir were 24.24% which dropped to 3.48% in next 20 years. The current national average for people living below poverty line in rest of India is 26.10%.

(iii) **Loans and Grants.** J&K gets 90% of the money as a grant and 10% as a loan. For rest of India, it is 70% as loan and 30% as a grant.

(iv) **Contribution to GDP.** In the year 2001, the GDP of India was \$494 Billion. In this GDP the contribution from Kashmir Valley was less than 1%.

(v) **Grants.** The GOI provided a monetary grant of Rs.35, 571/- crores to J&K between the year 1990 to 2002 and Rs 38,156/- crores between 2003 and 2008.

(vi) **State Expenditure.** In the year 2000-2001 the state spent Rs 7,516.6/- crores of which Rs 4,577/- crores or 60% of the money came from Central Government.

(vi) **Development Projects.** The Central Government has funded a sum of Rs 25,000/- crores for development projects in the valley. Excluding this, the state receives grants from the Centre amounting to Rs 1, 51, 321/- crores. This amount **excludes** the expenditure done on railways, roads and power projects.

(viii) **Annual income.** Jammu & Kashmir's annual income is Rs 6,500/- crores while the State's annual liability on staff salaries is Rs 13,500/- crore. The annual income of the state is way behind the salaries of the State, forcing it to be totally dependent on financial assistance from the Central Government.

52. Prior to drawing any conclusions for Kashmir, it is essential to summarize few ground realities which have emerged so far:-

- (a) Taliban is bound to come in power sooner or later in Afghanistan.
- (b) India since beginning has associated itself with Northern Alliance which has always been at war with Taliban.
- (c) Pakistan has more the 15 years of ties with Taliban; ties which has withstood the pressure of super powers.
- (d) For Taliban it is payback time towards Pakistan. Any peaceful expectations from Taliban by India are unlikely to bear results.

### **Way Forward.**

53. The hard reality is that terrorism is an inevitable feature of global change where all the countries of the world have it as an ongoing issue. Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert reasons that terrorism is fundamentally a challenge to be managed not solved. He further elaborates that 'waging war' against terror might be an incorrect assumption because it is a war which cannot be won. Therefore, striving for zero terrorist attacks is like expecting zero unemployment for economy; hence realistic goals with long term strategy needs to be formed which is achievable and not prone to knee jerk reaction.

54. Be it the McChrystal Afghan policy of **Clear-Hold-Build** which focused on delivering aid and building local relationships or Petraeus Iraqi policy of **striving for slow reduction of violence as reintegration ‘works its way upward’** or even the Canadians **3-D strategy of Defense, Diplomacy and Development**; all of these strategies had infrastructural development as main proponent of their CI campaign. All of them to large extent failed due to one single aspect; **implementation**. McChrystal never got his 80,000 for creating secure environment, a prerequisite for implementing his policy, Petraeus formulated his policy but implemented it in an entirely opposite fashion by unleashing lethality which proved to be counterproductive and finally the 3D policy also sank because the Canadians could never secure the southern provinces for the policy to be implemented.

55. In case of Kashmir, India has all the three components in place, it has a functional state police, sound civil administration and a strong resilient Army. India in its history of involvement in Kashmir has followed the policy of restraint even at the incurring heavy cost in body bags of its civilian officials as well those in uniform. The amiable Central government has always been willing to take any step for Kashmir’s development. No other state of India has received attention as Kashmir, yet it remains restless.

56. **DeRadicalizing Kashmir**. While Army continues to play its role effectively of eliminating terrorists local or otherwise, the main productive organ of such terror groups remains at large. The retrogression of the radicalization process set in motion by Islamic organizations like Jammāt-e-Islami is what needs to be addressed. They are the main terrorist producing agencies which are indoctrinating and propping up the youth to the path of violence. In such situations where high level of religious fervor is being maintained, the anti terrorist operations get negated as the cycle of **‘production and elimination’** continues unabated. These religious institutions need to be dismantled for any possibility of normalcy in the state. While it is well appreciated that machination for reducing

the radicalization process already set in motion is not easy to process, however, **only two instruments of power can be relied to counter it; blocking the terror funding of such institutions and heavy involvement of intelligence services to counter the religious ministrations.**

57. **Merging with Mainstream.** While most of the insurgencies or terrorists have continued due to either high handedness of security forces or lack of infrastructural development funds to wean them away, however, in case of Kashmir the situation refuses to improve in spite of restraint and colossal funding which probably makes it a unique case of terrorism aggravated due to **‘problem of plenty’**. Probably the **‘policy of appeasement’ which keeps the people of Kashmir Valley insulated and sheltered from harsh reality and in a time warp needs to be reviewed. ‘subsidized way of living’ needs to be replaced with ‘working for a living’ in Kashmir.**

58. Pakistan under the pressure of China due to the coming of CPEC has passed the ‘Gilgit–Baltistan Order’ of 21 May 2018, thereby paving way for making it a fifth province<sup>[41]</sup>. While Pakistan with its global standing might still be having some pressure to rethink its strategy of merger but India with its might both internationally and within state can abolish the long outstanding irritant; Article 370. For the state to break away from terrorism it needs to create a path of merger with the remaining country and it can only come about by abolition of Article 370. The urgency for such abolition need to be in sync with the fast developing situation in Afghanistan because if there is large influx of foreign terrorists in Kashmir even this step would be a delayed one and will have little impact on the situation.

59. **Administrative Reforms.** The other important factor is the implementation and monitoring factor between allocation of funds and it reaching the target audience. There seems to be, maybe due to nepotism or corruption or the threat of terrorist which might be the reason for a disconnect between



'intent of funds release' and 'its reaching the grassroots level'. The monitoring set up in Kashmir needs to be assessed and incase if required be revamped so that deliverance of development is ensured.

## CONCUSION

**'Oh Ye Muslims, Our Allah isone,  
Our prophet is one and our Quran isone'  
Therefore, Our Voice and Country MUST BE ONE**

**MA Jinnah  
Address at Dalgate, Srinagar  
May, 1944**

60. Strategy of providing '**Additional funds - Additional troops**' to resolve Kashmir issue has been persued by us for decades. A strategy which just does not seem to be working. We are victims of our own experiences and try to follow the approach that of our as predecissors without realising that neither past experience nor history can provide us with what we seek. All it can provide is a vast array of examples which illustrate general principles. The British set out to invade Afghanistan with a mindset with which they had conquered India. What held good for India failed miserably for Afghanistan. Though the British **possessed the means and the capability but what they lacked was an ability to change their approach and mindset**. As a result they lost both the times.

61. Gen Claude Wade, the first one to '**force the Khyber**' wrote to the Governor General to reconsider his strategy prior to venturing in Afghanistan in 1839. His prophetic advise to the Governor General is very much applicable even today, he wrote:

**'There is nothing more to be dreaded or guarded against, I think, than the overweening confidence with which we are too often accustomed to regard the excellence of our own institutions, and the anxiety that we display to**

**introduce them in new and untried soils. Such interference will always lead to acrimonious disputes, if not a violent reaction'**

***Sir Claude Wade to the Governor General,  
31 Jan 1839, BL Broughton Papers***

62. To counter diabolical intentions of a dysfunctional state like Pakistan we need a strategy which addresses core issues and outpaces and outclasses all mis intentions directed towards Kahmir.

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