

CENTRE FOR JOINT WARFARE STUDIES



CENJOWS

RTD ON COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER

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BY

SHRI R CHARNDRASHEKHAR

WELCOME ADDRESS AND OPENING REMARKS

BY

LT GEN VINOD BHATIA, PVSM, AVSM, SM (RETD)
DIRECTOR CENJOWS

Welcoming participants and attendees, Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia, Director CENJOWS expressed happiness that the TRD was being held under the auspices of the MOU between CENJOWS and SNU. Emphasising the imperative to study China.

On the aspect of CNP, Lt Gen Bhatia raised the issue of whether it was National Interests that drove CNP or the other way around. Quoting examples from history when small nations such as England, Portugal, Spain and France had wielded enormous power as has been subsequently done by the USA and Russia as also the Chinese and to an extent, even India, which is a responsible rising power to suggest that there are lessons to be learnt from history.

On CNP itself, he raised the aspect of why we need CNP at all, considering that we already have soft power, hard power smart power and / or various combinations of these. CNP itself is often taken as DIME +2,

DIMI=3, DIME+4 and there are add-ons. India too has a lot of these powers but somehow it does not work.

The objective, he added, is not just protecting national interests but also enforcing your will in your area of interests. Ideally, we would like a friendly neighbourhood with friendly Governments, but if they are not friendly, what do we do about it? How do we use soft power, or hard power or smart power?

At the global geo-strategic plane, India is doing well. We have strategic partnerships with 32 nations, but we are not doing well at all in the neighbourhood. Our 'Neighbourhood first' policy is in tatters.

Where does CNP come into play when we can do so well in the strategic relations with the US, with Russia, China and we do a balancing act between them. But when it comes to our neighbourhood, we are lacking in CNP.

Do we have synergy amongst all elements of national power? Do we have structures and systems in place to synergise all these elements? Mentioning the example of India's borders, he added that there are major stake holders. As many as three central ministries are involved – the MEA to delineate and demarcate the borders, the MHA for border management and the MOD who have a direct responsibility for unsettled borders. There are in addition the governments of the various states with as many as 19 states having international borders.

The Constitution stipulates the Govt to ensure the territorial integrity of India and that objective has to be safeguarded. There is no need to be apologetic about India, which is the largest democracy in the world, the 2nd largest population, the 4th largest economy, the 2nd largest Army and the 4th largest armed forces, the 4th largest economy and the 6th largest natural resources and the 7th largest real estate.

We have the culture to look down upon ourselves – a legacy left of the British raj days. India also did not lack the politico-military will when the occasion demanded. Whether in 1947 to push out the raiders, the accession of J&K, the 1962, 65 and the 721 ops, the PNE in 1974, the Sri Lanka and Maldives ops, the will was always shown.

In 1947, when we got independence, Germany and Japan were completely destroyed, yet they rose to be great economic powers. Somehow, we could not replicate their growth curves. We have now caught up.

We need to understand CNP and fore which we have an eminent panel comprising of Prof Siddharth, Brig HS Cheema, Dr Atul Mishra, Brig Rajiv Bhutani and Prof. Partho Chatterjee and look forward to an enriching discussion.

Talk by Prof SiddharthMallavarapu, Professor of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University

Commencing by expressing gratitude to CENJOWS for the collaborative effort, he wished to flag a few dimensions looking at it as student of international relations as to what are elements relation to national power that we ned to focus on.

On the notion of power itself, there have been a legacy and a good body of work in social sciences thinking about power.

The first dimension of power was effectively getting people to do things that they would otherwise not do. Power was viewed in terms of its exercise or application. The second generation of research looked at power more in terms of ts mobilisation, in successfully mobilising resources or successfully legitimising certain moves. The third generation looks at power not so much as bereft of values but intrinsically a contested concept and value laden and there are interesting pieces of work that seek to understand, theoretically as well as empirically.

Referring to the book 'Power in Global Governance' (*edited by Michael N. Barnett, Cambridge University Press, 2009*), and looking at power generically within the spheres of international issues, there are four idioms of Power.

- Notion of compulsory power – a more direct form of power which is quickly recognised. A powerful state in the international sphere almost dictates sometimes to a weaker player.
- Notion of institutionalpower. Institutional design which allows certain players to have greater say in how decisions are made – eg. Treaty outcomes, who decides, why these are decided to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others. Is there something in the design of institution itself that privileges certain players?
- The notion of structural power. Where the politico-economic relations are structured ina certain way. Power is exercised

through dominant patterns of economic organisations round the world.

- Notion of power as productive power. Tethered to the very notion of power. How does power help us frame certain notions in a particular way? By example, take the concept of modernisation. Is there a dominant conception of what modernisation means? What development means? There is power involved in defining certain elements. To take these definitions as granted and adopted is itself an index of power. We don't contest it and take them as given definitions. Hinges on definition, conception and the ability to frame the way we look at a particular issue.

In the context of India, one may wish to ask as to how the policy menu constructed? How are policies pursued once they are decided to be the most desirable policies? How are they legitimated and eventually how are they sustained over a period of time so that we have some continuity once we've decided that this is the best way. So, power is built around the narrative of how we view power itself and how we view questions of security understood in terms of what is important in our own vision. Its realisation depends on the instruments used to bolster that possibility.

Another way is to look a debate in the larger sphere of international security. In the post-cold war world, there was a lot of interest in widening our notion of what is security. There were a whole set of debates around what is traditional security (about the security of state itself) and what are non-traditional concepts of security (issues like the environment, energy, food security, potable drinking water,

There were some who argued that we should stick to the traditional concept of security. If there has to be a nucleus around which security has to be defined, there have to be some core postulates. The 'wideners' who argue we must have a broader concept of security arguing that the other issues are not unrelated and concern the overall wellbeing of the state and the citizenry within that state.

There is no one size fits all approach. Some argue that the old paradigms that define security need to be revisited in the context of a fast changing world. Part of the challenge for students of international relations is to keep pace with real world developments to understand and explain what is going on within a particular sphere.

There is also a recognition that institutions matter. Prof. Siddharth referred to the book 'How India manages its national Security' by Arvind Gupta who makes two claims which are important to think about.

- First, (and to what Gen Bhatia had earlier referred) – about creating a fair synergy between departments and bureaucracy to forge a clear security policy. There is urgency on this as there is an interconnection between different elements.
- Second, is the aspect of Institutional design – the requirement for a coherent framework that allows for security policies to be followed with rigour without losing too much time to act. Concern is on bureaucratic arrangements, institutional environments.

There are certain notions that are worth thinking about in the realm of national security:-

- Does the normative dimension always involve trade-offs? Such as the guns and butter predicament? Need to allocate resources in a manner that optimises the use of these resources to meet our strategic interests and our security purposes.
- We need to give some thought to institutions associated with security and bring various orgs like the MEA, the MOD etc under a framework that allows them to build synergies when they are both working towards the same goal of national interest.
- Forging coalitions – both internally and externally.
- Strategic community small but there are a while set of issues to deal with and make sense of the information coming from very diverse sources.

Two other issues worthy of consideration are:

- State capacity – when we need to translate into tangible and real, it also builds on state capacity – fund raising, legitimacy and right to rule, monopoly over the use of force
- CMR and institutions and integration

Albert O. Hirschman (*author of several books on Political Economy and Political Ideology*) has viewed paradigms to be sometimes a hinderance to understanding. Too clear a template and too clear a model of how things work we may be missing something fundamental and therefore we must have some room for revisiting our conceptions for what we treat as sacrosanct and what we treat as worthwhile.

In conclusion, Prof. Siddharth emphasised that the US had the advantage of Security knowledge producers who resource knowledge that is relevant and worthwhile for anyone formulating policy relating to national Security. We need to strengthen our own pool of security knowledge producers within our complex democratic space.

Presentation on ‘Understanding ‘Comprehensive National Power’

By
Brig HS Cheema, Senior Fellow, CENJOWS

There is a requirement to delve on the concept and ingredients of CNP, on how the West and the Chinese have defined CNP and eventually how the Arthashastra defines it and emphasised the need to revisit our scriptures to understand this phenomenon.

The 21st century, has seen economic globalization resulting into integration of the world economy at the same time there is also competition among/between countries, especially that among big powers. International competition is dynamic in nature and depends how a nation utilizes its strategic resources. They often come into conflict with one another and are locked in contention while being, in a complex way, interdependent and interconnected.

In the development process, which is quite out of balance, some countries have grown in national power while others are losing relatively. It is those changes that have brought about significant changes to the pattern of the world. The status (or position) of a country in the international community is in essence associated with the rise and fall of its national power, the increase and decrease of its strategic resources.

The Concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP)

CNP is a concept that is based on the contemporary political thought of the PRC and refers to the general power of a nation-state. Calculating CNP can aid a nation not just for war but also to ***“coordinate a political and diplomatic offensive, to psychologically disintegrate the enemy forces and subdue them.”*** According to the Chinese Politician Yuan Chunqing.

CNP can be calculated numerically and there are a number of indices, which combine various quantitatively indices to create a single number to measure the power of a nation-state. These indices take into account both military factors (known as hard power) and economic and cultural factors (known as soft power).

CNP generally means the sum total of the powers or strengths of a country in economy, military affairs, science & technology, education and resources and its influence (*China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, 2000*). More abstractly, it refers to the combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of a sovereign state, including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as well. (*Huang Shuofeng, 1999*).

Foreign scholars usually use National Power in its specific sense, that is, *“the strategic capabilities by which a sovereign state uses its overall resources to influence others.”* (*Ashley Telis et al, 2000*).

There is no unified definition or method of computation with regard to CNP or national power of a country. CNP may be simply defined as the comprehensive capabilities of a country to pursue its strategic objectives by taking actions internationally and the core factors to the concept are strategic resources, strategic capabilities and strategic outcomes, with the strategic resources as the material base.

The Components of CNP

Michael Eugene Porter (*an American academic known for his theories on economics, business strategy, and social causes. He is the Bishop William Lawrence University Professor at Harvard Business School*) lists five major resources: - Physical resources, Human resources, Infrastructure, Knowledge resources and Capital resources. The national strategic resources are divided into eight categories, with 23 indicators. Those categories constitute CNP.

Economic Resources

These are measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is the sum of the gross values added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

GDP is calculated on the basis of nominal exchange rate which method often underestimates the economic power of developing countries but overestimates the economic power of developed countries.

The other method to calculate is on the basis of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The international comparison project recommended by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) takes 1993 as the

base and calculates the gross national product (GNP) of 118 countries and uses PPP to estimate the value of the international dollar per capita GNP and per capita GDP.

Human Capital

The opportunities and capabilities of education, is regarded as the decisive factor in the process of economic growth. Human capital is expressed in the number of years of education received by a population. The more the number of years of education received, the more skilful the workers and the higher the labour productivity to stimulate economic growth. The number of working-aged people- people aged 15-64. Average number of years of education received by people over 15. constitute the total human capital of a country.

Human Resource is accordingly defined as the multiplication of labour forces and the average number of years of education received by the population. Labour forces conform to the definition by the International Labour Organization, that is, people of economic vitality.

Natural Resources

Natural resources refer to the abundance, quality, reachability and costs of major natural resources. These are the necessary conditions for economic development, but they are limited or the conditions or upper limits for restricting economic growth.

There are four major indicators of natural resources:

- Arable land.
- Annual fresh water withdrawals refer to total water withdrawal, not counting evaporation losses.
- Commercial energy use referring to apparent consumption, which is equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport.
- Electricity production measured at the terminals of all alternator sets in a station. In addition to hydropower, coal, oil, gas, and nuclear power generation, it covers generation by geothermal, solar, wind, and tide and wave energy, as well as that from combustible renewable and waste.

Capital Resources

As per Michael Porter, capital resources include three major indicators:

- Gross domestic investment.
- Foreign direct investment (FDI).
- Market capitalization (also known as market value).

Knowledge and Technology Resources

Most important strategic resources and with the inset of the knowledge and information society, the importance is growing daily. Knowledge & technology resources include five major indicators:

- Scientific and technical journal articles refer to scientific and engineering articles published by about 4,800 international academic publications.
- Patent applications by residents of a country. It reflects the technology innovation capability of country.
- Personal computers. It reflects the capabilities of applying new technologies of a country.
- Internet hosts, i.e., computers with active internet protocol (IP) addresses connected to internet. All hosts without a country's code identification are assumed to be located in the US. It reflects the capabilities of a country in spreading information.

Government spending on R&D, that is, the potential knowledge and technology innovation capabilities of a country in a long run.

Military Resources

Military Power reflects the abilities of a country in maintaining social stability and stops separatism and also reflects the external power for seeking the maximization of interests abroad. In the view of Ashley Tellis, *"Military power is also a kind of "output" of the national power. It is an important strategic asset, because military power is not only an explicit function of CNP but also an expressive function of the will of a state"*.

Military resources too have two major categories of indicators:

- Military expenditures cover military-related expenditures of the Defence Ministry (including recruiting, training, construction, and the purchase of military supplies and equipment) and other ministries are excluded.
- Armed Forces personnel refer to duty military personal, including paramilitary forces if those forces resemble regular units in their organization, equipment, training, or mission.

International Resources

They include four categories of indicators:

- The volume of exports and services.
- The volume of imports and services.
- Royalty and license fees receipts.
- Royalty and license fees payments. They are receipts or payment between residents and non-residents for the authorized use of intangible, non-produced, non-financial assets and proprietary rights.

Measuring Comprehensive National Power

The Western Method

Klaus E. Knorr (*Author of Power and Wealth - The Political Economy of International Power*) defined National Power as "Power that includes economic capabilities, administrative competitiveness and the ability of war mobilization".

In 1960 Clifford German, produced a world power index that took the following form:

$$G = N (\text{National Power}) = N (L + P + I + M)$$

(Where N stands for nuclear capability, L stands for territory, P stands for population, I stands for the industrial base, and M stands for military size. This is a national power equation centring round nuclear capabilities. The national power is in direct proportion to nuclear capability).

In 1965 Wilhelm Fucks sought to derive national power from three summational variables - population size (P), energy production (Z), and steel production (Z1)—arranged in one of nine formulas for measuring the national power (M), all of which were variants of one another and took the form:

$$M = (P^2) \times Z$$

$$M = (P^{3/2}) \times Z1$$

(The equation is based on the traditional resources in the era of industrialization. The strategic objectives are to obtain more energy in the world and to raise the industrial productivity).

In 1975 Ray Cline's national power equation (Ray Cline, 1975):

$$P = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$$

(where C stands for population and territory, E stands for economic capacity, M stands for Military capacity (including the strategic balance plus combat capabilities and a bonus for effort), S stands for the national strategy coefficient, and W stands for national will (including the level of national integration, the strength of leadership, and the relevance of strategy to the national interest).

This is a CNP formula. The first part of the equation reflects the objective strength or hard factors and the second part reflects the subjective strength or soft factors. CNP is the multiplication of the two, reflecting the attention attached by the author to soft factors. But it is difficult to calculate the soft factors.

Ashley Tellis and other scholars at the RAND hold that traditional indicators and methods are unable to reflect the national power in the information age. They have introduced their new concepts but have not produced any calculation equation or results of computing for international comparison. They focus mainly on hard powers, hence do not represent true "comprehensiveness". The core of all indices is mainly economic and military dimensions and treat "power-assessment-formulas" as 'resource containers', giving more emphasis to "material resources". It is a widely understood fact that there exist many intangible factors which play heavily on the manifestation of state-power, without which the approach to CNP would remain hollow. The soft-power, though recognised, is unduly underplayed when it comes to practical formulation vis-à-vis hard-power.

The Chinese Method

Method that evolved by the Chinese Military Academy represented by Huang Suofeng who holds that CNP should be the organic integration of capacities of survival, development and coordination, so he designed a “CNP dynamic equation”, which takes the following form:

$$P=K\times H\times S$$

(where P is CNP of a given year; K is the coordination system, including factors such as the capacities of national leaders to coordinate and unify; H is hardware, including all physical factors; S is software, including ideational ethos, intelligence and other factors).

Though the non-material resources are included in formulation, their importance is not correspondingly expressive. For example, in CASS index the weightage-coefficient of diplomacy, which is 0.07, is significantly lesser than that of economic factor which is 0.35.8. Economic and military domains form the core of the CNP concept. Many intangibles are not taken into account.

If seen scientifically, assessing CNP from the present capability only paints a partial picture. A genuine assessment should cater for futuristic ‘price-factor’ for present day development. This includes future challenges/negative consequences, either intended or unintended, which may stem from the present-day unbalanced growth, uneven development, environmental degradation, and political environment. In case of China, this argument gets more pronounced.

It is evident that the Chinese indices are more or less designed to fit China’s advantage, not surprisingly elevating China’s position in the CNP merit. This narrative is hugely being supported by the Chinese leadership.

The question of quality versus quantity has not been factored as a determining factor. Assessing CNP quantitatively alone would remain a half-truth. A true power assessment deserves both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Kautilya’s Saptanga Model

Kautliya speaks of seven constituent elements of state, called seven Prakritis. Their sum total manifests in “power” of a state. The components in descending order of importance are:-

<i>Swamin</i>	-	The Ruler
<i>Amatya</i>	-	Councillors.
<i>Janapada</i>	-	The territory/ resources.
<i>Durga</i>	-	Forts.
<i>Kosa</i>	-	Treasury.
<i>Bala</i>	-	Army.
<i>Mitra</i>	-	Friend / Ally

The word ‘*Sapta*’ means seven, and ‘*anga*’ means body parts. *Saptanga* therefore means seven body parts. As an analogy, a state can be considered as a growing organism, and the above *Prakritis* as its body parts. All seven body parts are essential for holistic growth of state.

Kautilya assigned priorities to them with leadership at the top: thus, *Kosa* is more important than *Bala*, *Durg* more important than *Kosa*, *Janapada* more important than *Durg*, and *Swamin* is the most important *Prakriti* for manifestation of power. Each preceding *Prakriti* is not only more important but also strengthens the latter; if one rots, it rots the latter doubly. Hierarchical interaction determines sound and cumulative health of *Prakritis* and their “Power”.

The Three Shakti(s)

The Seven *Prakritis* together manifest into *Shakti* of state. *Arthashastra* identifies three *Shaktis*:

Prabhava-Shakti - power to generate “effects” like Hard Power and encompasses economy and military power.

Mantra-Shakti- the power to influence, counsel, and induce co-opting (such as Soft Power) and incorporates diplomacy.

Utsaha-Shakti-representing the personal power of the leader which provides drive, energy, and direction to other six *prakritis*.

Kautilya rates *Mantra-Shakti* as the most important of the three and that the three powers interact “qualitatively” to produce *CNP*.

Vyasanans

For qualitative analysis, *Arthashastra* outlines two parameters: “*Sampator* Excellences” and “*Vyasanans* or *Vices*” of each *Prakriti*. His construct is pragmatic as on one hand, he defined the “excellences”, on the

other, he cautioned the king about the *Vyasana(s)*: vices/calamity or nemesis of each *Prakriti*. A leader should be vigilant in foreseeing, averting and overcoming *Vyasanas* to decay of the “organic-body”. Priority of *Vyasanas* is same as that of *Prakritis*: that means to save Treasury before Army; Resources before Fortifications; and the ruler before all.

Kautilya compares the king as “head” of the body. If the king is weak, the enemy will find it easier to intrigue against the state. Cumulatively, “*Prakritis*”, “*Sampat*”, “*Vyasanas*” and “*Shakti*” manifest into CNP through Kautilyan lens.

Shadgunya– The six fold Foreign Policy

The Arthashastra rationally determines which of the six foreign policies a state should adopt for peaceful growth. *Mandala* (the international relations) remains in eternal flux, it changes dynamically, producing opportunities for some states, while exposing others.

The “power equation” among the states keeps fluctuating: foes become allies, allies become foes; fluidity is ubiquitous. To exploit this fluidity, Kautilya introduces the “*Shadgunyas*”, and decrees that “He who sees the six measures of policy as being interdependent in this manner, plays, as he pleases, with the rival kings tied by the chains of his intellect.”

Sandhi (“making peace”), *Vigraha* (“hostilities”), *Asana* (“remaining stationary”), *Yana* (“marching/preparing for war”), *Samshraya* (“seeking protection/coalitions”), and *Dvaidibhava* (“dual policy” or “collaboration-cum-competition”). It is truly comprehensive in approach giving due weightage to non-material and material factors. Interactive inclusion of “*Prakritis*”, “*Sampat*”, “*Vyasanas*” and “*Shakti*” make it more holistic an approach.

It does not treat power as a “resource-container” (western thought). It establishes relative hierarchy of the seven constituent-elements of state and yet make them interactive with capability to augment/decay other “*Prakritis*”. It caters for “qualitative” analysis of constituents for CNP determination through “Excellences” and “Vices”.

Unlike the Chinese approach, Kautilya’s construct goes beyond mere inclusion of non-material constituents, but also gives greater weightage to them. It identifies *Mantra-Shakti* as the strongest power component amongst all forms of power. It recognises *Mitra* as an inherent constituent element of power determination matrix of a state, which is a unique argument in itself. It assigns “leadership” the highest priority in seven *Prakritis*.

Talk on “Power in International Affairs”
by
Dr Atul Mishra, Shiv Nadar University

Mentioning that he taught a course on Power, he added that when the student of power meets the practitioners, rather the constituents of power, it is the student who must listen to what the latter’s understanding of power is. He intended to Share notes from the course in three areas – the basic conceptual dimensions of power; How some elements of power politics have been framed in international relations; and Power in the context of India and specifically the power of India’s promise.

Key Propositions regarding the Conceptual Dimensions of Power

Dr Atul Mishra expounded four key propositions regard to the conceptual dimensions of power, which he considered could be controversial.

First, according to him, it not too helpful in getting too bogged down regarding definitional quibbles about power – because power, as also emphasised by Siddharth is an essentially contested concept. In social sciences, any proposition which is contested will not have a reasonably stable definition. The definition one works with depends on the purpose to which one is applying the concept. And beyond a point a discussion on the definition itself would really not be productive.

Second, the understanding of power does not involve a high degree of enumeration of the resources that constitute power – power is not something that is necessarily amenable to quantitative analysis. The reason I say so is that when we reduce power to competitive terms, we reduce power to resources. Resources are no doubt the elements of power but it’s the resources plus the X factor that establishes whether power is present or absent. So there are limitations to the enumerative measurement exercises relating to the exercise of power.

The third proposition, which comes up repeatedly during the course is that we think of power generally as ‘power over’. Referring to Prof Siddharth’s mentioning the definition of power which comes from Robert Dahl. **If A has power over B if A can get B to do what B would otherwise not do.**

Within the literature on power we have complemented the idea of ‘power over’ with ‘power to’. So ‘power over’ captures, encapsulates, comprises the controlling, the dominating, the coercive elements of power, but ‘power to’ talks about the cooperating, the productive and essentially the

positive dimensions of power. So I could have power over you or you could have power over me or we could have power to do things. That's the conceptual innovation which has been brought about in the literature on power. The philosopher who brings this to fore in the starkest manner is named Hannah Arendt in a book 'On Violence' where she introduces this idea of 'power to' alongside 'power over'.

Power and Morality

Propose three 'framings' of the relationship between power and morality. All who have pondered the question of power would have realised that at some level, there is a relationship that is at work. The demands of power politics and the commands of moral framework do not necessarily overlap all the time. What is the relationship that exists between the two?

Three framings that have been offered in the literature on power.

- Power politics is considered an immoral activity being violative of everyday moral frameworks. Power politics demands killing people, moral commands say don't kill people, so power politics is an immoral activity. Quoting from the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War in which the Melians are appealing to the Athenian's sense of justice to which the Athenians say that the question of justice as such does not arise because this is power politics. The Melian's stance at that point of time is essentially that of those who believe that power politics is essentially immoral. This has also been the position of Gandhi who has emphasised that power politics is immoral and we should make our choices in International Relations.
- The second relationship between morality and power, which is slightly nuanced and seductive relationship is the one that Machiavelli gives which is that power and morals are two dimensions of human activity. They are related but essentially different from each other. The difference being that when we indulge in power politics, we are engaged with questions of success, or failure. But when we are dealing with moral frameworks, it is about what is right and what is wrong which in itself will depend upon what results in a success or a failure. We are onto two different domains and therefore power politics is not immoral, it is amoral. This essentially Machiavellian idea is nuanced in the 20th century by the American philosopher Hans Morgenthau who says is that there are moral consequences of

power political actions and therefore there is a tension between power politics and moral commands.

- The third proposition regarding the relations of power and morality is the one articulated by Reinhold Niebuhr (*in his book 'Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics' published in 1932*) where he says that power politics is not immoral or amoral but is 'differently moral'. There is a set of moral frameworks that govern power politics and so long as a practitioner of power abides by the purpose of power. As long as it is associated with a larger public purpose, there is a case for association of morality to power politics.

Power in International Relations

The standard refrain is that the essential characteristic of international affairs is power politics. Why does power politics exist? Why is the international arena marked fundamentally by power politics?

Of those who have given answers, the most robust of the answers belong to the realist camp who boil down to two elements. They say that we do have power politics in the international arena because states are led by statesmen who are driven by the essential laws to compete and a desire to dominate, which is a part of all human endeavour. So, when human beings come into the leadership position and they act on behalf of their states, they end up acting in an aggressive manner and therefore you have power politics.

The second explanation is that there is power politics because there is nothing to prevent power politics, which is to state that there is no higher level of authority above that of the states. In other words, anarchy – which, in the absence of world government creates this peculiar situation where each state has to look out for itself. There is no 9/11 type situation to take recourse to and because each state has a sense of insecurity in regard to all the others each seeks to enhance its power. It is therefore in the nature of international relations that states indulge in power politics.

If that is the case and if anarchy or human nature are responsible for why there is power politics? We cannot wish away power politics because, if it's due to human nature, we cannot change human nature and if it is anarchy, the only condition under which anarchy will disappear is if you have world government, which will not come about due to very complex reasons.

Managing Power Politics

Hence, how do we go about managing power politics? We do so by establishing what is called the 'balance of power'. Balances, as such, can be stable or they can be unstable. There are some conditions under which balances are products of diplomacy and some conditions they are products of conflict and war. We would not know what sort of balance exists between for example US and China currently – all of it is speculation unless there is a conflict in which it will become clear as to what is one country's power standing in relation to another. That's the realist framing of power politics and the conceptual way which they think of power politics internationally.

What are the responses to it – several, but for paucity of time, we focus on the dominant response that comes from the liberals or liberal institutionalists who argue that we cannot wish away power politics. One cannot wish away power politics and accept it being there but also think of doing something more ambitious which is to moderate and tame power politics and tame it enough so that the very nature of international relations. To which the realists ask as to how do we go about doing it. There are four responses suggested:

- The world is composed on human beings who have two characteristics – the faculty for emotion and the faculty to reason. If we can strengthen each one of us for the rational quality amongst us to strengthen at the cost of the passionate or emotional quality, we can possibly do something about this human nature business. How do we go about doing so – by creating modern societies that are rational and scientific that cultivates the faculty to reason over the faculty of passion.
- Create international institutions and a network of international institutions. What will they do? Form a gentle cage to check ambition and prevent states from running away from each other if conflict escalates. More benignly, this becomes a platform for socialisation. The come together and socialise and the more they socialise, the less they begin to misunderstand each other and the less they misunderstand, the greater the possibilities for cooperation.
- Importance of Trade. The more nations trade, the more interdependence happens, the more wealth circulates and the lesser the incentives for power politics.
- Make as many systems for the world liberal democratic as you can. It is empirically established that with regard to liberal democracies, that they tend to be peacefully disposed. The claim is not that they

do not go to war with each other but they tend to be peacefully disposed in their relations with each other.

Now, putting together the liberal recipe, we have a modern education that is liberal and scientific, there are a network of international institutions, we make sure that as many nations of the world as possible are locked in beneficial trade. We then would have a world that is more optimistic and presents a better view. An examination of developments in the 20th century shows how liberal democracies have gone about taming power.

Quoting the example of the US, International relations give us reasons to be cautious about an unbridled, unrestrained use of power. In the eight years of Obama's presidency he ended up restraining use of power. In the eight years preceding Obama, we had George W Bush unleashing American power around the world that created antagonisms and not possibly achieving the goals sought to be achieved. Then came Obama and he very gradually restrains America. One of the central aspects of power is to learn to restrain. Just because we have resources does not mean that we necessarily got to use them and second, the mere possession of power is no guarantee to success. The starkest example of this is the Afghan war. You do not get victory in the Afghan war regardless of the imbalance of power.

India's 'Power of Promise'

The minimalist version is that it is only in the past two decades that India has started speaking the language of power. Till then we relied more on the power of language. For the first four decades of our existence as a sovereign state we seemed to be cagey about our power. Another way of putting it is that we almost had a moral disgust to power politics. So, we turned our backs to that dimension of international affairs. Narratives are powerful and sometimes its useful to nuance some narratives.

- If indeed it is the case that India turned its back to power politics, then what explains the very subtle changes India made to changing power alignments during the first four decades of its foreign policy. To say that India did not pursue hard power is not to say that India was not a student of international power politics. We read international situations to our advantage quite significantly and one objective of that was that we did not want to get entangled in power politics. It is not that we were in disgust over power politics as such but that we did not want to get caught into power politics. We were however reading international power dynamics closely.

- The assessment was that we did not necessarily have to pursue overwhelming amounts of hard power in order to guarantee security. Once the aftermath of the partition problem was addressed, there was indeed no mortal threat to India's security. The belief seemed to be that whatever excessive security India required, its diplomacy would somehow gain that for India as and when necessity arose. Hence it is not fair to view India's engagement with power politics in such crude and ungenerous terms.

Over the past two decades, we have invested substantially in augmenting our hard power capability, economic abilities included. While this is welcome, a question arises before us which is that once we start speaking the language of Power, what is the purpose to which we commit our power? It's a question to which answers at the moment seem to be open.

With regard to power politics per se, there are some propositions to be made. Expressing discomfort with the proposal made in certain quarters that we need to augment our military power to the extent that we are for example able to match up to that of the Chinese. Prof Bharat Karnad makes this argument to great lengths, but is sceptical on this as they do not necessarily fit in with our grand strategic goals, which are: internal development and internal security. If we can continue to improve the lives of our citizens and ensure that our borders are secure and our investments internationally are secure, we are fine.

Both these elements do not require us to rat race with the Chinese. Some combination of diplomacy at the forefront backed up by our incredible Armed Forces would be the best way to speak the language as far as power is concerned. Diplomacy at the forefront and make diplomats feel comfortable to go ahead and do their job. The utility of a military first approach is not clear.

Those who would have taken interest in the anti-colonial discourse that marked us between 1910s and the 40s and which was an argument for seeking independence was that a free India would be a boon for the world. It has great potential and great promise and by virtue of its freedom and by virtue of what it would do to its own citizens and its own share of humanity, it would be a power of great significance to world generally.

Fast forward to the period of 2005-08 when we are negotiating the nuclear deal with the Americans and what are the arguments we are putting forth – make this exception for us, give us access to nuclear commerce because we got the potential to be the force of stability internationally. It is

fascinating as it shows there is something different about India regarding the question of power. This that one of the great assets of India is the promise of its potential and the promise of its influence over world affairs. Hence the argument is that if you can do this for us, we could get the following done in the global community. This a dimension of power that I find interesting and I call it the power of India's promise.

Power Politics in the Context of India

The last point with which he sought to conclude is that the notion that liberals tend to associate with power politics in the context of India which is to say that we are thinking about the purpose of power in the Indian context of foreign policy and think about India s an exemplary power – a power that leads by example - by virtue of what India does to itself, the virtue of the performances we register domestically, we end up becoming examples for othersto follow.

This a slightly nuanced idea that that which gets captured under the 'soft power' idea -which isthat some resources of yours are so attractive that others get converted to it. Here it just what you do to yourself domestically that becomes a source for others tofollow you. – and we become an example to emulate.Four things for India to do - Manage this combination of pluralism and democracy successfully; provide human development; have a government regime that is marked by efficiency and transparency; have both traditional and non-traditional security given to ourselves. If we can have a combination of these elements in place and we do this well domestically, we would have done a lot to augment or identity and our status as an 'exemplary power'.

Presentation on 'Leveraging Comprehensive National Power to Enhance National Security' by Brig Rajeev Bhutani Senior Fellow, CENJOWS

Commenced the presentation with a pertinent quote from Deng Xiaoping that 'In measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides" adding that Comprehensive capability of a country to pursue its strategic objectives by taking the necessary actions internationally". Comprehensive National Power is thereby the capacity of a country to pursue strategic goals or attain its strategic objectives through purposeful action

National Power

Elaborating on his perception of national Power, Brig Rajeev Bhutani stated that in his understanding, power is simply military capabilities calling for finances to manufacture, procure and purchase weapons&equipment, the capabilities of individuals who serve in the armed forces, the scientific and technologies that a nation possesses and its superiority over those of other nations, the aspect of morale, both within the Armed Forces and the nation at large. At the strategic and decision level, this includes the capabilities of its leadership.

The significant component factors of national power are hence Technology, Enterprise, Human Resources, Financial & capital resources and Physical resources. National Performance is therefore predicated on External constraints, Infrastructural capacity, Ideational resources. The Military capability of a nation is an aggregation of Strategic resources and a 'Conversion capability' that sums up to Combat proficiency.

Comprehensive National Power

Comprehensive National Power is a larger canvas that incorporates firstly, the soft, internally oriented indicators of strength e.g. Economic prosperity, Domestic cohesion and cultural influence. Second is the hard, externally oriented measures e.g. Size of a state's nuclear arsenal, Territory, Military capability, the diplomatic influence, economic influence besides International prestige. For a 'Balanced Power Profile' he emphasised that 'the Ying of economic power must be balanced with the Yang of military, political and moral heft'.

National Security

The concept of national security has been traditionally linked with political independence and territorial integrity as values to be protected; but on other occasions, other values may be further added. Harold Brown, the former American Secretary of Defence (under President Jimmy Carter - 1977-81), included in his conception of national security, the maintenance of 'economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms'. National Security therefore has an External dimension (that is affected by and in turn affects the global environment) and an Internal dimension (that transforms the resources of its society into 'Actionable knowledge'). The capacity of a country to pursue strategic goals or attain its strategic objectives through purposeful action

How Much Security?

In the words of General Jacob L. Devers (who commanded the 6th Army Group in the European Theatre during WW II), “National security is a condition which cannot be qualified. We shall either be secure, or we shall be insecure. We cannot have partial security. If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all”. Yet, in common language, we speak of varying degrees of security.

On the question ‘Security from What Threats?’ Brig Bhutani explained that Security is generally used when the nation faces particular kinds of threats – which can be internal, external or even non-traditional threats such as economic threats ideological threats and so on.

On the aspect of ‘Security by What Means and at what cost, he elaborated that that the goal of security can be pursued by a wide variety of means. National Security is defined in terms of the protection of core values, which are the interests that are pursued, notwithstanding the costs incurred. Cost always matter but it is inevitable for there to be a conflict between the goals of maintaining a large and powerful mil establishment & other goals as we compete for scarce resources which are to be allocated for different goals.

Leveraging Power

This is a term understood and used variously over the time. For example, in 1827, it was the “Power or force of a lever” whereas in 1858, it was more the “Advantage for accomplishing a purpose, power or influence”. By 1933 leveraging was more “The ability to influence a system, or an environment, in a way that multiplies the outcome of one’s efforts without a corresponding increase in the consumption of resources.”

Leveraging Power in International Politics

This is achieved by working strategically with others in a ‘clever’ way, in order to lever a bigger change than we could ever achieve on our own. It depends on developing a rich web of mutually beneficial relationships and alliances at country, regional and global levels. Leverage emerges out of that connectivity.

US-China Trade War

On the aspect of whether the ongoing trade war offers an Opportunity to India to Leverage its Economic Strength and specifically whether India benefit by reducing its Trade Deficit with China, it is pertinent to examine the

specific items of import and export to suggest that India should look to replacing China in the Low-End Manufacturing or in Supply Chain of Electronic Goods and to assist America in Designing new America-Based Value-Chains & Factories through its IT Companies. India has a Strategic Partnership with the United States that requires to be exploited to further its economic aims and aspirations. Strategic Partnership with Japan to leverage India's Economic & Military Strength and Counter China's BRI

Japan-India Collaboration in the Field of Defence, Security & Economy

India is the biggest recipient of Japanese ODA of over \$ 3 billion per annum (\$ 40 billion by 2016). The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was concluded in 2011, Japan is now the third largest source of FDI into India - \$ 4.7 billion in 2016-17 alone, which is increasing Japan-India Collaboration in the Field of Defence, Security & Economy with Japan setting up a string of Technology and Industrial parks in India. Besides, Japan is providing India extensive loans for the proposed 505 km bullet train, the Delhi Metro as also the 1500 km Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). There is also the export of Japanese US-2 Amphibious aircraft with technology transfer to India and collaborative research in UGV/robotics. Besides Japan-India Collaboration in the Field of Defence, Security & Economy, infrastructure development in collaboration with Japan in India's immediate neighbourhood, Asia-Africa growth corridor & International North-south Transport Corridor (INSTC) will wean away the influence of China and act as a counter to China's Belt and Road Initiative. Both nations are committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and both Nations look to leveraging 'Soft Power' in the Immediate Neighbourhood to Counter Chinese Influence.

Talk on "Contemporary Economic Dimensions of Power" by Dr Partho Chatterjee, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Shv Nadar University

Professor Partho Chatterjee commenced his talk by stating that it is interesting that the forum has a combination of not just academicians and practitioners of power but also includes a macro-economist like himself. Macroeconomy in the context of power and security is an interesting dimension. He added that there was very little work on economics as a dimension of power particularly in the context of India, which is surprising as we are in the process of a dramatic shift of economic focus towards to east.

‘Quantifying’ Power ‘

While Dr. Atul Mishra had said that quantification is not going to be useful in the definition of power, from an economics perspective, it is probably more useful to think of a way to quantify power even if its imperfect, or just a proxy so that it gives us an idea so that it gives us an idea as to where we are or where the country is and changes that are happening. Several people have spoken about economic power and the growth of economic power solely through GDP, but that is grossly inadequate. There is a thriving business of experts who are predicting as to whether India is the world’s fourth largest economy or the fifth and when India would cross Germany etc. Mercifully no one has predicted as to when India would cross US or for that matter, China. But GDP is inadequate as it does not capture the several components that form constituents of economic power. That is where the CNP of China, which has several components of economic power comes to fore.

Dr. Kaushik Basu (*former Chief Economist of the World Bank from 2012 to 2016 and presently the C. Marks Professor of International Studies and Professor of Economics at Cornell University*), was the Chief Economic Advisor for India, he along with some others had prepared a paper in which they had sought to quantify economic power. While CNP has 23 indicators and is much broader concept, it is also that much more difficult to compile and capture all the requisite data. Kaushik Basu came with a narrow index of economic power – Government expenditure, foreign currency reserves, production of goods and services etc. The idea was to capture the sophistication of an economy in some ways and think about economic power in that context. Though this may be grossly inadequate as anyone can see, but these are some correlations in terms of which we would like to think about economic power. Some of these indices are interesting to examine as they provide an index to the shift of power say, to see how much the clout of Asia has been increasing along with some other economies such as Brazil and South Africa.

‘GDP’ as Index of National Power

To understand the nature of economic power and what strategic policies would be useful we need to think about this change and understand why power is shifting from the West to Asia. We can even think about this in terms of a cycle commencing from 1700s and observe how GDP has risen. The share of GDP for India and China then was about 45% and along with Japan and other Asian countries, it was well above 50%. Yet by 1950s, the

share of GDP of these countries fell to below 5%. So, a huge shift had happened then which changed the distribution of economic power across the world.

What then caused that imbalance? As per Prof. Chatterjee, it was largely the industrial revolution. But if we think of the change that is happening now which Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. (*American political scientist and co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory of neoliberalism, developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. Also Assistant Secretary for Defense under President Bill Clinton*) calls Restoration of Asia, or how Asia is getting back its due after a couple of centuries or so. At the heart of this restoration is some of these technological changes, particularly lowering of transportation costs, increased connectivity and information technology. Along with a large part of the population share, these countries now have the comparative advantage. So, a confluence of technologies and other factors have enabled China and India as well as countries of SE Asia (the Asian Tigers) to grow rapidly. It is worth mentioning that we take growth as a de facto status. We in India are in that part of the globe which is experiencing high growth. But if we study the rise of humanity, it will be seen that sustained growth over a period of time, such as two decades, is rare.

The 'Drivers' of Economic Growth and the Role of MNCs

It will however be foolish to imagine that this is all government's doing. When we consider economic power therefore, it is really not only the state but also a host of non-state actors we have to think about, particularly firms or companies including the MNCs. The Governments of course had a role and if we see China or India, it was much about opening up. But the whole process of economic growth was largely driven by firms of different sizes as also interaction between firms across borders and not necessarily interactions between Govt to Govt or State to State.

A tell-tale sign of growth in economic power is the number of MNCs that are operating in that country. At one stage the whole world was covered with MNCs such as Nestle and Unilever and Glaxo Smith Kline, all from Europe. Then came GM, Coca Cola McDonald which are US based MNCs. The first of Asian MNCs came through Japan, which itself was the first country to experience this high rate of growth post WW II. While speaking of Japan, it is significant that even without military power, it had substantial power, even if it was not a super power.

The Japanese MNCs were followed by Hyundai and Samsung and LG, all from Korea. And now we are talking about Huawei, Lenovo, etc from China. From India too TCS, HCL and Infosys have emerged as globally

present and globally known. Some of these companies wield much power and have revenues exceeding the GDP of some small states.

'Data' as Future Determinant of Power

It is not just the revenues they have but also the data they control in today's complex world that gives them power. If we have to understand power in terms of conflicts, we see that there are conflicts it also conflicts between Governments and firms. Right now, the hot controversy is about large companies holding data and who gets to control the data and hold it and control the flow and who gets to see that data. That's a question of enormous security consequence. Clearly the position of the government and the firms is at variance and we have not been able to resolve the issue as yet. The conflict is therefore between motives – of profitability and of greater public good and it may not be long before governments themselves get involved. The US has access not only to data that is stored in the US but also to any data that flows through the US. So many countries would have concerns not only with data that is stored in the US but also with data flows. The vast network of communication channels such as undersea cables gives Governments access to how data is flowing through and where data is flowing through. So, conflicts may soon involve nations.

Another aspect to consider closely is that of firms in relation to sovereign power. Firms such as Google etc not only set standards but bring regulations of one country to another. An example is that of the EU Ruling on the right to be forgotten. But to implement it google perhaps has to delete data across the world. So, is it in conflict with regulations within the country, or is it beyond the scope of other nations to stop that? Those are some of the questions that we need to think about it. If it is not possible to do that, what do we do to have jurisdiction over a particular geographical area or people.

To emphasise the seriousness of such a situation, he asked to Imagine if say, Google would implement Yemeni anti-blasphemy laws and that the posts we make are henceforth to follow that standard. If the jurisdiction of a European court extends to the whole world, then who knows what else can extend to the whole world. The need therefore is to think about how to regulate inter-border entities and firms. What sort of negotiations should the government do with other governments and sign treaties with other nations? He mentioned of an ongoing case in California Courts against the 'Right to be Forgotten' ruling that extends across the world. The US too is in negotiation with the EU on matters relating to creating standards about information regulation etc. If we are not conscious on this aspect and do not safeguard our interests, 'importing' such regulations could become a strong possibility.

The 'Shifting' of Power

If we go back to the example of shift of power to Asia, there is a huge difference between the earlier example and this. In the earlier case, the shift of power was accompanied by violence with people dying. However, in the current case of shift of power to Asia, there has been no violence at all. The Chinese leaders recognised this and in 2007, Hu Jintao told the 17th Congress of the Communist party of China that China must invest more in soft power and we are all aware of their recent Belt and Road Initiative. This is a clear example of using economic power for more national power facilitating access to both military and more natural resources. So, we need to understand the balance between economic power and cultural power and soft power as components of overall power.

Aspect of Trade

In the context of trade, which Dr Atul Mishra also mentioned about, India is running a trade deficit. In case of China what has been in some ways beneficial to them has been its trade surplus, which means they buy less from the rest of the world and sell more to the rest of the world. In case of India we do the reverse. China was so far investing their surplus from trade solely in US securities and the extent of Chinese holdings of US securities is so much that several commentators have viewed it to be a potential weapon in the hands of the Chinese. If they suddenly sold their holdings of US bonds, they could cause an economic crisis, though it is not as simple as that. The Belt and Road initiative now gives them an opportunity to channel funds to different countries into infrastructure projects and help them to gain access to natural resources.

Trade, per se, has been almost primal to human nature. But trade and power became related by Mercantilism in the 16th Century. According to the Mercantile idea, trade is a zero-sum game. In trade, while one country gains, the other country loses precisely because one country runs a trade deficit and another runs a trade surplus. While this theory was discredited by later economists like Ricardo, the fear that a deficit in trade weakens power persists and lies at the root of the protectionism being practiced by the US.

One of the big aspects in today's world is the mismatch – between the fact that economics has become global but the politics, particularly that of choosing a government is still local. That has created tensions and imbalances. Hence, the local fear of losing out to global competition manifests itself when we think about this US wave of protectionism.

The US as an Economic Power

So, in the life cycle of an economic power, is the US in a decline? It is very difficult to think about the life cycle of an economic power and whether we are seeing the decline of a nation or the ascent of a nation. But one thing that we can all agree is that the US is hardly on decline. It is still one of the largest economies, it still attracts global talent, it is been growing at a fantastic rate given its size and its developed status. so, it's hardly on a decline.

He asks as to what then is the anxiety? It is about relative positions. Relative positions between US vs China and India. This is factor with enormous consequences of what we see right now in terms of the trade world.

Options for India

We in India have to be conscious of that - whether this will play to our advantage or impede our ability to gain more power and in this context, what should India do?

Insofar as the government's response, frankly, these have been confusing, rather poor. India has increased tariffs for some items in the budget a couple of months back. The question is whether this is a strategic move or whether it is in response to do something else. Some members in the Prime Minister's Economic Council have suggested this was done to stem the outflow of dollars, to prevent people from buying luxury goods. Clearly, this has worked and markets have worked and the rupee has depreciated further after that. So, we need to accept that there are limitations to what governments can do on their own even if they want. So, the global context sets certain constraints.

Should India also increase tariffs and take the route of protectionism? Will that benefit India? In Prof Chatterjee's opinion, absolutely no. In his view, the relation between economic power, or even the GDP and the trade liberalisation, trade liberalisation increases the growth rate of the country and if we look at the few countries that have experienced high growth and have transformed themselves from a poor economy to a high middle income, not necessarily a rich economy, it has always been through openness and trade that this has happened. There is no example of closed economy that has moved itself out from the poor to a richer group. Even the economic survey points this out that there is a strong correlation between the prosperity of a country and international trade.

Trade, in his view, clearly at least helps increase the size of an economy. On the other hand, if we see the regime of protectionism which

we experienced in the 1960s 70s 80s, we have seen how inefficiencies quickly build up and what that means is a rather weak country and state, leading him to conclude that protectionism even in the context of this trade war is a good idea for India and India will be well served if it espouses open trade

Observation by Director CENJOWS

An Interesting aspect is that we first had 'might is right' then we had 'money is power', then 'knowledge is power' and 'information is power', today it is 'data is power' and we do not seem to have the data.

Interventions / Questions by Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma (Retd)

For Prof Siddharth – is this subject of comprehensive national power an exercise in futility – the subject per se. because we are so siloed in our country we are so disaggregated with everyone fighting for their own turf, I think we should not talk about comprehensive national power as it only brings divisions between various organs of the government like

For Dr Chatterjee – this 3% gets spoken every day ad lib. Every one speaks of 3% of GDP that it has become fashionable – romantic so as to say. But the bureaucrat who handles the money nowadays says do not talk of 3% of GDP. But says talk about annual national income and annual national expenditure and of the annual national expenditure .17-28 % goes to defence and if we say 3% of GDP it will come to 35% of the rupee being spent for defence. S what would go to nation building if 35% of the annual income goes to defence? Would you say this argument is right or wrong.

For Dr Atul Mishra: You say that two nations with Mc Donald's would not fight wars. Do you think India and China which both have Mc Donald's would not fight a war? And you are Utopian about your last issue – India power of promise. Power of Promise? I Think 2118 is when we would perhaps realise the power of promise.

Responses by Prof Partho Chatterjee

On National Income and GDP: What the bureaucrat meant was government income and not national income as GDP is equal to national income. We had a lot of issues even measuring GDP so forget about national power, we can't even measure GDP. In some sense we have to think about the competing objectives of the government and we think about security in a broader framework not only military security – building up data

centres, building up infrastructures then there is a case for arguing that spending is actually more than what we actually see and assess if there is need to shift some of the resources towards the newer things that ought to be done if we want to increase national security.

On MNCs: Do MacDonald's prevent conflict? There is a handbook of defence economics in which there is a chapter which estimates that 1% increase in trade would mean 20% decrease in conflict. In general, we would imagine that moresophisticated the trade relationship, the self-preserving instincts will prevent a complete collapse or a warlike situation. Since we are thinking a 100 years after WW1, there is a counter-example of Britain and Germany. Before WW1 they were the largest trading partners with each other and yet that did not prevent WW1. That is in fact a worry about the current trade war between US and China – would it become larger and engulf other states and other nations? According to him, while we do think this a distant possibility, it still is a possibility.

Responses by Dr Atul Mishra

On India's 'Power of Promise': We seem to have held great promise in 1947, in the early 70s. What I was saying is that it seems peculiar to India that it manages to sell its potential and get something done. So as long as you are able to get something done, you seem to possess power. The substantive point is as to why we seem to have the potential but never seem to realise it. It's a speculation but I believe it has a lot to do with this immense domestic imperative that we have of modernising developing and governing large pool of people who regionally are unevenly economically developed in relation to each other. One caters to the needs of people in one part of the country which comes at the cost of the people in some other part of the country. Someone, therefore, is constantly missing out. This uneven development has kept us bogged down for a very long time. Add to this our extremely competitive electoral politics which creates its own pathologies and it becomes fascinating that we are constantly in crisis and we are constantly innovating – be it our institutions, our public culture, our basic democratic practices. He therefore believes it is because we have been bogged down so completely in these challenges that we don't seem to have arrived, so to speak. Further, it is a good rhetorical arsenal in the repertoire of our politicians that keeps us going as well. To conclude, talking of the discourse of new India on the anvil, the discourse is the same as a hundred years ago – new India just does not happen.

On the Grand Strategy being 'Benign': States in defence of his contention that it is the combination of those four elements – a pluralist democracy, a governance that is transparent and efficient, development that is not just of infrastructure but also of human indicators, a modicum of security for all of

us, both traditional and non-traditional. The combination of these elements if we can sustain them domestically, we present ourselves as a great exemplar power. He therefore defends a primarily inward oriented grand strategy. Development and security both our country and our citizens on various grounds remains our key priority and remains in a sense, a 'sequentialist'. He further added that the term GrandStrategy does not make much sense for us. If it has to be used, it basically means that we have to create an external environment that is conducive to you. If that means building security partnerships by all means do it. If it means developing cultural ties to make it cushy for all of us to grow, by all means do it. But all this is basically aimed at those two principal domestic goals – development and security.

On the aspect of Ethics: Immoral, differently moral, amoral – these moral notions are a function of power.

Responses and Concluding Remarks by Prof Siddharth

On the aspect of comprehensive national power being a mirage: There being so much that partisan when we conceive of comprehensive national power and whether we are lulling ourselves – there is so much tug of war and we are pulling ourselves for resources, interservice rivalries bureaucratic pathologies sometimes – these are all there

On the aspect of expediency: There is also an imperative for national survival, for state survival, there is also an imperative sometimes to connect the dots as well as you can with existing systems but if existing systems are not good enough we are almost compelled to revisit it – incrementalism, not lock stock and barrel changes (which do not happen easily).

On Reforms: We know it is very difficult bring about fundamental reforms. Bureaucratic reforms have been on the cards for very long time but it hasn't taken place in the fashion one would have imagined it to have taken place. Significant not to think of power as an end in itself but power being tethered to a vision of what we want to be. So there again, questions such as a political leadership come into play and we need to give some thought about how we should go about those specific areas. The analytical exercise of thinking about what would be in our best interests is important. And I am sure this is being done by very different bodies and agencies but the real challenge is getting together intuitional designs and combining these various pieces of the puzzle into a coherent whole. Arvind Gupta, he opined, is arguing that the NSA is toothless. Is the generalist bureaucracy delivering, or do we want a more specialist bureaucracy? Do we find other ways of skilling our bureaucrats or even how we attract better talent into the bureaucracy – these are all issues.

On MNCs: These are historical continuities, even imperial continuities. If we look China, it is said that it does not have the rhetoric of Europe but is doing exactly what Europe did in the past.

Concluding Remarks by Director CENJOWS

The National aim remains to transform India into a powerful and secure nation. Are we achieving it – No. What we need to achieve is peace and stability, which it was said, are interlinked. Are we achieving that – No. Are we optimal – No.

Yet, he wished to conclude on a positive note – everything is not wrong even if everything is not right. We are a nation which has defied everything and survived. We integrated the 542 states that existed during the Raj. We were supposed to disintegrate, in the 50s and then the 60s and the 70s and even the 80s. We are not going to disintegrate. We are here to stay. The world has realised that. No one now talks of disintegration.

We have to construct our own narrative. To say that the bureaucracy is all wrong, I will not buy that argument, but to say that they are all right also is incorrect. We are a global leader, we are a regional leader, we are a responsible power. We are seeing economic growth, we have a demographic dividend which some see to be more as a demographic disaster.

On allocations to the Defence Forces, we are not going to get 3% of GDP. It is difficult to understand why we continue to speak about that. There are national priorities which will take over.

One thing we missed talking during this afternoon's discussions was about India's geo strategic location. Pakistan has used it very intelligently and smartly over the years. We have just about started doing so, with the Indo-Pacific and theretoo, we have not done it right because for the US, IndoPacific ends somewhere else and we thought that it was somewhere else and we don't want to tell them whatthat is.

On the aspect of morality, in his view, one cannot be morally wrong and morally incorrect, especially when we talk aboutour ancient culture.We can laugh on Yoga Day and laugh at Diwali being celebratedthroughout the world but the fact is that Diwali is celebrated around the world. And this is because the world needs India and Indians. That too, he stated, is soft power.

Lt Gen Bhatia concluded with a suggestion that it would be interesting to study the Ottoman empire. How did they dominate for over 700 years? What was their National Power, how did they survive, grow and disintegrate thereafter? There are no doubt lessons to be learnt from that.